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Abstract
In this article, I provide a comparative historical account on the debate of whether corporations 
should exclusively be run by the company in the interest of shareholders, or whether managers 
should be permitted or required to take the interests of others groups (stake-holders) into account. 
The comparison focuses on the US, Germany and France and traces the debates through the most 
important formative periods of these countries’ corporate governance systems. 
It is generally assumed that shareholder primacy has a stronger following in the US and the UK than 
in Continental Europe, where the stakeholder view is thought to be more inﬂ uential. Without doubt, 
the respective political histories and cultures of these countries have inﬂ uenced this divergence. 
Without ignoring the signiﬁ cance of these factors, this article emphasizes a core issue that has so 
far been largely overlooked in comparative analysis. I argue that the respective historical debates 
exhibited important differences that can be attributed to the shareholder-manager balance of powers 
and differences in stock ownership structure across countries. Scholars in the US, Germany and 
France were therefore arguing about different issues due to different economic circumstances, 
which is why it is problematic to equate adherents of shareholder primacy or a stakeholder view of 
the ﬁ rm with their counterparts in other corporate governance systems. 
In the US, Berle and Means famously identiﬁ ed the prevalence of a strong separation of ownership 
and control in 1933. US-style dispersed ownership has always generated debates about the question 
of how to best address what is today described as an agency cost problem, but also to what extent 
managerial power is legitimate. 
By contrast, larger blocks of share ownership prevailed around 1930 in Continental Europe, as 
they still do today. Participants in the German and French debates were therefore concerned 
with issues of controlled companies and corporate groups, which undermined the power of the 
board of directors. At the same time, the comparatively strong inﬂ uence of shareholders raised 
other concerns that were rarely an issue in large US corporations, such as blockholders’ private 
beneﬁ ts of control and conﬂ icts between competing groups of shareholders that arguably harmed 
business development. Institutional theories of the corporation, which are traditionally hospitable 
to stakeholder concerns, seemed to provide a defense of the corporation against its shareholders. 
The different nature of the main issues put pro-management and pro-shareholder on different 
sides of the shareholder-stakeholder debate on the two sides of the Atlantic. In the US, reformers 
typically had the goal of limiting the power of management to the beneﬁ t of shareholders, thereby 
“taming” the large corporations, whose power was (and is) often identiﬁ ed with that of top 
management. In France and Germany, critics of the prevailing allocation of control advocated an 
institutional theory of the corporation to protect the “business in itself” in Continental Europe, and 
by proxy, its stakeholders from destructive shareholder inﬂ uence. Continental critics of the status 
quo therefore sought to limit allegedly excessive inﬂ uence of shareholders and capital on corporate 
management. 
Keywords: shareholder primacy, stakeholders, corporate theory, theory of the firm, 
Rathenau, Unternehmen an sich, interet social, codetermination
JEL Classifications: J53, K22, L22, N12, N14, P16, P52
 
Martin Gelter
Fordham University School of Law
140 West 62nd Street
New York, NY 10023
United States
phone: 646-312-8752 
e-mail: mgelter@law.fordham.edu
Fordham University
School of Law
August 2010
“Taming or Protecting the Modern Corporation? 
Shareholder - Stakeholder Debates in a Comparative Light”
 
By
MARTIN GELTER
ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR OF LAW
 
WORKING PAPER SERIES
This paper can be downloaded without charge
from the Social Science Research Network electronic library:
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1669444
MARTIN GELTER 8/19/2010 
3
Table of Contents 
1. Introduction ................................................................................4
2. What’s at stake? The underlying conflicts of interest ..............11
2.1. Powerless American shareholders? ..........................................11
2.2. The current trend towards shareholder empowerment .............16
2.3. Objections to shareholder empowerment .................................19
2.4. Vehicles of the debate: How do “legal” theories about the 
nature of the corporation matter? .......................................................25
3. Preeminent managerial power: contextualizing the historical 
US debate ...........................................................................................29
3.1. Berle, Dodd, and dispersed ownership ....................................29
3.2. The irrelevance of corporate jurisprudence .............................34
3.3. How the US differs from Germany and France .......................38
4. German block ownership and the theory of the “Unternehmen
an sich“ ..............................................................................................40
4.1. In the realm of majority shareholders ......................................41
4.2. The dark origins of German institutionalism ...........................42
4.3. Post-War reception...................................................................57
4.4. An unusual practical application: The Mannesmann case .......62
4.5. Conclusion: Institutionalism as an attempt to constrain 
shareholder power ..............................................................................66
5. French institutionalism and the “intérêt social” ......................67
5.1. The origins of the French institutional school .........................68
5.2. Institutionalism, the law, and the courts ..................................72
5.3. Dismissal ad nutum ..................................................................80
5.4. Conclusion: Another attempt to constrain shareholders through 
institutionalism ...................................................................................81
6. Emerging comparative patterns ...............................................81
6.1. A transnational history of the debate .......................................82
6.2. Defending the firm against its shareholders .............................85
6.3. Does the theory predict more recent developments .................87
7. Conclusion ...............................................................................93
TAMING OR PROTECTING THE MODERN CORPORATION?  8/19/2010 
4
“In the last seven deals that I've been involved with, there were 2.5 million 
stockholders who have made a pretax profit of 12 billion dollars. … The point is, 
ladies and gentleman, that greed, for lack of a better word, is good.” 
- Gordon Gekko in “Wall Street”1
“It is infidelity of the lord to the vassal for Siemens to ax 12000 jobs, while 
at the same time broadcasting a 20% increase in profits.” 
- Rolf Hochhuth, “McKinsey is coming”2
1. Introduction
What is, and what should the ultimate purpose of the corpora-
tion be? What goals should directors by required or permitted to pur-
sue? While there is widespread agreement that ultimately “corporate 
enterprise should be organized and operated to serve the interests of 
society as a whole”,3 there are two opposing philosophies how this 
objective can best be advanced. The majority of US corporate law 
scholars today would probably side with Gordon Gekko, the fictional 
1980s takeover artist who, like his real-life counterparts, broke up 
firms to make money for shareholders. Milton Friedman, in a 1970s 
essay, provided a succinct summary by stating that “[t]he Social Re-
sponsibility of Business is to Increase its Profits."4 According to the 
contemporary standard explanation, the maximization of long-term 
shareholder value should indeed be the goal of corporate law, whe-
reas the protection of the interests of other stakeholders such as em-
ployees, suppliers, costumers, local communities etc. should be left to 
1 WALL STREET (20th Century Fox 1987). 
2 “Untreue des Herrn gegen den Knecht ist, wenn Siemens 12 000 Stellen abbaut, 
doch zugleich eine Gewinnsteigerung um 20 Prozent ausposaunt!” (own transla-
tion). ROLF HOCHHUT, MCKINSEY KOMMT. MOLIÈRES TARTUFFE 76 (4th ed. 2004). 
3 E.g. Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate 
Law, 89 GEO. L. J. 438, 441 (2001). 
4 Milton Friedman, The social responsibility of business is to increase its profits, 
NEW YORK TIMES, SUNDAY MAGAZINE, Sept. 13, 1970, at 17. 
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contracts, or other fields of law, given that shareholders are residual 
claimants.5
The quotation from Rolf Hochhuth’s controversial 2004 play 
casts the social role of the corporation in an entirely different light: 
Like the medieval feudal lord, who was expected to protect his vas-
sals, the corporation owes a responsibility to protect its employees 
and to provide them with benefits and a secure livelihood. The broad-
er issue is that the goal of corporate activity should be to increase the 
welfare of all groups that closely interact with the firm and have an 
interest in its continuous well-being (its so-called “stakeholders”). 
The German origin of the quotation betrays that this philosophy is 
understood to enjoy a much larger following in Continental Europe 
than in the more market-oriented economies of the US and the UK.6
Nevertheless, this question has stirred debate among scholars 
and practitioners in much of the developed world. The participants of 
such debates sometimes knew about debates in other countries. In the 
US, Adolph Berle engaged in a famous exchange with Merrick Dodd 
that is typically seen as foreshadowing later shareholder-stakeholder 
discussions in 1932. Berle must have been aware of at least some 
ideas of Walther Rathenau, the forerunner of the German debate, giv-
en that he cites Rathenau in his seminal book with Gardiner Means.7
Although these debates have repeatedly been subjected to retrospec-
tive analysis by academics and policymakers in the respective coun-
tries, a true comparative understanding of the intellectual history of 
corporate law has yet to emerge. The objective of this paper is to fill 
in part of this gap and suggest a specific theory to explain differences 
between the US debate on the one hand, and the German and French 
5 Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 3, at 449. 
6 E.g. Brian R. Cheffins, The Metamorphosis of “Germany Inc.”: The Case of Ex-
ecutive Pay, 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 497, 500-501 (2001); Hansmann & Kraakman, 
supra note 3, at 443-449; Amir N. Licht, The Maximands of Corporate Gover-
nance: A Theory of Values and Cognitive Style, 29 DEL. J. CORP. L. 649, 733
(2004); Martin Gelter, The Dark Side of Shareholder Influence: Managerial Auton-
omy and Stakeholder Orientation in Comparative Corporate Governance, 50
HARV. INT’L L.J. 129, 131 (2009); Christopher M. Bruner, Power and Purpose in 
the “Anglo-American” Corporation, 50 VA. J. INT’L L. 579, 581 (2010). 
7 ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE 
PROPERTY 352 (1933). 
TAMING OR PROTECTING THE MODERN CORPORATION?  8/19/2010 
6
debates on the other. The truth that the conventional wisdom of Con-
tinental Europe is more stakeholder-oriented is debatable, despite 
frequently cited examples such as German codetermination.8 Howev-
er, the intellectual history seems to support a greater focus on share-
holder welfare in the US: Shareholder primacy seems to have had a 
larger following. 
One explanation could be that (Continental) Europeans are 
more socialistic than Americans.9 Indeed, it is often thought that 
stakeholder theories were popular among those who sought govern-
ment intervention in the economy. However, this is not an entirely 
satisfactory explanation: The US has had its fair share of political 
populism that was often directed against powerful players in corpo-
rate governance.10
The “varieties of capitalism” school of economic sociology 
provides the basis for another hypothesis. This literature distinguishes 
between liberal and coordinated market economies, with liberal ones 
relying primarily on markets and hierarchies to organize economic 
activity, and coordinated ones relying on long-term relationships.11 A 
stakeholder view of corporate law and a corresponding duty of direc-
tors could be seen as an instrument of protecting long-term relation-
ships.12 While the respective national manifestations of the debate 
were certainly influenced by cultural and economic circumstances in 
8 E.g. Klaus J. Hopt, Labor Representation on Corporate Boards: Impact and Prob-
lems for Corporate Governance and Economic Integration in Europe, 14 INT’L
REV. L. & ECON. 203, 208-209 (1994). 
9 Cf. Marco Becht & J. Bradford DeLong, Why Has There Been so Little Block 
Holding in America? in A HISTORY OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AROUND THE 
WORLD 613, 613 (Randall K. Morck ed. 2005) (citing German economist Werner 
Sombart about why the US had no socialism 100 years ago); MARK J. ROE, POLITI-
CAL DETERMINANTS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (2003) (explaining the persis-
tence of block ownership in Europe with the presence of strong political pro-labor 
pressure).  
10 MARK J. ROE, STRONG MANAGERS – WEAK OWNERS 51-124 (1994). 
11 Peter A. Hall & David Soskice, An Introduction to Varieties of Capitalism, in
VARIETIES OF CAPITALISM 1, 8-9 (Peter A. Hall & David Soskice eds. 2001). 
12 Katharina Pistor, Legal Ground Rules in Coordinated and Liberal Market Econ-
omies, in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN CONTEXT 249, 259, 269-270 (Klaus J. Hopt, 
Eddy Wymeersch, Hideki Kanda & Harald Baum eds. 2005). 
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general, the explanation proposed in this article relates to this argu-
ment, but differs in an important respect. I argue that cross-country 
differences in corporate ownership structure, played a decisive role 
for why movements against the prevailing powers in corporate gover-
nance took different shapes, given the impact that the existence of 
large ownership blocks have on the relationship between different 
groups of shareholders, and between shareholders and stakeholders. 
In the US, “stakeholder” arguments and institutional theories 
of the corporation tended to be brought forward in defense of the sta-
tus quo, which is characterized by an unusual degree of managerial 
power. By contrast, similar theories in France and Germany served as 
a possible argument to constrain large firms there, namely large 
blockholders, and to prevent them from using their influence in a way 
that hurts the firm, minority shareholders, and other stakeholders. In 
other words, “pro-stakeholder” arguments stood on two different 
sides of the debate: Perhaps critics of prevailing corporate structures 
had better reasons to advocate stakeholder protection than their 
American counterparts. 
Today, the US and the UK are normally thought to be charac-
terized by dispersed ownership, while in most other countries’ econ-
omies concentrated ownership persists even in most of the largest 
firms.13 While the exact time that dispersed ownership developed is 
far from clear14 and the actual prevalence of dispersed ownership is 
even disputed by some,15 the study of comparative intellectual history 
13 According to the conventional wisdom, the US and the UK have dispersed own-
ership in most large firms, whereas elsewhere, concentrated ownership prevails. 
E.g. Raphael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, Corporate 
ownership around the world, 54 J. FIN. 471 (1999).  
14 When the UK developed dispersed ownership is disputed. Most scholars believe 
that dispersion occured some time between the 1950s and the 1980s. See e.g. Brian 
R. Cheffins, Does Law Matter? The Separation of Ownership and Control in the 
United Kingdom, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 459, 466-468 (2001); ROE, supra note 9, at 
100; but see Julian Franks, Colin Mayer & Stefano Rossi, Ownership: Evolution 
and Regulation (2006), 29 REV. FIN. STUD. 4009 (2009) (arguing that dispersed 
ownership was already present in the early 20th century). 
15 Clifford G. Holderness, The Myth of Diffuse Ownership in the United States, 22 
REV. FIN. STUD. 1377 (2009) (arguing that, contrary to the conventional wisdom 
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reveals that conventional wisdom about ownership structures influ-
enced shareholder-stakeholder debates. Following the emergence of 
the large, “modern corporation” (in the words of Berle and Means16),
scholars and practitioners attempted to make sense of what they ob-
served in practice, and to influence policy. Their respective percep-
tion of ownership structure was sometimes an explicit, sometimes an 
unspoken premise that shaped the debates and the views expressed 
therein.
I further highlight how the shareholder-stakeholder controver-
sy is intimately linked to the balance of powers between management 
and directors on the one hand, and shareholders on the other. As a 
consequence of perceived corporate governance failures during the 
scandals of the early 2000s and the current financial crisis, US corpo-
rate law policy finally seems to be moving in the direction advocated 
by most academics by increasing shareholder power,17 apparently 
undergoing a “seismic shift.”18 This issue takes us back to the old 
controversy between proponents of “contractual” and “institutional” 
theories about the nature of the corporation. With the foundational 
contract between shareholders fading into the background in institu-
tional theories, the latter is more amenable to greater independence 
from shareholders, which also allows a stronger role for stakeholders 
such as workers. 
I argue that the positions of the proponents of either view on 
one side of the Atlantic cannot easily be equated with their purported 
equivalents on the other side, given that they brought forward argu-
ments against the backdrop of very different economic patterns and 
and most other empirical evidence, dispersed ownership is not more prevalent in the 
US than elsewhere). 
16 BERLE & MEANS, supra note 7. 
17 See most prominently, the proposed Shareholder Bill of Rights Act of 2009, S. 
1074 111th Cong. (requiring a mandatory shareholder vote on executive pay and a 
greater input of shareholders in board elections), and the proposed SEC Rules Faci-
litating Shareholder Director Nominations, 74 Fed. Reg. 29024-01 (SEC proposed 
June 18, 2009) (requiring the inclusion of shareholder nominees in the management 
proxy statements). 
18 Jennifer G. Hill, The Rising Tension Between Shareholder and Director Power in 
the Common Law World, ECGI LAW WORKING PAPER NO. 152/2010, 3 (2010), at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1582258.
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therefore were concerned with different political and economic is-
sues. Since Berle and Means discovered dispersed ownership in the 
US in 1932, scholars argued about the strong position of managers, its 
consequences, and possible remedies to the problems it caused. A 
considerable degree of institutional independence of the corporation 
from shareholders was always evident, and the economic and political 
power of “big business” seemed to be concentrated in the hands of a 
managerial elite. The main concern therefore was whether and how 
managers should be constrained. While some hoped to commit them 
to shareholder value, others wanted to enlist them as guardians for the 
interest of all corporate constituencies. Members of the opposing 
camp were more optimistic about managers’ ability and willingness 
to consider stakeholder concerns. Even today, the defining characte-
ristic around which all debates revolve is managerial power. “Stake-
holder” and “institutional” arguments tend to serve the purposes of 
corporate insiders, specifically to defend their entrenched position 
from assaults of outside investors and policymakers hoping to hold 
them more accountable. 
By contrast, participants in the German and French debates 
addressed issues of controlled with larger blocks of shares. In the ab-
sence of an atomized shareholder structure, the potential for conflict 
between competing groups of shareholders became a major concern. 
At least according to some, it impeded the creation of welfare by 
large corporations, and its ability to serve the public interest. Ob-
viously, conflicts among shareholders are more important when there 
are large blocks, particularly when ownership structures became fluid 
in an unstable economic environment. 
As a consequence of the difference in the relative importance 
of these two concerns, the roles of contractual and institutional theo-
ries were reversed in the US and the two Continental European coun-
tries, with the “reformist” camp ending up on two different sides. In 
the US, excessive shareholder influence remained a non-issue. Scho-
lars were (and still are) concerned with excessive managerial power 
that was criticized as lacking legitimacy and later as causing large 
agency costs. “Institutionalist” or pro-stakeholder arguments tended 
to be a defense for managers (unless they were coupled with regulato-
TAMING OR PROTECTING THE MODERN CORPORATION?  8/19/2010 
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ry intervention19), while critics of the current status quo tended to be 
the ones emphasizing shareholder interests and assailing the mana-
gerial stronghold. Contrariwise, in Germany and France, analysts who 
sought to change the status quo by limiting the excessive influence of 
the apparently power-wielding group needed to constrain shareholder 
influence, and thus advanced theories emphasizing the “institutional” 
character of the corporation, which are typically more hospitable to 
stakeholder concerns. These were intended to defend the corporation 
against the effective controllers of the firm – large shareholders – in 
order to limit outside influence that was sometimes detrimental. Insti-
tutional theories were suggested to defend corporations against their 
shareholders. The “interest of the corporate entity” – a core concept in 
Germany and France– was originally intended as a mechanism to 
balance conflicting interests and to avoid abuses, although the prac-
tical significance has remained limited. 
This article proceeds as follows. Section 2 sets the scene by 
describing the relevant economic theory and the stakes of the debate, 
focusing particularly on US corporate governance and showing why 
the historical comparison is important for the current discussion in 
shareholder empowerment: Why does the balance of powers between 
shareholders and managers matter so much? What effects does it have 
on stakeholders, and why does the debate about the institutional or 
contractual understanding of the corporation matter? This section also 
introduces the historical vehicle of these conflicts of interest, namely 
the controversy about the “legal nature” of the corporation. Section 3 
briefly describes the historical development of the US debate relating 
to the shareholder-stakeholder controversy and seeks to contextualize 
it against the backdrop of dispersed ownership. Sections 4 and 5 pro-
vide relatively detailed accounts of the historical German and French 
debates, emphasizing how the presence of blockholders and intra-
shareholder conflicts of interest resulted in a different debate. Section 
6 puts the pieces of the puzzle together and develops the comparative 
theory of this paper. Section 7 concludes. 
19 An example would be RALPH NADER, MARK GREEN & JOEL SELIGMAN, TAMING 
THE GIANT CORPORATION (1976). 
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2. What’s at stake? The underlying conflicts of inter-
est
This section provides an overview of the US development of 
the balance of power between managers and shareholders, both in its 
historical dimension and the contemporary discussion; in doing so, it 
introduces the underlying conflicts of interest, and explains how ma-
nagerial power and shareholder-stakeholder issues are connected. US 
corporate law seems to be currently undergoing a shift from a system 
with shareholders that are powerless vis-à-vis managers (described in 
section 2.1) to one where their significance grows (this trend is de-
scribed in section 2.2). Section 2.3 looks at the arguments against 
shareholder empowerment, and section 2.4 introduces the debate be-
tween “contractual” and “institutional” theories of the corporation. 
Both are important for the comparative study, since more arguments 
against shareholder empowerment often resemble historical European 
ones.
2.1. Powerless American shareholders? 
Historical discussions of US corporate governance often begin 
with Berle and Means. Adolph Berle, a Columbia law professor on 
his way to becoming the doyen of American corporate law, and the 
young economist Gardiner Means famously identified the “separation 
of ownership and control” in their 1932 book:20 Having conducted a 
meticulous empirical study21, the two authors found that a large pro-
portion of the publicly traded firms were owned by a large number of 
widely dispersed, but powerless shareholders, and de facto controlled 
by a managerial oligarchy. Berle and Means’ seminal study became 
the fundament on which economists and legal scholars have built 
their debates upon until today. Dispersed ownership, which they iden-
tified as the predominant structure among large, publicly traded firms, 
20 BERLE & MEANS, supra note 7. 
21 Gardiner C. Means, The Diffusion of Stock Ownership in the United States, 44 Q.
J. ECON. 561 (1930); Gardiner C. Means, The Separation of Ownership and Control 
in American Industry, 46 Q. J. ECON. 68 (1931). 
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continues to be seen as a defining characteristic of US-style capital-
ism.22
Following the Depression, the New Deal and World War II, 
the US economy entered a period of growth. American firms devel-
oped into large conglomerates that not only extended into various 
industries and behemoths of worldwide importance. The internal 
structure of these firms, however, remained relatively stable, as they 
developed into large bureaucracies governed by managerial elites.23
In that period, top management may have grown even more distant 
from any influence of shareholders, who continued to be considered 
the owners of the firm by legal doctrine.24
Things changed dramatically around 1980. Triggered by inno-
vations in banking, such as the development of junk bonds and the 
proliferation of leveraged buyouts, a wave of hostile takeovers shook 
the economy.25 For a while, this new market for corporate control 
resulted in many firms being taken over and restructured. Some 
praised the qualities of this market for reducing inefficiencies by 
aligning managerial interests with those of shareholders, thus reduc-
ing agency cost.26 Others were concerned about stakeholders of firms, 
22 But see supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
23 E.g. DAVID SKEEL, ICARUS IN THE BOARDROOM 108-111 (2005); GERALD F. DA-
VIS, MANAGED BY THE MARKETS 72-77 (2009) (describing managerial dominance 
during this period); for contemporary accounts of the “managerial revolution” see
ALFRED DUPONT CHANDLER, THE VISIBLE HAND: THE MANAGERIAL REVOLUTION 
IN AMERICAN BUSINESS (1977); JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, THE NEW INDUSTRIAL 
STATE (1st ed. 1967; 4th ed. 1985; reprint 2006). 
24 E.g. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 3, at 444 (suggesting that legislative 
developments of that period tended to further entrench managers). 
25 See Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, How I Learned to Stop Worrying and 
Love the Pill: Adaptive Responses to Takeover Law, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 871, 884,
873-874 (2002) (providing empirical evidence about the takeover wave); SKEEL,
supra note 23, at 111-116: John Armour & David A. Skeel, Jr., Who Writes the 
Rules for Hostile Takeovers, and Why? The Peculiar Divergence of US and UK 
Takeover Regulation, 95 GEO. L. J. 1727, 1755 (2007); DAVIS, supra note 23, at 81-
87. 
26 Henry Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. POL. ECON.
110 (1965); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Proper Role of a Tar-
get’s Management to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161 (1981); Ronald J. 
Gilson, A Structural Approach to Corporations: The Case Against Defensive Tac-
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such as creditors whose claims declined in value because of junk debt 
issues, communities where factories were closed, and employees los-
ing their jobs.27
On one level, the change was only temporary: takeover artists 
did not typically retain a controlling stake in the firm, so that ulti-
mately most companies remained management-controlled (even 
though the companies emerging from a hostile takeover were often 
very different from their predecessors). Managers and lawyers 
representing them learned how to defend against hostile takeovers, 
and after some years of back and forth in the Delaware courtrooms, 
the courts acquiesced to granting directors wide latitude to defend 
against hostile takeovers.28
On another level, the American economy was deeply affected. 
Observers often attribute a paradigm shift from a “managerial” to a 
“shareholder-centric” corporate economy that happened to this pe-
riod. Following the development of agency theory in corporate 
finance,29 the idea that managerial agency cost was the main problem 
of corporate law and that managers should work only in the interest of 
shareholders gained widespread acceptance.30 The proliferation of 
defined contribution pension plans, which essentially made Ameri-
cans dependent on the stock market, may have been a contributory 
tics in Tender Offers, 33 STAN. L. REV. 819 (1981);Michael C. Jensen, Agency Cost 
of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 323,
327-329 (1986).. 
27 Andrei Shleifer & Lawrence Summers, Breach of Trust in Hostile Takeovers, in 
CORPORATE TAKEOVERS. CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 33, 37 (ALAN J. AUERBACH 
ed. 1988); Morey W. McDaniel, Stockholders and Stakeholders, 21 STETSON L.
REV. 123, 123-126 (1991). 
28 Infra note 37-41 and accompanying text. 
29 Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial 
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976); see
RAKESH KHURANA, FROM HIGHER AIMS TO HIRED HANDS 317-326 (2007). 
30 E.g. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 3, at 440-441; (arguing that a sharehold-
er-based corporate governance system replaced a managerial system during that 
period); DAVIS, supra note 23, at 87-95; KHURANA, id., at 297-305. 
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factor.31 A changing culture in business education and managerial 
social norms seems to have been a collateral consequence.32
Nevertheless, managers remained steadfastly in control of 
firms, as the hostile takeover market declined in the early 1990s. 
However, this was followed by an increase in incentive-based execu-
tive compensation, which some have interpreted as an adaptive re-
sponse by the market to align managers’ incentives with shareholder 
interests.33
Despite this apparent shift, Berle and Means’ “separation of 
ownership and control” persists. Factual managerial power is bols-
tered by pro-management legal institutions. The balance of power is 
tilted in favor of the board of directors (compared to shareholders) in 
a way that is unparalleled in other important corporate jurisdictions. 
The board of directors is entrusted with the task of directing the busi-
ness and affairs of the corporation34 with little influence from share-
holders. The process of nominating and reappointing directors, in-
cluding independent outside board members, is dominated by the in-
cumbents, who have the advantage of using the firms’ resources to 
run the proxy machinery to garner votes. The chances for an insurgent 
outsider to oust management are dim, and incentives are mitigated by 
the uncertainty of being reimbursed.35 Securities law erects further 
31 DAVIS, id., at 212-222; Markus Roth, Employee Participation, Corporate Gover-
nance and the Firm: A Transatlantic View Focused on Occupational Pensions and 
Co-Determination, 11 EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV. 51, 58-59, 68-69 (2010); see ED-
WARD A. ZELINSKY, THE ORIGINS OF THE OWNERSHIP SOCIETY 101-105 (2007)
(contrasting the prevalence of defined contribution plans in the US with their ab-
sence in other major industrial countries). 
32 KHURANA, supra 29, at 305-323. 
33 Kahan & Rock, supra note 25. 
34 DGCL 141(a). 
35 The leading case is Rosenfeld v. Fairchield Engine & Airplaine Corp., 128 
N.E.2d 291 (N.Y. 1955) (establishing the “Froessel rule” named after Judge Charles 
Froessel). For a more thorough description and a deeper analysis see Lucian Arye 
Bebchuk & Marcel Kahan, A Framework for Analyzing Legal Policy Towards 
Proxy Contests, 78 CAL. L. REV. 1073, 1106-1126 (1990); see also Lucian A. Beb-
chuk, The Myth of the Shareholder Franchise, 93 VA. L. REV. 675, 682-683 (2007)
(reporting that the number of contested proxy solicitations per year never exceeded 
40 for the period between 1996 and 2004, during which time there were about 300 
contested solicitations in total). 
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barriers to coordination that might tip the balance of power towards 
shareholders.36
The effects of market mechanisms that align the interests of 
managers with those of shareholders have long remained limited. 
While the US saw a famous wave of hostile takeovers in the 1980s, 
these subsequently became rarer as a consequence of Delaware case 
law. With the narrowing of the Unocal37 standard in Unitrin38, and 
the restriction of Revlon39 duties under the two Paramount40 cases, 
managers are essentially able to “just say no” to a hostile bid.41 Stu-
dies have found that firms with both a poison pill and a staggered 
36 Under § 13(d) of the Securities Exchange Act, anyone directly or indirectly ac-
quiring beneficial ownership of 5% of any class of equity security must submit a 
13(d) filing with the SEC within 10 days. One important aspect is SEC Rule 13d-
5(1), under which persons acting together “for the purpose of acquiring, holding, 
voting or disposing of equity securities” are deemed a group for purposes of 
§ 13(d), and are thus required to submit a 13D filing if they jointly surpass the 5% 
threshold. See John C. Coffee, Jr., The SEC and the Institutional Investor: A Half-
Time Report, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 837, 842, 877-882 (1994), and Bernard S. Black, 
Shareholder Activism and Corporate Governance in the United States, in 3 THE 
NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 459, 461 (vol. 3, Peter 
Newman ed. 1998) (both discussing how this requirement inhibits, if not entirely 
prevents coordination among shareholders). 
Furthermore, shareholders communicating among each other run the risk of having 
to file a proxy statement. Securities Act § 14 and SEC Rule 14a-1(l)(iii) require one 
if communication is “reasonably calculated to result in the procurement, withhold-
ing or revocation of a proxy.” Rule 14a-8, which allows a proposal to be included in 
the company’s proxy statement, is open only to limited subject matters requires 
submission six months before the shareholder meeting. See Black, id, at 459; see
also Coffee, id., at 884. Regarding impediments against institutional shareholder 
such as banks and insurers see ROE, supra note 10 (showing how banking regulation 
and other laws prevented institutional investors from taking a greater role in US 
corporate governance).
37 Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A. 3d 946 (Del. 1985). 
38 Unitrin, Inc. v. American General Corp., 651 A.2d 1361 (Del. 1995). 
39 Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 179 (1986). 
40 Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1153 (1989); 
Paramount Communications Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 47 (Del. 
1993). 
41 E.g. Jeffrey N. Gordon, “Just Say Never”: Poison Pills, Deadhand Pills, and 
Shareholder-Adopted Bylaws: An Essay for Warren Buffet, 19 CARDOZO L. REV.
511, 516 (1997). 
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board that is entrenched in the corporate charter are essentially takeo-
ver-proof.42 Executive compensation was intended to align financial 
managerial interest with shareholders’43 and was sometimes even 
described as an adaptive response making up for the absence of pro-
shareholder incentives resulting from takeover defenses.44 However, 
there is mounting criticism that it primarily serves as a rent-creational 
device for management.45
2.2. The current trend towards shareholder empowerment 
Finance theorists and scholars of corporate law have often la-
mented this state of affairs and sought to make management more 
attentive to the needs of shareholders. The debate has intensified in 
recent years due to the financial crisis, and to some extent the efforts 
of shareholder rights advocates are now coming to fruition. First, 
shareholder activism has led some firms to abandon certain practices 
that impede shareholder influence. Upon the insistence of institutional 
investors, an increasing number of firms have dismantled staggered 
boards, thus removing one barrier to hostile takeovers.46 Bylaw provi-
sions requiring majority approval for uncontested elections of direc-
42 Lucian Arye Bebchuk, John C. Coates IV & Guhan Subramanian, The Powerful 
Antitakeover Force of Staggered Boards: Theory, Evidence, and Policy, 54 STAN.
L. REV. 887 (2002). 
43 Michael C. Jensen & Kevin J. Murphy, Performance Pay and Top-Management 
Incentives, 98 J. POL. ECON. 225 (1990); Lucian A. Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, How 
to Tie Executive Compensation to Long-Term Results, 22 J. APPL. CORP. FIN. 99
(2010) (describing how executive compensation could be fixed to achieve long-term 
benefits).
44 Kahan & Rock, supra note 25, at 896-899; see also Jeffrey N. Gordon, An Ameri-
can Perspective on Anti-Takeover Laws in the E.U.: The German Example, in RE-
FORMING COMPANY AND TAKEOVER LAW IN EUROPE 541, 553–54 (Guido Ferrarini, 
Klaus J. Hopt, Jaap Winter & Eddy Wymeersch eds., 2004) 
45 Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, Executive Compensation as an Agency 
Problem, 17 J. ECON. PERSP. 71 (2003); Lucian A. Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, Pay 
without Performance: Overview of the Issues, 30 J. CORP. L. 647 (2005). 
46 Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, Embattled CEOs, 88 TEX. L. REV. 987, 1007-
1010 (2010); see also Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder 
Power, 118 HARV. L. REV. 835, 852-856 (2005) (providing data about precatory 
resolutions by activist shareholders to dismantle staggered boards) 
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tors have also become more widespread,47 thus reducing managerial 
control over the process.48 Second, modifications of securities law 
have somewhat expanded the shareholder franchise. A July 2009 
amendment of NYSE Rule 452 and the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 now 
prohibit brokers from voting shares held for clients in uncontested 
director elections without having received instructions.49 This in-
creases the influence of institutional investors by essentially eliminat-
ing votes that would otherwise have almost certainly been cast in the 
favor of the incumbents. Recent amendments facilitate the electronic 
dissemination of proxy statements, thus reducing the costs of a share-
holder insurgency.50
Additional proposals are currently being debated. Most prom-
inently, the SEC has repeatedly51 issued proposals to amend its rules 
in order to expand “shareholder access” to the company’s proxy 
statements, which would permit larger shareholders to place nomi-
nees for a limited number of seats on the company’s proxy state-
ment.52 Bebchuk has suggested that shareholders should be permitted 
47 STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, THE NEW CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THEORY AND 
PRACTICE 213 (2008) (reporting that 31% of the Fortune 500 companies had 
adopted a majority voting bylaw by 2006); Kahan & Rock, id., at 1010-1011. There 
was some debate whether Securities Law should require majority voting, but the 
Dodd-Frank Act was passed such a provision. 
48 Under plurality voting, which is the default rule (DGCL 216(3); RMBCA 
7.28(a)), an unopposed candidate is elected if he gets a single vote (with all other 
shareholders abstaining). Both the DGCL and the RMBCA were amended in 2006 
to prohibit directors from amending bylaws that require majority voting. See Wil-
liam K. Sjostrom & Young Sang Kim, Majority Voting for the Election of Direc-
tors, 40 CONN. L. REV. 459, 474-479 (2007). 
49 SEC Release No. 34-60215; File No. SR-NYSE-2006-92. Dodd-Frank Act § 957. 
50 See Jeffrey N. Gordon, Proxy Contests in an Era of Increasing Shareholder Pow-
er: Forget Issuer Proxy Access and Focus on E-Proxy, 61 VAND. L. REV. 475, 487-
491 (2008); see Shareholder Proposals Relating to the Election of Directors, Ex-
change Act Release No. 56,914, Investment Company Act Release No. 28,075, 72 
Fed. Reg. 70,450 (Dec. 11, 2007) (effective Jan. 11, 2008). 
51 The initial proposal was made by the SEC in 2003. See Security Holder Director 
Nominations, Exchange Act Release No. 48,626, Investment Company Act Release 
No. 26,206, 68 Fed. Reg. 60,784, 60,785 (Oct. 23, 2003); Gordon, supra note 50, at 
484. 
52 Kahan & Rock, supra note 46, at 1022. § 971 of the Dodd-Frank Act clarifies that 
the SEC has the power to pass such a regulation. 
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to “set the rules” by allowing them to initiate important decisions 
such as charter amendments or reincorporations,53 which they cur-
rently cannot do without a proposal by the board of directors.54 Dissa-
tisfaction with managerial compensation practices has led to calls for 
“say on pay” in the form of an annual shareholder vote on compensa-
tion packages.55 The Dodd-Frank Act now requires such a vote every 
three years.56
Advocates of such reforms argue that greater shareholder em-
powerment would induce management – either directly or indirectly – 
to act in the interest of shareholders, and reduce agency cost. The 
underlying concern is that directors and officers, if left unconstrained, 
will, on the one hand, squander the assets firm or shift them into their 
own pockets through self-dealing transactions, but on the other hand, 
frequently just not work hard enough to achieve the best possible re-
sult for shareholders. The normative conclusion is that shareholders 
are the group whose payoff managers should seek to maximize. Since 
they do not have explicit contractual rights, but are left with the 
firm’s residual cash flows,57 their position is most strongly at risk. 
They also have the best incentives to monitor managers and other 
constituencies in order to maximize the total value of the firm.58 If 
managers maximize shareholder value, it follows logically that all 
other constituencies will also be fully satisfied. On the other hand, the 
more pragmatic reason for shareholder primacy is the relative ease of 
holding directors accountable to the clear objective of shareholder 
primacy, as opposed to a multi-faceted goal including stakeholders 
53 Bebchuk, supra note 46, at 865-875. 
54 In a dispersed ownership firm, directors will typically side with entrenched man-
agement and not make proposals favoring shareholder involvement. 
55 Supra note 17; see e.g. Jeffrey N. Gordon, “Say on Pay”: Cautionary Notes on 
the U.K. Experience and the Case for Shareholder Opt-in, 46 HARV. J. LEG. 323
(2008).
56 Dodd-Frank Act § 951 (introducing a new § 14A of the Securities Exchange Act). 
57 FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF 
CORPORATE LAW 11 (1991). 
58 Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Cost, and Eco-
nomic Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777, 781-783 (1972). 
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and society as a whole.59 Assuming that shareholder wealth maximi-
zation is the proper goal of corporate law, shareholder empowerment 
indeed appears as a solution to accountability problems, minimizing 
agency cost and optimizing incentives for directors and officers. 
2.3. Objections to shareholder empowerment 
If shareholder power is indeed so beneficial, why are large 
businesses typically run as corporations, where the board of directors 
enjoys such great authority and control by shareholders is tightly cur-
tailed?60 Some objections can be made within the shareholder prima-
cy framework: Centralized management under the direction of a 
board of directors has a transaction cost advantage over shareholder 
decision-making, as it involves only a relatively small group of 
people who (in the best case) have the information, capabilities and 
incentives to run the firm well; direct control by the firms owners is 
usually only workable in small enterprises. Otherwise, DGCL 141(a), 
which grants broad authority to directors in spite of the obvious po-
tential for agency cost, would be a losing proposition right from the 
beginning.61 Some scholars argue that shareholders have good rea-
sons to bind their own hands in favor of a group of experts with supe-
rior information and comparatively homogenous interests that will 
avoid mutual holdup of decision-makers. For example, shareholders 
may agree that corporations should maximize shareholder wealth, but 
disagree about how to best pursue this goal. Given the complexity of 
corporate decisions, it may be preferable to concentrate them at the 
level of the board of directors, which constitutes a relatively homoge-
59 A. A. Berle, Jr., For Whom are Managers Trustees: A Note, 45 HARV. L. REV.
1365, 1368, 1372 (1931); See Bebchuk, supra note 35, at 731 (arguing that looser 
accountability also hurts stakeholders with managers’ loss of accountability to 
shareholders). 
60 See DGCL 141(a).(“The business and affairs of every corporation organized 
under this chapter shall be managed by or under the direction of the board of direc-
tors [...]”). 
61 E.g. Lynn A. Stout, The Mythical Benefits of Shareholder Control, 93 VA. L.
REV. 789, 792-793 (2006); John Armour, Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, 
What is Corporate Law? in THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW 1, 13 (2nd ed.,
Reinier Kraakman et al. 2009) 
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neous group of people with good information and incentive, which 
will generally yield better results than bickering among potentially 
heterogeneous shareholders.62 Relatedly, an argument against minori-
ty directors is that these might lead to a balkanization of the board.63
Some analysts point out that the interests of different groups 
of shareholders may diverge strongly, which is likely to create fric-
tion and inhibit decision-making in corporations.64 Short-term and 
long-term shareholders often have strongly divergent goals, which is 
particularly relevant given the increasing role of activist short-term 
investors such as hedge funds. Since capital markets are not perfectly 
efficient and do not accurately reflect long-term value, some share-
holders may be tempted to seek short-term profits by taking decisions 
that are contrary to the long-run interest of the firm, thus undermining 
an enduring productive development.65 Diversified and undiversified 
shareholders are likely to have different risk preferences, and the in-
terests of shareholders that have hedged their risks may be decoupled 
from the financial welfare of the corporation.66 In fact, some share-
holders may rather seek to advance their personal rent-seeking goals 
resulting from opportunities to obtain private benefits of control ra-
ther than to vote in favor of the greater good of the shareholder 
62 Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate 
Governance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 547 (2003); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Pri-
macy and Shareholder Disempowerment, 199 HARV. L. REV. 1735, 1744-1751
(2006); see also Martin Lipton & Steven A. Rosenblum, Election Contests In the 
Company’s Proxy: An Idea Whose Time Has Not Come, 59 BUS. LAW. 67, 73
(2008); Grant Hayden & Matthew T. Bodie, Shareholder Democracy and the Cu-
rious Turn Toward Board Primacy, 51 Wm. & My. L. Rev. 2071, 2088 (2008) 
(“”In sum, many of the arguments used to support shareholder primacy theory … 
are based on shareholder homogeneity”). 
63 Lipton & Rosenblum, id., at 82-83. 
64 Iman Anabtawi, Some Skepticism About Increasing Shareholder Power, 53 UC-
LA L. REV. 561, 577-593 (2006): contra George W. Dent, Jr., The Essential Unity of 
Shareholders and the Myth of Investor Short-Termism, CASE RESEARCH PAPER 
SERIES IN LEGAL STUDIES, WORKING PAPER 09-22, 8-25 (2009), at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1435400.
65 Anabtawi, id at 579-583; see also Larry E. Ribstein, Accountability and Respon-
sibility in Corporate Governance, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1431, 1467 (2006). 
66 Anabtawi, id at 583-585, 590-592. 
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class.67 Generally, the emphasis on shareholder value has been criti-
cized as creating a short-term focus for managers who will no longer 
be able to take the long-term development of the firm into account.68
Bratton and Wachter suggest that there is a tradeoff between 
reducing managerial agency cost resulting from unconstrained power, 
and the severe informational disadvantage of shareholders, even if 
shareholders were able and willing to vote for the greater good of the 
firm, and if the market price reflects historical information.69 Related 
arguments focusing on misinformation of shareholders and the inabil-
ity of capital markets to reflect future information has often been 
brought forward in hostile takeovers, among others by prominent 
practitioners such as Martin Lipton:70 Managers and directors possess 
superior information over shareholders and should therefore be given 
the capability to defend against hostile bids. Otherwise, shareholders 
may mistakenly accept an offer at an inadequately low price, given 
that the markets are unable to given sufficient weight to manage-
ment’s vision for the firm, and to other factors that are hard to assess 
for an outsider. This view has been a core policy reason for the Dela-
ware courts jurisprudence on takeover defenses71, and some have ar-
gued that it has been vindicated by the rise of behavioral finance and 
the fall of the efficient capital markets hypothesis.72
The recent crisis has added more fuel to the debate about 
shareholder empowerment. While it may have pushed the trend to-
wards more shareholder influence, we cannot rule out that the in-
creased shareholder orientation of the past two decades is partly to 
blame for the events, given that pressure to produce more shareholder 
67 Stout, supra note 61, at 794-795. 
68 Lawrence E. Mitchell, A Critical Look at Corporate Governance, 45 VAND. L.
REV. 1263, 1283 (1992).
69 William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, The Case Against Shareholder Em-
powerment, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 653, 691-705 (2010). 
70 Martin Lipton, Takeover Bids in the Target’s Boardroom, 35 BUS. LAW. 101 
(1979) (arguing that shareholders benefit from takeover defenses). 
71 See the case law described supra in notes 37-40 and accompanying text. 
72 Lynn A. Stout, Takeovers in the Ivory Tower: How Academics Are Learning 
Martin Lipton May Be Right, 60 BUS. LAW. 1435, 1440-1444 (2005). 
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value may have led to more risk-taking, particularly in financial insti-
tutions.73
As this overview shows, detractors of shareholder empower-
ment tend to focus on the absence of adequate information of share-
holders and problems of their decision-making process. Another 
range of issues that are hard to explain under a pure contractual agen-
cy view also may play a role. As some scholars have pointed out, an 
important contribution of corporate law seems to have been the estab-
lishment of a stronger degree of stability in business life. One aspect 
is “entity shielding”, i.e. the protection of the corporate pool of assets 
from shareholders’ individual creditors:74 If a shareholders defaults, 
her personal creditors do not have recourse to the company’s assets. 
This prevents the breakup of firms for reasons that have nothing to do 
with how well they do and protects going concern value.75 Members 
of a partnership therefore often waive their withdrawal rights for spe-
cified periods of time, while in corporations, a majority vote is re-
quired to initiate liquidation.76 The reduction of the need to monitor 
the firm’s owners therefore reduces capital accumulation.77 Margaret 
Blair has taken this argument further by suggesting that the “lock-in” 
of capital in corporations was a historically important factor that faci-
litated the development of big business, as it made it much more dif-
ficult for partners or investors to withdraw (or threaten to withdraw) 
73 Bratton & Wachter, supra note 69, at 716-726; see also Lucian A. Bebchuk & 
Holger Spamann, Regulating Bankers‘ Pay, 98 GEO. L. J. 247 (2010) (suggesting 
that compensation in financial institutions should be based on total firm value in-
stead of shareholder value). 
74 See Henry Hansmann, Reinier Kraakman & Richard Squire, Law and the Rise of 
the Firm, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1333, 1343-1356 (2006). 
75 Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The Essential Role of Organizational 
Law, 110 YALE L. J. 387, 403-404 (2000). 
76 Hansmann et al., supra note 74, at 1348-1349. In Europe, the typical requirement 
is a supermajority. See e.g. AKTG (GERMANY) § 262 I 2 (requiring 75% of the capi-
tal represented in the shareholder meeting to initiate a voluntary dissolution); C.
COM. L. 225-96 (FRANCE) (requiring a majority of two thirds for decisions of an 
extraordinary shareholder meeting, which is required for voluntary dissolution un-
der L. 225-246).See also Edward Rock, Paul Davies, Hideki Kanda & Reinier 
Kraakman, Fundamental Changes, in THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW 183, 219
(Reinier Kraakman et al. 2009). 
77 Hansmann et al. id., at 1350. 
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their contribution and thus put pressure on others relying on the con-
tinued existence of a large-scale institution.78 She argues that the del-
egation of decision-making authority to the board – and hence, an 
absence of shareholder empowerment – helps to restrict the control 
any individual large investor had on the firm, which supported the 
development of large-scale, business-specific organizational capital.79
This relates to the contemporary stakeholder theory, informed 
by economics, which asserts that not only shareholders, but also other 
groups in the firm can be residual claimants: employees, for example, 
are often thought to invest in specific human capital with limited use 
outside of the particular firm, e.g. sets of skills that cannot easily be 
transported elsewhere without a transition cost (which may not only 
include further learning, but also moving expenses).80 Since invest-
ment of this type is costly, it will be efficient to protect employees 
from “expropriation” by the group effectively controlling the firm (at 
least if this group is strongly mindful of the financial interests of 
shareholders). In this view, the attenuation of shareholder control 
over directors, and a divergence from shareholder primacy as a matter 
78 Margaret M. Blair, Locking in Capital: What Corporate Law Achieved for Busi-
ness Organizations in the Nineteenth Century, 51 UCLA L. REV. 387 (2003); but 
see Ribstein, supra note 65, at 1489 (suggesting that more sophisticated contracting 
methods have largely solved these problems today). 
79 Blair, id. at 433-434. 
80 See e.g. HENRY HANSMANN, THE OWNERSHIP OF ENTERPRISE 26 (1996); James 
M. Malcolmson, Individual Employment Contracts, in 3 HANDBOOK OF LABOR 
ECONOMICS 2291, 2311-2337 (Orley Aschenfelter & David Card eds. 1999) (re-
viewing the labor economics literature on contractual protection of specific invest-
ment); Larry Fauver & Michael E. Fuerst, Does good corporate governance include 
employee representation? Evidence from German corporate boards, 82 J. FIN.
ECON. 673, 679 (2006); Edward P. Lazear, Firm-Specific Human Capital: A Skill-
Weights Approach, IZA DISCUSSION PAPER NO. 813 (June 2003), at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=422562 (discussing the nature of specific investment); John 
C. Coffee, Jr., Shareholders Versus Managers: The Strain in the Corporate Web, 85
MICH. L. REV. 1, 74 (1986) (discussing learning about social networks within an 
organization); ANNALEE SAXENIAN, REGIONAL ADVANTAGE: CULTURE AND COMPE-
TITION IN SILICON VALLEY AND ROUTE 128, 35 (1994) (describing the geographical 
aspect of specific investment by quoting an engineer contrasting the difficulty of 
getting another job in the same industry in Texas on one hand and the easiness in 
Silicon Valley on the other). 
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of the objective of directorial decision-making may be beneficial be-
cause it facilitates specific investment and the long-term development 
of the corporation to the benefit of all.81 Blair and Stout’s model de-
scribes the board of directors as a mediating hierarchy standing be-
tween shareholders and other corporate constituencies. Without being 
strongly accountable to any specific group, the board is in the position 
to assign the rents produced by the corporation to all groups, thus 
permitting specific investment and allowing long-term business de-
velopment.82 Excessive shareholder empowerment might result in an 
opportunistic “hold up” of other team members in order to maximize 
short-term shareholder value.83 While the stakeholder position has 
traditionally been unpopular among those viewing corporate gover-
nance from an economic perspective, it has gained adherents in recent 
years. Even in finance, stakeholder concerns seem to be taken more 
seriously than they used to be. Even the latest edition of a leading 
finance textbook notes that “managers and employees of a firm are 
investors, too. … If you give financial capital too much power, the 
human capital doesn’t show up – or if it does show up, it won’t be 
properly motivated.”84 By going public, stockholders can commit 
“not to interfere if managers and employees capture private benefits 
when the firm is successful.”85
Irrespective of which side one takes in this debate, it is hard to 
deny that both have a point: The benefits of reducing the agency cost 
produced by unaccountable management have to be weighed against 
the costs of shareholder involvement. Thus, there seems to be a trade-
81 Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate 
Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247 (1999); see also Kent Greenfield, The Impact of “Going 
Private” on Corporate Stakeholders, 3 BROOK. J. CORP. & FIN. L. 72, 86 (2008) (“If 
management is more autonomous, it is possible for managers to use their autonomy 
to allocate more of the corporate surplus to employees and other stakeholders.”) 
82 Blair & Stout, id., at 288-289; see also Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales, 
Power in a Theory of the Firm, 113 Q. J. ECON. 387 (1998); Bruno Frey & Margit 
Osterloh, Yes, Managers Should Be Paid Like Bureaucrats, 14 J. MGMT. INQ. 96, 
99-100, 101-102 (2005); see also Gelter, supra note 6, at 136-143. 
83 Stout, supra note 61, at 795-797. 
84 RICHARD A. BREALEY, STEWART C. MYERS & FRANKLIN ALLEN, PRINCIPLES OF 
CORPORATE FINANCE 949 (8th ed. 2006). 
85 BREALEY ET AL., id., at 949 n.36. 
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off between managerial discretion on one side and accountability to 
shareholders on the other.86 For the comparative exercise of this pa-
per, it suffices to say that the arguments on both sides are relevant and 
were therefore considered significant by participants in the historical 
debates. The crucial point I seek to make is that their relative impor-
tance historically was, and maybe still is different in the US on the 
one hand and in France and Germany on the other, given differences 
in structures of corporate control. 
2.4. Vehicles of the debate: How do “legal” theories about 
the nature of the corporation matter? 
Before looking at the national shareholder-stakeholder contro-
versies, it is necessary to clarify what is meant by the debate about the 
legal nature of the corporation, given that the two were often linked. 
Historically, scholars and courts have construed corporations have 
been construed as “artificial entities”, “aggregates”, or “natural enti-
ties”, with each theory being identified with different political cur-
rents.87 While the “artificial entity” theory emphasizes the role of the 
state in creating the corporation,88 the “aggregate theory” focuses on 
the underlying contractual relationship. The “natural entity” theory 
emphasizes the existence of the corporation outside the law, which 
merely reflects the social reality. 
In the US, a great point of contention has often been whether 
corporations should enjoy constitutional protections against govern-
ment like natural persons, most recently in the Supreme Court’s Citi-
zens United decision on corporate speech.89 A natural entity theory 
86 Alessio M. Pacces, Controlling the Corporate Controller’s Misbehaviour, RILE
WORKING PAPER NO. 2009/01, 8-11 (2009), at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1327800.
87 John C. Coates IV, Note: State Takeover Statutes and Corporate Theory: The 
Revival of an Old Debate, 64 NYU L. REV. 806, 809 (1989); Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, 
The Cyclical Transformations of the Corporate Form: A Historical Perspective on 
Corporate Social Responsibility, 30 DEL. J. CORP. L. 767, 772-793 (2005) (tracing 
the theories through Ancient Roman and medieval sources). 
88 A famous endorsement of the theory is Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 
518 (1819); see Avi-Yonah, id., at 789. 
89 Citizens United v Federal Election Commission, 558 U.S. 50 (2010). 
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implies a stronger protection of the corporation against the govern-
ment, which was an issue in several 19th century cases.90 However, 
the meaning of corporate personhood under the Constitution is only 
peripherally related to the debates studied in this paper, which dealt 
with the governance of the relationship between firms and their man-
agers, shareholders and other stakeholders. The aggregate or contrac-
tual theory is more often identified with the “shareholder” position in 
the debate about the purpose of corporate law, both with respect to 
shareholder empowerment, and an understanding of the corporation 
as serving the interest of shareholders. The two entity theories, partic-
ularly the natural entity one, are often identified with a broader objec-
tive, and a more independent position of management. In Germany, 
this “reification” of the corporation is often traced to the theory of the 
“association” of Otto von Gierke, who understood legal personality as 
the reflection of social reality.91 On the basis of his historical study of 
German medieval law, he suggested that human beings were able to 
form fellowships that developed an autonomous existence that was 
necessary for social fulfillment.92 Thus, he became internationally 
known as the forefather of natural entity theory.93 His work was po-
90 See Coates, supra note 87, at 809-825. The victory of the “natural entity” theory 
is usually identified with Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific Railroad, 118 U.S. 
394 (1886); contra Morton J. Horwitz, Santa Clara Revisited: The Development of 
Corporate Theory, 88 W. VA. L. REV. 173 (1985) (arguing that the court’s famous 
dictum was grounded in the contemporary “aggregate theory”). Similarly, Avi-
Yonah argues that the trajectory of the two federal cases on the constitutionality of 
antitakeover statutes ended in a victory for the real entity theory. Avi-Yonah, id., at 
803-810. The two cases are Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1982), and CTS 
Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 481 U.S. 69 (1987). 
91 OTTO GIERKE, DAS DEUTSCHE GENOSSENSCHAFTSRECHT (1868). This position 
was much later espoused in a graphic way by ADOLF A. BERLE, THE 20TH CENTURY 
CAPITALIST REVOLUTION 18-19 (1954) (describing how a corporation would con-
tinue to operate if its charter were canceled by the state). 
92 ROGER SCRUTON, THE PHILOSOPHER ON DOVER BEACH 59 (1990). 
93 See e.g. Horwitz, supra note 90, at 179; Ron Harris, The Transplantation of the 
Legal Discourse on Corporate Personality Theories: From German Codification to 
British Political Pluralism and American Big Business, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
1421, 1431-1435 (2006) (both describing Gierke’s theories and their reception in 
Britain and the US); Hasso Hofmann, From Jhering to Radbruch: On the Logic of 
Traditional Legal Concepts to the Social Theories of Law to the Renewal of Legal 
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pularized in English-speaking countries by Frederic Maitland in the 
early years of the 20th century, and a number of English political and 
legal theorists began to entertain a “natural entity” view.94 Gierke’s 
longstanding influence may have helped to spread an institutional 
understanding of corporate law in Continental Europe, at least in 
Germany. However, a “stakeholder debate” was not yet on the hori-
zon during his lifetime. Gierke’s core concerns were very fundamen-
tal ones, most of all the possibility of citizens to freely form associa-
tions, and the recognition of legal capacity and personality of the lat-
ter. Still, his natural entity theory later helped to underscore the legi-
timacy of managerial control95 and influenced the German debate of 
the 1920s and 1930s.96 Similarly, Merrick Dodd, who came to be seen 
as the forerunner of American stakeholder theory as a result of his 
Idealism, in A HISTORY OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW IN THE CIVIL LAW WORLD,
1600-1900, 301, 335 (Damiano Canale, Paolo Grossi & Hasso Hofmann eds. 2009); 
see also Coates, supra note 87, at 818 (citing Gierke as one of the original propo-
nents of the natural entity theory of the corporation). Gierke favored collectivism 
over the individualism embodied in Roman law (Mathias Reimann, Nineteenth
Century German Legal Science, 31 B.C. L. REV. 837, 871 (1990); Hofmann, id., at 
331) and criticized the draft for the German Civil Code for the absence of social 
elements. OTTO GIERKE, DER ENTWURF EINES BÜRGERLICHEN GESETZBUCHES UND 
DAS DEUTSCHE RECHT (1889). 
94 See Frederic William Maitland, Translator’s Introduction, in POLITICAL THEORY 
OF THE MIDDLE AGES vii, xviii-xliii (Otto Gierke, translated with an introduction by 
Frederic William Maitland, 1900); FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, 3 THE COL-
LECTED PAPERS OF FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND 310-326 (1911); see also A.V.
DICEY, LECTURES ON THE RELATION BETWEEN LAW AND PUBLIC OPINION IN ENG-
LAND DURING THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 154 (2nd ed. 1914); see also Harold Laski, 
The Personality of Associations, 29 HARV. L. REV. 404, 413 (1916) (describing the 
corporation as a “real entity, with a personality that is self-created”); John Dewey, 
The Historic Background of Corporate Legal Personality, 35 YALE L. J. 655, 665 n.
13 (1926). 
95 William W. Bratton, Jr., The “Nexus of Contracts” Corporation: A Critical Ap-
praisal, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 407, 425 (1989). 
96 See ARNDT RIECHERS, DAS “UNTERNEHMEN AN SICH” 53-55 (1996) (describing 
the influence of Gierke on authors of the 1920s). 
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rebuttal to Berle97, used a natural entity theory to suggest that manag-
ers should have wider responsibilities than merely to shareholders.98
The rise of economic analysis of corporate law has somewhat 
blurred these frontlines, although adherents of this school often speak 
of the corporation as a “nexus of contracts.” In spite of the linguistic 
similarity, it would be wrong to identify this model the old contrac-
tual theory, as the corporate nexus is meant to include relationships 
with employees, creditors, suppliers and others, while the traditional 
contractual theory focuses only on the contract between shareholders 
as members of the corporation, thus interpreting it as an aggregate of 
shareholder interests. While economic analysis of corporate law 
tended to emphasize only shareholders in its earlier years,99 stake-
holder theories based on the idea of specific investment of other cor-
porate constituencies merely differ in the assumption that regular con-
tracts do not provide complete protection for these groups, but are 
still firmly grounded within the nexus framework.100 Furthermore, 
proponents of a shareholder wealth maximization view of corporate 
law have shown how the corporation as an independent entity can 
provide long-term commitment to creditors, but to the ultimate bene-
fit of shareholders.101
In the historical debates that are the primary subject of this ar-
ticle, however, the dividing lines are clear: Contractual theories ulti-
mately view shareholders as owners of assets striking a deal among 
each other; thus, the corporation obviously must pursue shareholder 
interests. According to institutional theories, the corporation as dis-
tinct entity has emancipated itself from mere shareholder interests, 
which makes it rhetorically easier to justify limitations on shareholder 
power and an emphasis on stakeholder interest. 
97 Infra section 3. 
98 E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom Are Managers Trustees? 45 HARV. L. REV.
1145, 1160-1162 (1931); see David Millon, Theories of the Corporation, 1990
DUKE L. J. 201, 216-220. 
99 E.g. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 57, at 12. 
100 The most prominent one is the “team production” model. See Blair & Stout, 
supra note 81. The “nexus of contracts” thus morphs into a “nexus of specific in-
vestment.” Id. at 275. 
101 Supra notes 74-77 and accompanying text. 
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3. Preeminent managerial power: contextualizing the 
historical US debate 
The US debate is well known and is therefore kept short, but it 
needs to be contextualized for the comparative objective of this paper. 
Section 3.1 describes this debate and emphasizes the significance of 
dispersed ownership for it. This is the feature of corporate governance 
in most large US firms that distinguishes them internationally and has 
also created the model that captured the imagination of American 
corporate law scholars. A large degree of institutional independence 
was self-evident, as was managerial power and debates about the ne-
cessity of curbing it. Section 3.2 discusses the role of jurisprudence 
regarding the “shareholder primacy norm”, and why it has little to add 
to the discussion. Section 3.3 explains how US corporate governance 
was differed from the German and French systems discussed in the 
subsequent chapters, and how this difference influenced the respec-
tive shareholder-stakeholder debates. 
3.1. Berle, Dodd, and dispersed ownership 
The cornerstones of the academic paradigm set by the Berle-
Dodd debate of the 1930s. In the course of finalizing the seminal trea-
tise with Gardiner Means102, Adolf Berle published an article in the 
Harvard Law Review emphasizing the fiduciary position of directors 
and analogizing from trust law to corporate law. Having empirically 
studied the separation of ownership and control and identified what 
we would now call agency problems, he argued for great judicial dis-
cretion to police conduct by managers.103 His original concern was 
not the relationship between a firm and non-shareholder constituen-
cies, but chiefly the protection of shareholders against management 
and particularly their equal treatment in issues such as preemptive 
rights and dividend payments. Merrick Dodd, another luminary of 
corporate law at that time, argued against Berle’s suggestion that 
102 BERLE & MEANS, supra note 7. 
103 Adolf A. Berle, Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1049
(1931). 
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stockholders should be considered the sole beneficiaries of corporate 
activity, as large corporations had become the subject of public inter-
est and developed a life and a responsibility of their own as a going 
concern.104 As distant stockholders could hardly become subject to “a 
professional spirit of public service”,105 the board had discretion to 
act also in favor of other interests would be more socially desirable. 
Managers should not be seen as fiduciaries of shareholders, but rather 
of the corporation as an institution instead of its members.106 Berle 
promptly rebutted Dodd’s critique, arguing that private property was 
an essential element of American society, providing income streams 
in times of old age, childhood and sickness. If management were not 
strictly accountable to passive proprietors, management would further 
primarily its own welfare (to the detriment of everyone else).107 How-
ever, in 1954 Berle conceded that Dodd’s point of view had pre-
vailed.108
From reading the last chapters of Berle and Means’ book, one 
could infer that Berle modified his position as early as 1932. The two 
authors speculate that corporate law may be moving toward a new 
concept, in the course of which the owners of the firm would lose full 
control over the corporation, to the benefit of “the paramount interests 
of the community”, allowing “corporate leaders” to “set forth a pro-
gram comprising fair wages, security to employees, reasonable ser-
vice to their public, and stabilization of business, all of which would 
divert a portion of the profit from the owners.”109 Berle almost 
seemed to join Dodd. One could possibly conclude that Berle’s posi-
tion was inconsistent, or that the chapter only reflected Gardiner 
Means’ views.110
104 Dodd, supra note 98, at 1145. 
105 Dodd, id., at 1153. 
106 Dodd, id., at 1162-1163. 
107 Berle, supra note 59, at 1365. 
108 BERLE, supra note 91, at 169; see also Adolf A. Berle, Foreword, in THE CORPO-
RATION IN MODERN SOCIETY ix, xii (Edward S. Mason ed. 1959). 
109 BERLE & MEANS, supra note 7, at 355-356. 
110 See William W. Bratton, Berle and Means Reconsidered at the Century’s Turn, 
26 J. CORP. L. 737, 761-762 (2001); Dalia Tsuk, From Pluralism to Individualism: 
Berle and Means and 20th-Century American Legal Thought, 30 L. & SOC. INQ.
179, 205-209 (2005); see also Marc T. Moore & Antoine Rebérioux, Corporate 
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Bratton and Wachter recently suggested a persuasive interpre-
tation of this exchange against the background of political struggles 
surrounding the New Deal. They explain that Berle and Dodd were 
adherents of different varieties of corporatism that were endorsed by 
different groups of pundits vying for the attention of the future presi-
dent Franklin Roosevelt.111 While reformers in both camps agreed 
that more centralized planning was needed to avoid the excesses of 
the capitalist system that had brought about the crisis, they differed on 
important details. The “business commonwealth” camp, some of 
whose representatives Dodd cites in his article, favored planning on 
the industry level, with powerful managers taking a prominent role. 
The Progressives, who went on to prevail in the early years of the 
Roosevelt administration, favored government planning and a signifi-
cant role of unions. Berle was a partisan of this group and played a 
prominent role in the planning of the New Deal.112 When his rebuttal 
to Dodd appeared in print, the book with Means was in the final stage 
of completion, and he had already transformed from his earlier incar-
nation as an analyst of corporate law doctrine into a New Deal Pro-
gressive. While he did not disclose these new goals in his rebuttal, his 
argument is, at its core, based on the idea that the elimination of the 
fiduciary obligation of management to shareholders would endow 
them with undesirable absolute power.113 Seen in the light of Dodd’s 
adherence to the pro-management camp in the political debate, 
Berle’s opposition to a broader duty of managers within corporate law 
seems consistent with both his earlier articles and his work with 
Means. He believed that, absent regulation, a strict duty to sharehold-
ers was the best check on managerial power, and Berle and Means 
were not only concerned with the separation of ownership from con-
trol, but maybe even more with the concentration of economic power 
Power in the Public Eye: Reassessing the Implications of Berle’s Public Consensus 
Theory, 33 U. SEATTLE L. REV. 1109, 1113-1117 (2010) (describing the view of 
Berle as a forerunner of agency theory as a myth). 
111 William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, Shareholder Primacy’s Corporatist 
Origins: Adolf Berle and the Modern Corporation, 34 J. CORP. L. 99, 122-124
(2008). 
112 Bratton & Wachter, id.
113 Berle, supra note 59, at 1367. 
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in the hands of a few:114 Acknowledging the suggestion of a corpora-
tion serving the community on its own accord to be utopian, they 
suggested that the implementation of a “communitarian” conception 
of the corporation would first require a “convincing system” to be 
worked out, in which the problem of too many principals (as we 
might say today) would be resolved.115
In his later work, Berle acknowledged that Dodd’s position 
had been proven right in the end (even on normative grounds), ar-
guing that the managerial class should accept the responsibility result-
ing from power; if they would not, America was likely to become 
more statist, as government would have to step in.116 Bratton and 
Wachter suggest that for Berle, Dodd’s position had not been right at 
the time of its publication in 1932, but had become the right answer 
only as a result of the New Deal regulatory state. Under the new sys-
tem, a large part of the economy was subject to regulation in which 
public policy was able to shape managerial action.117 In 1962, Berle 
affirmed his belief that managers could be more trusted to live up to 
the necessarily high standards in their powerful function in 1962 than 
they were in the late 1920s for this reason.118
For the objective of this paper, the most important point is that 
both Berle and Dodd were clearly taking their positions against the 
backdrop of powerful management and passive investors. The subse-
quent corporate law debate remained within the path prepared by the 
Berle-Dodd exchange. Participants differed whether managers were 
part of the problem and needed to be constrained, or whether they 
were part of the solution and deserved more discretion. By and large, 
analysts, including Berle, resigned to managerial power given the 
circumstances, but offered few alternatives. If they did, they were 
grounded rather in regulation than in corporate law.119 Managerial 
114 Tsuk, supra note 110 (pointing out this aspect of Berle and Means). 
115 BERLE & MEANS, supra note 7, at 356. 
116 BERLE, supra note 91, at 172-173. 
117 Bratton & Wachter, supra note 111, at 133-134. 
118 Adolf A. Berle, Modern Functions of the Corporate System, 62 COLUM. L. REV.
433, 437 (1962). 
119 A.A. BERLE, JR., POWER WITHOUT PROPERTY 107-110 (1959); see also Abram 
Chayes, The Modern Corporation and the Rule of Law, in THE CORPORATION IN 
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power came to be seen as an inevitable technological and organiza-
tional development, as shown by Alfred Chandler’s famous historical 
account, which credited the rise of the managerial class for the devel-
opment of the large firm and its success.120 John Kenneth Galbraith 
argued that the firm’s “technostructure”, composed of managers and 
other leading groups in the corporation, resulted in a situation where 
it led a life on its own, distant from the shareholder.121 Galbraith had 
no particular prescription for corporate governance and, maybe typi-
cal for this period, acknowledged that the goal of the firm was in 
practice no longer profit maximization (as neoclassical producer 
theory had assumed), but growth and market share. Shareholders 
seemingly were of little concern, and the stock price was of some 
minor psychological importance at best.122 Some scholars even be-
lieved shareholder voting rights to be so unimportant that they consi-
dered their abolition.123
It seems that the typical view of this period to “abuses” of 
power would have been government intervention: Berle argued that 
the legitimacy of the power of self-perpetuating managers was the 
public consensus,124 and Eugene Rostow suspected that excessive use 
of managerial power for political goals might trigger legislative reac-
tions.125 William Cary’s critique of the purported “race to the bot-
tom”126 can be understood as part of the same trend, as can be Ralph 
Nader’s proposal to “tame the giant corporations” by introducing fed-
MODERN SOCIETY 25, 40-41 (Edward S. Mason ed. 1959) (arguing that the voiceless 
position of shareholders is in fact deserved, as they are sufficiently protected by 
disclosure requirements). 
120 CHANDLER, supra note 23; see also Edward S. Mason, Introduction, in THE
CORPORATION IN MODERN SOCIETY 1, 9-10 (Edward S. Mason ed. 1959). 
121 GALBRAITH, supra note 23. 
122 Berle, supra note 118, at 446. 
123 Chayes, supra note 119, at 151; Bayless Manning, Review of Livingston: The 
American Stockholder, 67 YALE L. J. 1477, 1490-1493 (1958). 
124 BERLE, supra note 119, at 109-110. 
125 Eugene V. Rostow, To Whom and For What Ends is Corporate Management 
Responsible? in THE CORPORATION IN MODERN SOCIETY 46, 68 (Edward S. Mason 
ed. 1959). 
126 William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware,
83 YALE L. J. 663 (1974). 
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eral chartering.127 Milton Friedman’s famous 1970 essay against cor-
porate social responsibility128 seems to have represented a minority 
opinion during that period. In any case, the most important overall 
concern characterizing the debate of that time was not shareholders, 
but the absence of compelling legitimacy of managerial power that 
was thought to go beyond the economic sphere.129 All of these scho-
lars shared a concern about striking the right balance in the regulation 
of management activity primarily with a view to the shareholder-
manager relationship. With the development of the law and econom-
ics movement in the 1960s and 1970s, markets (including capital 
markets, product markets, and the market for managerial labor) were 
recognized as an additional constraint on managerial decision-
making.130 This, however, did not change the fundamental nature of 
the conflict of interest between atomistic shareholders and strong 
managers with which analysts were preoccupied. 
3.2. The irrelevance of corporate jurisprudence 
This brief account of the debate shows one important pattern: 
as one would expect in light of the prevailing share ownership pat-
terns, the issue at hand remained whether and how to constrain po-
werful managers. In the academic debate, shareholder primacy served 
to constrain managers, while the stakeholder argument did the oppo-
site. Berle was a reformer fighting for investors, while Dodd was 
aligned with managerial interests. 
Corporate case law addressing the “shareholder primacy 
norm” shows a different picture. Most Delaware cases plainly state 
that directors and officers hold a fiduciary duty to the corporation and 
127 NADER ET AL., supra note 19. See particularly id., at 75 (“in nearly every large 
American business corporation, there exists a management autocracy”).
128 Friedman, supra note 4. 
129 E.g. Mason, supra note 120, at 5-9; Rostow, supra note 125, at 60. 
130 For an important early contribution see Henry Manne, Mergers and the Market 
for Corporate Control, 73 J. POL. ECON. 110 (1965). 
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its shareholders, and have to act in the best interests of both.131 This 
seems to support an “entity” view and could even underscore a stake-
holders view,132 but analyzing linguistic details provides little benefit, 
given the scarcity of true shareholder-stakeholder conflicts outside of 
the takeover context. The most well-known cases discussing “share-
holder primacy” are old and not from leading corporate law jurisdic-
tions, the most cited ones being Dodge v. Ford Motor Co. and
Shlensky v. Wrigley.
In Dodge133, Henry Ford, the majority shareholder and direc-
tor of Ford Motors, then a privately held firm, intended to retain earn-
ings in order to expand the company and ultimately bring down the 
price of cars produced. The plaintiff Dodge brothers, who held a mi-
nority stake,134 desired a dividend because they needed the money to 
set up a competing operation.135 Ford argued that he was well within 
his rights to pursue his strategy, which he professed was motivated by 
“social and altruistic reasons.”136 The Michigan Supreme Court ob-
jected by enunciating the now famous “shareholder primacy norm”: 
131 E.g. Guth v. Loft, 5 A.2d 503, 510 (1939), Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 811 
(Del. 1984); Smith v. van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985); Cede & Co. v. 
Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 361 (Del. 1993). 
132 See Rutheford B. Campbell, Jr. & Christopher W. Frost, Managers‘ Fiduciary 
Duties in Financially Distressed Corporations: Chaos in Delaware (and Else-
where), 2007 J. CORP. L. 491, 493-494 (speculating about the interpretation of the 
term). At the very least, the Delaware courts seem to assume that the “entity” stands 
for the wealth of all financial investors. See Credit Lyonnais Bank Netherlands, 
N.V. v. Pathe Communications Corporation, 1991 Del. Ch. LEXIS 215 at n. 55 
(Dec. 30, 1991) (exploring the possibility of fiduciary duties to creditors in the 
vicinity of insolvency); N. Am. Catholic Educ. Programming Found., Inc. v. Ghee-
walla, 2007 Del. LEXIS 227 (finding that directors do not have direct fiduciary 
duties to creditors, but suggesting that creditors may bring derivative claims on 
behalf of the corporation if the firm is nearly insolvent and they are thus the residual 
claimants).
133 Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919). 
134 For a list of Ford shareholders in 1908, see M. Todd Henderson, The Story of 
Dodge v. Ford Motor Company: Everything Old is New Again, in CORPORATE LAW
STORIES 37, 49 (J. Mark Ramseyer ed. 2009).
135 Henderson, id., at 57. For a detailed account of the facts see D. Gordon Smith, 
The Shareholder Primacy Norm, 23 J. CORP. L. 277, 315-320 (1998). 
136 ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 603 (1986). 
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“[a] business corporation is organized and car-
ried on primarily for the profit of the stockholders. The 
powers of the directors are to be employed for that 
end. The discretion of directors is to be exercised in 
the choice of means to attain that end and does not ex-
tend to a change in the end itself […].”137
Ford later bought the Dodge brothers’ share, continued to pay 
high wages and produce many cars, and as a result made the company 
even more profitable.138
In Shlensky, decided in Illinois in 1968,139 the plaintiff sought 
to compel the directors of a baseball team to install lights at the sta-
dium, thus allowing evening games, a higher spectator turnout and 
more profits. Wrigley, 80% shareholder and president of the corpora-
tion, objected "that baseball is a 'daytime sport' and that the installa-
tion of lights and night baseball games will have a deteriorating effect 
upon the surrounding neighborhood."140 The court did not object to 
the contestable argument that this would ultimately hurt the firm, thus 
resulting in a long-term decline of shareholder wealth. In doing so, it 
effectively deferred the decision to the directors’ business judgment 
in the absence of any personal conflict of interest. 
Two lessons are to be drawn. First, shareholder primacy is not 
enforceable – it all depends on how incumbents rationalize their deci-
sion. Dodd was among the first to note that the Dodge court cautious-
ly avoided an “unqualified acceptance of the maximum-profit-for-
stockholders formula.”141 Modern commentators generally share this 
view. Lynn Stout points out that the precedent is hardly ever cited by 
courts.142 Robert Clark argues that Henry Ford’s mistake was not his 
137 170 N.W., at 684. 
138 Henry G. Manne, The Limits and Rationale of Corporate Altruism: An Individu-
alistic Model, 59 VA. L. REV. 708, 713 (1973). 
139 Shlensky v. Wrigley, 237 N.E. 2d. 776 (Ill. App. 1968). 
140 237 N.E. 2d. 778. 
141 Dodd, supra note 98, at 1157-1158 n. 31. 
142 Lynn A. Stout, Why We Should Stop Teaching Dodge v. Ford, 3 VA. L. & BUS.
REV. 163, 168-172 (2008) (pointing out that the case hails from an unimportant 
jurisdiction for corporate law and that the shareholder primacy statement is essen-
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decision as such but his purported social motivation,143 while in fact 
he intended to expand the company and, most of all, suppress the 
Dodge brothers’ nascent competitive venture by forcing them to sell 
him their shares at a low price.144 Thus, Ford’s professed philanthrop-
ic inclinations were a cover for actions that harmed other sharehold-
ers. By contrast, most managerial decisions with a potential share-
holder-stakeholder conflict of interests are protected by the business 
judgment rule.145 This is illustrated by Shlensky, given how the de-
fendant was able to turn a “social” argument into a shareholder pri-
macy one. Ford probably could have done the same.146
Second, both cases arose in privately-held firms with a clear 
majority shareholder and illustrate rather a majority-minority conflict 
than a shareholder-stakeholder one. Commentators often emphasize 
that the shareholder primacy norm is irrelevant in publicly traded cor-
porations,147 suggesting that modern courts would rather employ a 
duty of loyalty and minority oppression rhetoric in similar situations 
today, which had not yet been developed by the courts at that time.148
The case law on the “shareholder primacy norm” has very little to do 
with the questions that animated the academic debate before hostile 
tially a dictum that is rarely cited by courts); Henderson, supra note 134, at 34 
(“[shareholder wealth maximization] was not and is not the law.”).
143 Cf. CLARK, supra note 136, at 138, 603; see also Jonathan R. Macey, A Close 
Read of an Excellent Commentary on Dodge v. Ford, 3 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 177,
182 (2008). 
144 Cf. CLARK, id., at 604; see also Nathan Oman, Corporations and Autonomy 
Theories of Contract: A Critique of the New Lex Mercatoria, 83 DEN. U. L. Rev. 
101, 135 (2005) (providing a similar account of Dodge v. Ford). 
145 Stephen M. Bainbridge, Means and Ends, supra note 62, at 582; see also Einer 
Elhauge, Sacrificing Corporate Profits in the Public Interest, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV.
733, 775 (2005) (“So even Dodge, the high-water mark for the supposed duty to 
profit-maximize, indicates that no such enforceable duty exists.”); Macey, supra 
note 143, at 181, 190. 
146 It is also possible that the courts looked favorably on Shlensky because there was 
no apparent self-dealing or self-interested behavior involved (other than in Dodge). 
Ribstein, supra note 65, at 1470. 
147 Smith, supra note 135, at 277. 
148 E.g. Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545 (N.Y. 1928); Donahue v. Rodd Electro-
type, 328 N.E.2d 505 (Mass. 1975). See Smith, supra note 135, at 320-322. 
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takeovers emerged: or concede that it is of little practical relevance,149
particularly because of the business judgment rule. The controversy 
about Ford’s dividend had nothing to do with the small investor 
whose interests are neglected by powerful managers where control 
was separated from ownership. Addressing issues of closely held cor-
porations with controlling shareholders, the cases rather fall into the 
Continental European pattern discussed in sections 4 and 5, where the 
question is not whether and to what extent to align managers with 
shareholders, but whether and how to constrain blockholders. 
3.3. How the US differs from Germany and France 
Managerial power was the motivator of the historical US de-
bate, and the best balance of powers between shareholders and direc-
tors is still debated. As we will see subsequently, institutional theories 
of corporate law have been historically prominent in Germany and 
France. In consequence of different ownership structures, institutional 
theories of the corporation had a function they did not have in the US. 
Here, a large degree of independence of management was always 
taken for granted, given the strong position of the board in those firms 
in which most scholars were interested. Arguments against share-
holder empowerment are made in defense of the status quo. Their 
proponents suggest that US corporate law works if shareholders re-
main largely disenfranchised. 
Models of corporate law explaining the benefits of managerial 
power only work well in a corporate system characterized by an 
“atomistic” share ownership structure,150 where shareholders vote on 
few things, and when they do, they are a faceless mass of tiny finan-
cial investors. Where managers are de facto always subject to a risk 
of being replaced by a controlling shareholder, they will obviously be 
149 E.g. Jill E. Fisch, Measuring Efficiency in Corporate Law: The Role of Share-
holder Primacy, 31 J. CORP. L. 637, 651 (2006) (“no modern court has struck down 
an operational decision on the ground that it favors stakeholder interests over share-
holder interests”); WILLIAM T. ALLEN, REINIER KRAAKMAN & GUHAN SUBRAMA-
NIAN, COMMENTARIES AND CASES ON THE LAW OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS 298
(3nd ed. 2009). 
150 Cf. Bebchuk, supra note 46, at 909. 
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inclined to please him to avoid eviction.151 When there is no single 
controlling shareholder, but a number of blockholders in controlling 
or changing coalitions that carry some influence, managers and direc-
tors have a reason to please the members of these coalitions. Control-
ling shareholders may abuse their position to obtain private benefits 
from the firm, to the detriment of minority shareholders and other 
stakeholders, who may be concerned that shareholders may use their 
power to harm them.152. Minority investors will be concerned that 
controlling shareholders will do with the firm as they please and take 
large private benefits.153 And even if there is no single controlling 
shareholder, but there are blocks of share ownership that can jointly
impose their will on the firm if enough of them cooperate, there is the 
additional problem of friction. Coalitions may change, and corporate 
policies may therefore lack stability. 
In Germany and France during the periods of these historical 
debates, dispersed ownership structure was not widespread, which is 
why friction between shareholders must have been common. In the 
following two chapters, I suggest that institutional theories of corpo-
rate law had a great appeal in the debates in the early period of those 
two corporate law systems particularly because share ownership 
structures were not dispersed. Shielding corporations against share-
holders was seen as an instrument to mitigate disruptive intra-
shareholders conflicts, and to protect the firm and all of its stakehold-
ers against shareholders opportunism. 
There are of course also important political implications: Un-
like the United States, where managerial bureaucrats had replaced 
large blockholders as a politically powerful elite,154 “capitalist” 
shareholders persisted in France and Germany. To those concerned 
151 E.g. Gérard Charreaux & Philippe Desbrières, Corporate Governance: Stake-
holder Value versus Shareholder Value, 5 J. MGMT. & GOV. 107, 116 (2001). 
152 Gelter, supra note 6, at 154-168, 168-176. 
153 E.g. Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, A Survey of Corporate Governance, 
52 J. FIN. 737, 754-755 (1997); John Armour, Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraak-
man, Agency Problems and Legal Strategies, in THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE 
LAW 35, 36 (2nd. ed., Reinier Kraakman et al. 2009). 
154 Mark S. Mizruchi & Daniel Hirschman, The Modern Corporation as Social 
Construction, 33 U. SEATTLE L. REV. 1065, 1075-1076 (2010). 
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how corporations could help to pursue the public interest, danger to 
that purpose was emanating from those shareholders, and not primari-
ly from management. One could summarize the difference to the US 
by saying that the debate was not about the optimal extent of con-
straints on management, but of constraints on shareholder power. 
4. German block ownership and the theory of the 
“Unternehmen an sich“
The German corporate governance system is notorious for its 
focus on stakeholder interests.155 The main reason is codetermination 
on German supervisory boards, which creates a limited, but signifi-
cant influence of employees on corporate decision-making by grant-
ing them a number of mandatory seats.156 While its roots can be 
traced back to the early years after World War I,157 the current system 
took shape after World War II – partially in response to the large 
firms’ cooperation with the Nazis,158 and culminated in the 1976 Act, 
which requires equal representation in firms with more than 2000 
employees.159
German corporate law has also long been dominated by an 
understanding of the corporation as an entity distinct from sharehold-
ers and the idea of an “interest of the firm” or “of the business.” The 
155 Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 3, at 444-446. 
156 See e.g. Katharina Pistor, Codetermination: A Sociopolitical Model with Gover-
nance Externalities, in EMPLOYEES AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 163 (Margaret 
M. Blair & Mark J. Roe eds. 1999); Luca Enriques, Henry Hansmann & Reinier 
Kraakman, The Basic Governance Structure: Minority Shareholders and Non-
Shareholder Constituencies, in THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW 89, 100-101
(2nd ed. Reinier Kraakman et al. 2009). 
157 Employee participation was introduced shortly after World War I, but abolished 
by the Nazis. HERMAN KNUDSEN, EMPLOYEE PARTICIPATION IN EUROPE 32 (1995); 
Pistor, id., at 166; Otto Kahn-Freund, Industrial Democracy, 6 INDUS. L. J. 65, 83-
84 (1977) (describing it as a “half-hearted scheme”); Roth, supra note 31, at 62-63. 
158 KNUDSEN, id., at 33. There was concern that the Western allies might otherwise 
have dismantled the iron and steel industries. Pistor, supra note 156, at 167; Roth, 
supra note 31, at 73. 
159 Pistor, id., at 168-175. In the case of a tied vote, the vote of the chairman, who is 
invariably a shareholder representative, is decisive. 
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theoretical underpinnings go back to an academic debate of the 1920s 
and early 1930s. Section 4.1 describes the environment to which this 
debate reacted, namely a system with powerful (controlling) share-
holders. Section 4.2 describes the development of German institution-
al theory of the “business in itself” during the 1920s and 1930s, and 
what influence it had on the 1937 corporate law reform. Section 4.3 
looks at its post-war reception and its consequences for corporate law 
today, and section 4.4 looks at the Mannesmann decision as a promi-
nent example. Section 4.5 concludes by linking it to ownership struc-
ture and the overarching thesis of this article. 
4.1. In the realm of majority shareholders 
One might feel tempted to trace the German proclivity to an 
institutional theory of the corporation and stakeholder orientation to 
19th century legal theory. However, while Otto von Gierke’s espousal 
of a natural entity theory of the firm near the end of the 19th century160
is well known, the roots of a German “stakeholder theory” are more 
recent. Legal policy remained steeped in economic liberalism in the 
late 19th and the early 20th century, and the law continued to emphas-
ize shareholders’ ownership of the corporation, as a result of which 
shareholders retained complete control over corporate matters during 
that period.161 For example, the Reichsgericht (the German Supreme 
Court at that time), opined in a 1904 decision that the purpose of the 
corporation is “to work for shareholders and to reassign its assets to 
them, during its existence in the form of profits, after its dissolution 
by means of distribution.”162 While the context of this statement is 
highly peculiar and the significance of the rhetoric should not be ex-
aggerated,163 subsequent decisions – primarily addressing majority-
160 OTTO GIERKE, DAS DEUTSCHE GENOSSENSCHAFTSRECHT (1868). 
161 Gerald Spindler, Verfassung der Aktiengesellschaft: Vorbemerkung, note 8, in
MÜNCHENER KOMMENTAR ZUM AKTIENGESETZ, BAND 3 (3rd ed., Wulf Goette, 
Christian Habersack & Susanne Kalss eds, 2008).  
162 RGZ 59, 423, 425 [own translation]. 
163 Like other “shareholder primacy v. stakeholder” cases, the decision arose from a 
conflict among shareholders. The core issue was whether the founding founding 
shareholders’ oral commitment to proportionally reimburse the corporation for the 
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minority conflicts – continued to be based on a contractual under-
standing of the firm. Up to the 1920s, the “interest of the corporation” 
continued to be defined as what had been decided in the shareholder 
meeting,164 e.g. in the Hibernia case, where the majority (several 
banks) had decided to issue preferred shares (without preemptive 
rights) in order to prevent the Prussian government from gaining con-
trol.165
4.2. The dark origins of German institutionalism 
Subsequently, the Weimar Republic saw a debate about the 
concept of the “enterprise in itself” (Unternehmen an sich) during the 
Weimar Republic, which is usually cited as the origin of the move-
ment towards what we might call stakeholder orientation today, but is 
more accurately described as the beginning of the emancipation of the 
corporation from its shareholders. The most important antecedent of 
the debate was Walther Rathenau, who published a booklet about the 
state of affairs of corporations in 1917 (“Vom Aktienwesen”).166 Ra-
thenau was an industrialist, social theorist, and politician.167 Describ-
ing how German corporations had been transformed from ventures of 
a small number of business partners into truly great enterprises during 
the past decades, and how family ownership was disappearing,168 he 
addressed various corporate governance issues such as the role of the 
members of the supervisory board. Corporate law, he argued, had not 
been able to keep up with progress. His main concern, however, was 
apparently interference from shareholders. To some extent his treat-
administrative costs of incorporation qualfied as a gift, which would have required 
notarization to be enforceable. 
164 RGZ 68, 314, 317; RGZ 85, 170, 172; RGZ 107, 67, 71. See FRANK LAUX, DIE
LEHRE VOM UNTERNEHMEN AN SICH 37-38 (1998) (surveying the case law). 
165 RGZ 68, 235, 246. 
166 WALTHER RATHENAU, VOM AKTIENWESEN. EINE GESCHÄFTLICHE BETRACH-
TUNG (1917). For good overviews see e.g. ADOLF GROSSMANN, UNTERNEHMENS-
ZIELE IM AKTIENRECHT 141-143 (1980); RIECHERS, supra note 96, at 7-10. 
167 A member of the liberal Deutsche Demokratische Partei (German Democratic 
Party), he was assassinated by right-wing extremists while serving as foreign minis-
ter in 1922. 
168 RATHENAU, id., at 7-13, 23-25. 
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ment of shareholder involvement seems odd to a modern reader 
schooled in thinking about corporate governance in terms of owner-
ship structures and agency problems. He did not distinguish between 
blockholders and dispersed investors, but between long-term share-
holders expecting an adequate yield on their investment and specula-
tors seeking short-term capital gains.169 Rathenau was preoccupied 
mainly with the latter group and denounced, for example, that corpo-
rate law no longer required a minimum time period of stock owner-
ship before a shareholder was entitled to vote.170 He also criticized 
that legal scholars, courts and newspapers frequently exhorted man-
agers to follow the wishes of the shareholder meeting.171 In spite of 
being an advocate of democracy in the political arena, he pointed out 
that even democratic states typically do not allow parliament to vote 
on each and every issue, but delegate day-to-day activities to a small-
er group of people.172 Hypothesizing that the shareholders of Deut-
sche Bank could vote to liquidate the firm, he argued that the gov-
ernment could not allow this to happen and would surely interfere by 
passing a special law.173 He did not clarify why the firm’s assets 
should be worth more than the stock price, so that it would pay for 
shareholders to vote for such a proposal and invest the proceeds in 
government bonds;174 however, in this context he made his famous 
connection between corporate law and the public interest, suggesting 
that large firms were an important factor in the national economy, 
whose significance exceeded private interests by far.175
169 RATHENAU, id., at 26. 
170 RATHENAU, id., at 29. 
171 RATHENAU, id., at 34. 
172 RATHENAU, id., at 59. 
173 RATHENAU, id., at 39. Landsberger, writing in 1932, sees Rathenau’s prediction 
as confirmed in view of government intervention in favor of banks during the global 
economic crisis. See Herbert Landsberger, Der Rechtsgedanke des „Unternehmens 
an sich“ und das neue Aktienrecht, 7 ZENTRALBLATT FÜR HANDELSRECHT 79, 82
(1932). 
174 Theoretically, such a theory might have arisen if the government had pressured 
Deutsche Bank e.g. into extending unprofitable loans. Rathenau discusses this pos-
sibility in the context of the war economy, which may explain the particular con-
cern for the public interest.  
175 RATHENAU, id., at 38. 
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While this reference has often been interpreted as promoting a 
communitarian conception of the economy,176 Rathenau’s booklet 
rather gives the impression of a director complaining about annoying 
shareholders than that of one developing an economic or social 
theory. Haussmann, Rathenau’s most frequently cited critic, ex-
plained that his classification of shareholders and his focus on specul-
ative investors with his personal experience at AEG, the German 
equivalent to GE founded by Rathenau’s father. In that company, 
management indeed faced “an unspecified multitude of shareholders 
without a particular majority group.”177 Haussmann criticized that 
Rathenau gave insufficient consideration to the role of large share-
holders, while in reality firms with majority groups were more com-
mon.178 In a longer book published in 1918 (“Von kommenden Din-
gen”), in which Rathenau summarized his social, political and eco-
nomic visions, he described how large corporations were turning into 
“institutions resembling the state”179 He suggested that the “joy of 
creation” was already overshadowing the desire for financial profit, 
and that the “official idealism identical with that prevailing in public 
service” dominated.180 It may well have been this highly optimistic 
view of both management and public service that encouraged his 
hopes that autonomous corporations, standing between the private 
176 See Oskar Netter, Zur aktienrechtlichen Theorie des „Unternehmens an sich“, in 
FESTSCHRIFT HERRN RECHTSANWALT UND NOTAR JUSTIZRAT DR. JUR.H.C. ALBERT
PINNER ZU SEINEM 75. GEBURTSTAG 507, 547-550 (Deutscher Anwaltsverein, Berli-
ner Anwaltsverein & Firma Walter De Gruyter & Co. eds. 1932) (criticizing 
Haussmann for exaggerating Rathenau’s communitarian ideas). 
177 FRITZ HAUSSMANN, VOM AKTIENWESEN UND VOM AKTIENRECHT 20 (1928).
Haussmann uses the term “AEG type” to describe firms that we might call “Berle-
Means” type firms today. It is possible that hyperinflation had led to increased 
ownership concentration in the early 1920s. Infra notes 195-197 and accompanying 
text. Against this backdrop, Netter’s assessment that Rathenau wanted to protect the 
majority from the minority does not seem accurate. See Netter, id., at 552.
178 HAUSSMANN, id., at 26. 
179 WALTHER RATHENAU, VON KOMMENDEN DINGEN 143 (1918). Other than his 
booklet on corporate law, this work was also translated into English and cited by 
Berle and Means. See WALTHER RATHENAU, IN DAYS TO COME 121 (transl. Eden & 
Cedar Paul 1921). 
180 RATHENAU, VON KOMMENDEN DINGEN, id., at 144-145; RATHENAU, IN DAYS TO 
COME, id., at 122-123. 
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sector and the state, could become a building block of the post-
capitalist society he was expecting to develop.181
At first glance it might seem that Rathenau, the publication of 
whose 1917 booklet is often seen as a defining moment for the Ger-
man debate (i.e. comparable to the role of the Berle-Dodd debate in 
the US), cannot easily be placed into the theory of this article, given 
the apparent assumption of a dispersed ownership structure. However, 
it is indeed typically Continental, as the dispersed ownership structure 
described by Rathenau is not entirely the atomistic version encoun-
tered by Berle and Means, where shareholders are purely passive, but 
a distinct German variety, where they are not. His concern was clear-
ly not excessive managerial power, but the intervention of sharehold-
ers (both the majority and the demands of investors), for example by 
requesting dividends, thus depleting liquidity. Managers had to make 
concessions to these demands. While Americans were discussing the 
extent of managerial power and whether to constrain them, Rathe-
nau’s concern was how to protect the company and its business ac-
tivity from shareholders. Within the framework of the US debate, one 
might be inclined to group him with scholars defending the powerful 
role of management.182 However, given the focus on public policy in 
his second book, he should better be classified as close to social plan-
ners such as Berle after the New Deal. Nevertheless, it seems that this 
aspect of his work was not the one that primarily influenced the de-
bate among legal commentators advancing an institutional theory of 
the corporation. 
Among these, Haussmann was the first to address Rathenau’s 
theories. He coined the term “Unternehmen an sich” and used it to 
describe how he understood Rathenau,183 criticizing him and other 
economic theorists, including John Maynard Keynes, who had sug-
gested that large corporations tended towards “self-socialization” in a 
181 RATHENAU, VON KOMMENDEN DINGEN, id., at 146-150; RATHENAU, IN DAYS TO 
COME, id., at 124-128. 
182 E.g. Stephan M. Bainbridge, The Case for Limited Shareholder Voting Rights, 
53 UCLA L. REV. 601 (2006); contra Bebchuk, supra note 46, at 833. 
183 RIECHERS, supra note 96, at 16. 
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lecture given in Berlin in 1926.184 Haussmann studied the major con-
flicts of interest within firms and argues that, while the interests of the 
controlling shareholder typically coincide with that of the “business 
in itself”, the main conflict being the one between large shareholders 
and transient investors.185 His legal argument did not rest on the 
“business in itself”, as he argued that the corporation was not an end 
in itself, but on the “collective interest of shareholders.” He suggested 
that shareholders were tied to this interest, which should be used to 
provide the decisive balance in cases of conflicts.186
Other legal writers, however, viewed the concept of an inde-
pendent interest of the corporation more favorably, such as Oskar 
Netter, who espoused the theory of the Unternehmen an sich as a le-
gal theory rooted in the real life of corporations.187 Shares held by the 
firm’s management – a controversial issue during the Weimar Repub-
lic – should be deemed permissible unless they were not used to con-
vey special advantages to the controllers to the detriment of the cor-
poration.188 The use of voting rights by shareholders should be li-
mited by the duty of loyalty, he argued, which is tied to the interest of 
the corporation; the duty of loyalty thus implied recognition of the 
principle of the “business in itself”.189 This interest should also be the 
measure in majority-minority conflicts about the firm’s business poli-
cies,190 and in disputes about the extent to which the firm should be 
184 JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, DAS ENDE DES LAISSEZ-FAIRE: IDEEN ZU VERBIN-
DUNG VON PRIVAT- UND GEMEINWIRTSCHAFT 32-33 (1926); JOHN MAYNARD 
KEYNES, THE END OF LAISSEZ-FAIRE 42-43 (1926) (German and English publica-
tion of this lecture); see HAUSSMANN, supra note 177, at 30. Keynes was in fact 
describing the weak position of shareholders in large firms, in which case manage-
ment was no longer promoting maximum profits for shareholders, but able to rele-
gate them to receiving “adequate dividends.”  
185 HAUSSMANN, id., at 52-54. 
186 Fritz Haussmann, Gesellschaftsinteresse und Interessenpolitik in der Aktienge-
sellschaft, 30 BANK-ARCHIV 57, 64-65 (1930). For a description of the development 
of his views, see RIECHERS, supra note 96, at 21. 
187 Netter, supra note 176, at 583. 
188 Netter, id., at 587. 
189 Netter, id., at 592. 
190 Netter, id., at 596-599. 
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permitted to withhold dividends from distribution.191 Similarly, 
Landsberger argued that the corporation had developed into an inde-
pendent organization, thereby establishing the Unternehmen an sich 
as a real-world fact to be reflected by the law.192 The business orga-
nized as a corporation was to be considered a purpose in itself, and 
the underlying legal principle a factor needed to balance the interests 
of “providers of capital, owners, proprietors of influence”, who “even 
where they possess a majority, are pitted against the interest of the 
totality of shareholders, which is recognized as a legal person by the 
law.”193 Landsberger, who cited Gierke’s theory as a basis for his, 
argued that the point of the theory is simply to emphasize the impor-
tance of the entirety of shareholders, as opposed to their individual 
interests; stability of the corporation was the key, also in view of the 
public significance of the firm.194
The Weimar period saw an intense discussion about the term 
that extended beyond the handful of authors referred to here. While 
the idea of managerial independence had adherents in socialist circles, 
it served business interests as well. The hyperinflation period of fol-
lowing World War I had facilitated the acquisition of large ownership 
shares and changes in the prevailing majorities due to the redistribu-
tive effects of inflation, and possibly because the prices of stocks did 
not grow as fast as inflation.195 This helped in particular foreign ac-
quirers, whose actions caused concern about excessive foreign influ-
ence.196 While the development of ownership structure during that 
191 Netter, id., at 600-602. 
192 Landsberger, supra note 173, at 84, 88. 
193 Landsberger, id., at 86. 
194 Landsberger, id., at 87-88. 
195 Heinz-Dieter Assmann, in 1 GROSSKOMMENTAR AKTIENGESETZ, Einleitung,
comment 131 (Klaus J. Hopt & Herbert Wiedemann eds. 1992); LAUX, supra note 
164, at 127.  
196 Curt Eduard Fischer, Rechtsschein und Wirklichkeit im Aktienrecht, 154 ARCHIV
FÜR DIE CIVILISTISCHE PRAXIS 85, 101 (1955); Assmann, id.; Gerald Spindler, 
Kriegsfolgen, Konzernbildung und Machtfrage als zentrale Aspekte der aktienrecht-
lichen Diskussion in der Weimarer Republik, in 1 AKTIENRECHT IM WANDEL 440, 
note 17 (Walter Bayer & Mathias Habersack eds. 2007). 
TAMING OR PROTECTING THE MODERN CORPORATION?  8/19/2010 
48
period is not clear,197 managers and controlling shareholders therefore 
began to entrench their positions through by multiple-vote shares or 
shares to a trustee of the corporation, typically banks, which increased 
the influence of these institutions on industrial firms.198 Curt Fisch-
er199, viewing the debate on the Unternehmen an sich in retrospect 
after World War II, criticized the erosion of individual rights of 
shareholders and disclosure duties, while divergences from the one-
share-one-vote principle increased, so that large shareholders’ became 
more entrenched and powerful.200 The opinions voiced in the course 
of the debate were highly diverse, and the same is true for its academ-
ic assessment in later decades. While some argued that its purpose 
was to legitimize the power of managers and the group of sharehold-
ers supporting it,201 others suggested that the point was rather to em-
power directors, who had no particular interest in shareholder profits, 
to advance “general economic concerns”.202
While all of these readings seem well-founded in some aspect 
of the complex debate, for the objective of this article it is necessary 
197 Caroline Fohlin, The History of Ownership and Control in Germany, in A HIS-
TORY OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AROUND THE WORLD 223, 229 (Randall K. 
Morck ed. 2005). 
198 See e.g. Assmann, supra note 195, at 133; Fohlin, id., at 262-263; Spindler, id. 
notes 21-50. 
199 In the mid-1930s the young Curt Fischer had still criticized the proposals of the 
corporate law reform committee as not having absorbed Nazism to a sufficient 
degree. E.g. Curt Fischer, Führerprinzip und Verantwortlichkeit im neuen deut-
schen Aktienrecht, 1934 DER PRAKTISCHE BETRIEBSWIRT 29; Curt Fischer, Resigna-
tion vor der Anonymität in der A.-G., 1934 DIE DEUTSCHE VOLKSWIRTSCHAFT 
1004. On Fischer’s biography see Werner Schubert, Einleitung zu Band I, in 1 
AKADEMIE FÜR DEUTSCHES RECHT 1933-1945, PROTOKOLLE DER AUSSCHÜSSE:
AUSSCHUSS FÜR AKTIENRECHT XX, XXX n. 70 (Werner Schubert, Werner Schmid 
& Jürgen Regge eds. 1986) [hereinafter: AKADEMIE FÜR DEUTSCHES RECHT]. 
200 Fischer, id., at 94-101; see also CLAUS OTT, RECHT UND REALITÄT DER UNTER-
NEHMENSKORPORATION 179 (1977). 
201 Fischer, id., at 101-106; ERNST-JOACHIM MESTMÄCKER, VERWALTUNG, KON-
ZERNGEWALT UND RECHTE DER AKTIONÄRE 13-16 (1958); RUDOLF WIETHÖLTER,
INTERESSEN UND ORGANISATION IM AMERIKANISCHEN UND DEUTSCHEN RECHT 38
(1961). 
202 WOLFGANG ZÖLLNER, DIE SCHRANKEN MITGLIEDSCHAFTLICHER STIMM-
RECHTSMACHT BEI DEN PRIVATRECHTLICHEN PERSONENVERBÄNDEN 69 (1963);
RIECHERS, supra note 96, at 177. 
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to focus on another one that seems not to have received a lot of atten-
tion, namely the role of ownership structure. To that end, it is neces-
sary to distinguish Rathenau from the legal writers of the late 1920s 
and 1930s, who had different objectives. Rathenau did not believe he 
had much to say about corporate law and merely observed the separa-
tion of ownership and control, much as Berle and Means did in the 
US. As Haussmann pointed out, Rathenau’s view was distorted by his 
personal experience at AEG, while concentrated ownership prevailed 
in most large German firms. His hope that autonomous large firms 
would contribute to the development of his utopian world of tomor-
row was therefore of little significance. However, with his managerial 
background he was typical insofar as he voiced concern about share-
holder decisions and requests, which set him sharply apart from the 
later American debate. The German legal writers a decade later had a 
similar concern that was unimportant in the Berle-Means world, 
namely conflicts of interest between shareholders that apparently 
were a lot more important in the German corporate world of that time 
than in the US. These authors followed a “sociological” method of the 
law, which viewed the law and the real world as mutually depen-
dent.203 Thus, legal authors such as Netter204, Landsberger205 and Gei-
ler206 argued that shareholders should be constrained in their decision-
making by the interests of the business, understood as a separate enti-
ty from shareholders. The theory of the Unternehmen an sich, even 
though it was not always explicitly referred to, was intended to con-
strain shareholders. Even Haussmann, who denied the independent 
interest of the interest of the business (or of the firm) sought to limit 
shareholder influence by tying them to the interest of the “entirety of 
203 Karl Geiler, Die wirtschaftsrechtliche Methode im Gesellschaftsrecht, 68 BEI-
TRÄGE ZUR ERLÄUTERUNG DES DEUTSCHEN RECHTS (GRUCHOTS BEITRÄGE) 592
(1927); KARL GEILER, BEITRÄGE ZUM MODERNEN RECHT 35 (1933) (both arguing 
that “is” and “ought” should not be seen as separate, and suggesting the application 
of legal sociology in corporate law). On the transient flirtation of early 20th century 
scholars with legal realism see generally Kristoffel Grechenig & Martin Gelter, The 
Transatlantic Divergence in Legal Thought: American Law and Economics vs. 
German Doctrinalism, 31 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 295 (2008). 
204 Netter, supra note 176, at 592. 
205 Landsberger, supra note 173, at 87-88. 
206 GEILER, supra note 203, at 82. 
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shareholders.”207 Given this difference in emphasis, Haussmann can 
probably be classified as a shareholder primacist. Rathenau had may-
be misunderstood the preeminent problems under the most common 
type of ownership structure, and the goals of his initial sermon were 
those of a practitioner. However, both he and later authors sought to 
protect managerial power from shareholders, which stands in contrast 
to the concern about managerial power emphasized by Berle and 
Means. 
The case law underwent a parallel development, in which the 
Reichsgericht (Supreme Court) moved away from the majority-
focused understanding of power within the firm. In the 1927 “Ham-
burg-Süd” opinion, it gave its blessings to a shareholder decision to 
increase the firm’s capital by issuing new multiple-vote shares to a 
consortium controlled by the management and supervisory board 
members, from which other shareholders were excluded.208 The effect 
was effective entrenchment, given that only 25% of par value had to 
be paid up front, while the outstanding stock traded at 220%.209 While 
most of the court’s approval of the takeover defense (another bank 
was threatening to take over the firm) is relentlessly positivistic,210
the opinion also declines that the structure could be contrary to public 
policy, since there were good reasons why the firm should be pro-
tected from shareholders: 
“It is obvious that the financial expansion and 
protection of the corporation in particular are of deci-
sive significance to secure its autonomy and indepen-
dence, and that a blocking majority in its common 
stock could endanger its viability and, in any case, the 
207 Haussmann, supra note 186, at 64. Netter criticized Hausmann’s reliance on the 
“collective interest” of shareholders as inappropriate, since the collective interest 
could not be the sum of individual interests. Therefore, the only way would be to 
rely on majority decisions, which would be problematic because of private benefits 
of control. See Netter, supra note 176, at 577-578. 
208 RGZ 119, 248. 
209 RIECHERS, supra note 96, at 113. 
210 The court emphasizes that none of the individual elements of this early takeover 
protection was contrary to the law. 
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beneficial continued development of the corpora-
tion…This is absolutely in line with other provisions 
of the defendant firm’s articles, which obviously aim 
at preserving the enterprise in itself and its autoch-
thonous character while repelling shareholders’ inter-
ests.”211
Generally, the case law was moving towards putting more 
limits on shareholders conduct in exercising their right to vote during 
the 1920s. After describing the case law, a 1930 article summarized 
the state of the law as follows: 
“Nothing prevents a shareholder from letting 
his own interests guide his vote. However, the ballot, 
and thus the shareholder resolution, is against public 
policy if the majority pursues selfish goals in a one-
sided way at the cost of the company, or at the cost of 
the minority without this cost being necessitated by the 
good of the company.”212
The intense Weimar Republic and early Nazi Germany de-
bates about the reform of corporate law ultimately led to § 70 of the 
1937 Aktiengesetz, which is often cited in the stakeholder debate. It 
stated that the management board was required 
“to manage the corporation as the good of the 
enterprise and its retinue and the common wealth of 
folk and realm demand.”213
211 RGZ 119, 256 (own translation). The plaintiff was an association of sharehold-
ers. RIECHERS, supra note 96, at 112. 
212 Walter Horrwitz, Über die Freiheit der Abstimmung im Aktienrecht, 59 JURISTI-
SCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT 2637, 2638 (1930). 
213 § 70 German AktG of 1937, translation following Detlev F. Vagts, Reforming 
the “Modern” Corporation: Perspectives from the German, 80 HARV. L. REV. 23,
40 (1966). “Folk and realm” is used here to translate “Volk und Reich”, a wording 
that (at least today) would be clearly associated with Nazism that was duly purged 
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Most importantly,214 the reform turned the relationship be-
tween management and shareholders on its head. The management 
board was charged by the law with the exclusive responsibility of 
managing the company215, with unsolicited interference by the super-
visory board or by shareholders not being legally binding.216 While 
previously the meeting of shareholders had been the supreme control-
ling body,217 its role now became a comparatively limited one.218
Since 1937, the law requires the management board to be appointed 
and dismissed by the supervisory board. A premature revocation of a 
management board member requires cause (which could simply be a 
shareholder vote of no confidence if it is not obviously abusive).219
Supervisory board members can only be dismissed prematurely by a 
from the law in the 1965 reform. Raiser‘s proposal to translate “Gefolgschaft” as 
“membership”, is highly questionable.. See Thomas Raiser, The Theory of Enter-
prise Law in the Federal Republic of Germany, 36 AM. J. COMP. L. 111, 123 (1988). 
214 RIECHERS, supra note 96, at 167 (suggesting that the practical importance of § 
70 was close to zero compared to other reforms). 
215 § 76(1) AktG. 
216 Hans Joachim Mertens, in KÖLNER KOMMENTAR ZUM AKTIENGESETZ, § 76, 
comment 42 (vol. 2, 2nd ed., Wolfang Zöllner ed. 1988/1996); Gerald Spindler, in
MÜNCHENER KOMMENTAR ZUM AKTIENGESETZ, BAND 3, § 76, comment 22 (3rd ed., 
Wulf Goette, Matthias Habersack & Susanne Kalss eds., 2008); UWE HÜFFER, AK-
TIENGESETZ, § 76, comment 10 (9th ed. 2010) (pointing out that there is no fiduciary 
relationship between members of the management board and shareholders); see also 
BGH 30.3.1967, II ZR 245/63, 1967 NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT 1462; 
Dieter Eckert, Shareholder and Management: A Comparative View on Some Cor-
porate Problems in the United States and Germany, 46 IOWA L. REV. 12, 20 (1960).
217 On the historic development see e.g. Hefermehl & Semler, supra note 161,
comments 10-20. 
218 The provision is mandatory [HÜFFER, supra note 216, § 23, comment 36] , ex-
cept for the case of a control agreements under § 291(1) AktG, according to which a 
controlling entity (an “enterprise” such as a parent company) has the right to control 
the firm, but is subject to certain special duties. See generally Peter Hommelhoff, 
Protection of Minority Shareholders, Investors and Creditors in Corporate Groups: 
the Strengths and Weaknesses of German Corporate Group Law, 2 EUR. BUS. ORG.
L. REV. 61, 64-66 (2001); John Armour, Gerard Hertig & Hideki Kanda, Transac-
tions with Creditors, in THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW 115, 127-128 (2nd ed.,
Reinier Kraakman et al. 2009); Luca Enriques, Gerard Hertig & Hideki Kanda, 
Related Party Transactions, in THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW 153, 176-178
(2nd ed., Reinier Kraakman et al. 2009). 
219 § 84(3) AktG. 
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supermajority of three quarters in the shareholder meeting.220 Since 
the reform, the shareholder meeting can legally only get involved in 
management decisions when a decision is submitted for a vote by 
management.221 Franz Schlegelberger, the leading official in the 
German Ministry of Justice at the time of the reform, famously de-
scribed the shareholder meeting as the “dethroned king” of the corpo-
ration.222
The extent to which the previous debate had influenced these 
reforms has recently become a matter of dispute. According to the 
traditional narrative that emerged after World War II, the 1937 Act 
was the legislative conclusion of a broader current in a Weimar-era 
legal and economic thought that had begun with Rathenau,223 al-
though was also compatible with the Nazi Führerprinzip (leader prin-
ciple), which exalted the role of the president of the management 
board over other members.224 Even Fischer, who had opposed the 
Unternehmen an sich during the 1930s,225 suggested that the idea of 
the “leader principle” did not bring about too many new develop-
220 § 103(1) AktG. 
221 § 119(2) AktG. Previously, the shareholder has been entitled to give instructions 
to management under § 235 HGB. 
222 FRANZ SCHLEGELBERGER, DIE ERNEUERUNG DES DEUTSCHEN AKTIENRECHTS 28
(1935). Schlegelberger served as the Third Reich’s minister of justice in 1941/42 
and served some years in prison after the war. See also E. Geßler, Vorstand und 
Aufsichtsrat im neuen Aktienrecht, 66 JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT 497, 497
(1937) (pointing out that previously large shareholders and banks had ensured that 
the shareholder meetings had the desired content). 
223 E.g. BRUNO KROPFF, AKTIENGESETZ 13 (1965) (official report on the 1965 
reform); Vagts, supra note 213, at 48; Knut Wolfgang Nörr, Zur Entwicklung des 
Aktien- und Konzernrechts während der Weimarer Republik, 150 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR 
DAS GESAMTE HANDELS- UND WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT 155, 161 (1986); RIECHERS,
supra note 96, at 166; DIRK BAHRENFUSS, DIE ENTSTEHUNG DES AKTIENGESETZES 
VON 1965, 45 (2001); SUSANNE KALSS, CHRISTINA BURGER & GEORG ECKERT, DIE 
ENTWICKLUNG DES ÖSTERREICHISCHEN AKTIENRECHTS 320 (2003). 
224 See Jan von Hein, Vom Vorstandvorsitzenden zum CEO? 166 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR 
DAS GESAMTE HANDELS- UND WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT 464, 475 (2002). 
225 Fischer, Führerprinzip, supra note 199, at 29. 
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ments, but rather in a codification of the corporate practice of several 
decades.226
Interestingly, American law was one of the sources of inspira-
tion for German policymakers after the Nazi takeover: Johannes 
Zahn, who had completed an S.J.D. degree at Harvard Law School,227
criticized the theory of the “Unternehmen an sich” for carrying Marx-
ist thought into private law,228 but nevertheless proposed the powerful 
position of the board in the US as the basis for German reform in his 
1934 book in order to restructure the relationship between sharehold-
ers and directors in Germany. Like their American counterparts, 
German directors should become leaders of a business organism in-
dependent from changing majorities among shareholders.229 Zahn, 
who spoke before the corporate law reform committee’s work in 
1934,230 agreed with the plan to strengthen the role of management, 
as he was personally close to banking and business circles.231
226 Fischer, supra note 196, at 109. 
227 According to the title page of the book. In the preface he reports having worked 
as “scientific assistant at the Seminar for Comparative Private Law of Harvard 
University.” 
228 JOHANNES C. D. ZAHN, WIRTSCHAFTSFÜHRERTUM UND VERTRAGSETHIK IM 
NEUEN AKTIENRECHT. ANREGUNGEN ZUM NEUBAU DES DEUTSCHEN AKTIENRECHTS 
AUF GRUND EINER VERGLEICHENDEN DARSTELLUNG DES DEUTSCHEN UND NORD-
AMERIKANISCHEN AKTIENRECHTS 39 (1934). 
229 ZAHN, id., at 94. While Zahn emphasized that American law, not having been 
influenced by Roman law, was based on “Teutonic” legal principles, he suggested 
that the strong position of directors in the US stems from the idea of liberty of the 
individual (as businessman), a precept that entirely differed from what was consi-
dered “German” at that time. ZAHN, id., at 13, 201 passim. However, Zahn also 
discussed Dodge v. Ford in great detail and concluded that managers should act to 
the benefit of shareholders (id., at 41-48). The Berle-Dodd exchange apparently 
came too late to be included in his book. 
230 Schubert, supra note 199, at XLVII (thanking Ernst Geßler, one of the leading 
drafters of both the 1937 and 1965 acts, for bringing this to his attention); von Hein, 
supra note 224, at 476; contra Bernd Mertens, Das Aktiengesetz von 1937 – unpoli-
tischer Schlussstein oder ideologischer Neuanfang? 29 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR NEUERE 
RECHTSGESCHICHTE 88, 98 n.54 (2007). Mertens argues that the pre-1945 sources 
do not support the claim of Zahn’s influence, and that German law moved even 
further away from the US board system by inhibiting the supervisory board’s in-
volvement in management. It is true that Zahn recognized that the ideological basis 
of managerial leadership was different in the US. However, von Hein (id., at 476) 
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In a recent article, Bernd Mertens doubts the received wisdom 
and argues that the reforms were not the logical continuation of a pre-
vious development, but rather an ideological new beginning.232 He 
suggests that the reason for the preponderant view (according to 
which Nazi ideology was merely reflected by some of the language of 
the law) was that scholars and policymakers sought to distance them-
selves from that period.233 He is of course right in pointing out that 
the 1930 draft for a new corporate law did not include the provisions 
discussed here,234 and that the discussion about the Unternehmen an 
sich doctrine remained controversial.235 However, even Hjalmar 
Schacht, the Minister of Industry, opposed the most extreme propos-
als that might have implemented a completely authoritarian Führer-
prinzip, which would have eliminated any residual shareholder con-
trol. Schacht conceded that large firms needed to obtain capital, 
which would not be possible without at least limited shareholder in-
fluence.236
correctly points out that ZAHN (id., at 17) considered the “leader principle” to be a 
fixture of American corporate law and that his participation in committee meetings 
is proven by the minutes. He presented his case before the corporate law committee 
of the Academy of German law on February 9, 1934. While he did not explicitly 
refer to American law, he proposed to make management independent from share-
holders in order to allow the “average investor” to see management as “the entre-
preneur”, and to establish a clearer duty of loyalty between shareholders. See AKA-
DEMIE FÜR DEUTSCHES RECHT, supra note 199, at 60-65 (transcript of the meeting). 
231 RIECHERS, supra note 96, at 159. 
232 Mertens, supra note 230, at 91-108. 
233 Mertens, id., at 115. 
234 Reichsjustizministrerium, Entwurf eines Gesetzes über Aktiengesellschaften und 
Kommanditgesellschaften auf Aktien, reprinted in 2 QUELLEN ZUR AKTIENRECHTS-
REFORM DER WEIMARER REPUBLIK (1926-1931) 847 (Werner Schubert ed. 1999). 
235 An overview is provided by RIECHERS, supra note 96, at 154-169.
236 Walter Bayer & Sylvia Engelke, Die Revision des Aktienrechts durch das Ak-
tiengesetz von 1937, in 1 AKTIENRECHT IM WANDEL 619, notes 49-52 (Walter Bay-
er & Mathias Habersack eds. 2007) (citing Schacht’s speech held before the Acad-
emy for German Law on November 30, 1935); but see Peter Doralt, Die Unabhän-
gigkeit des Vorstands nach österreichischem und deutschen Aktienrecht – Schein 
und Wirklichkeit, in DIE GESTALTUNG DER ORGANISATIONSDYNAMIK. FESTSCHRIFT 
FÜR OSKAR GRÜN 31, 37 (Werner H. Hoffmann ed. 2003) (suggesting that the 
draftsmen only paid lip service to the Führerprinzip and implemented a program 
skeptical of capitalism, particularly anonymously held capital). 
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The 1937 reform also addressed dividends, which had been 
the subject of the famous controversy between the Dodge brothers 
and Henry Ford in the US and was also widely debated in Germany. 
The reform transferred the authority to approve the annual accounts 
from shareholders to the management and supervisory boards by al-
lowing the two bodies to jointly decide to create retained earnings in 
the balance sheet, and thus to curb shareholders’ “hunger for divi-
dends.”237 In the US, Henry Ford’s predicament of being forced to 
pay dividends was and is unusual, given that the decision by default 
lies with the board of directors.238 As such, it is normally protected by 
the business judgment rule and not usually liable to attack as self-
dealing, given that all shareholders participate pro rata.239 True, reten-
tion of profits within the firm is only beneficial if it has good projects 
to invest in. However, participants in the German debate displayed 
strong concerns about the risk of management being forced to make a 
distribution at an inconvenient time, which sometimes disrupts for 
business planning.240
The overall emerging picture of the debate is that German 
analysts of the interwar period were strongly concerned with the pres-
ence of different shareholder groups, changing majorities, and con-
trolling shareholders, which was not much of a concern in American 
“Berle-Means” type corporations. The Unternehmen an sich debate
reacted partly to this. Stakeholder concerns and employee interests 
seem to have entered the German debate primarily as a result of the 
enactment of § 70. In an influential treatise, Schlegelberger and other 
senior officials of the Ministry of Justice suggest that the “retinue” of 
237 Hefermehl, Die Rechnungslegung im neuen Aktiengesetz, 66 JURISTISCHE WO-
CHENSCHRIFT 503, 503 (1937) (“In other firms, the shareholder meeting confirmed 
financial statements that stood in blatant contrast to the proposals of the administra-
tion. This did not happen because shareholders considered different financial state-
ments to be correct because they had better expertise, but exclusively because they 
desired a personal advantage, while remaining indifferent towards the fate of the 
firm”); see Fischer, supra note 196, at 99; KALSS ET AL., supra note 223, at 318. On 
the debate before the 1965 act, when the concern was the lack of capital of German 
firms, see Kropff, supra note 244, note 65. 
238 § 170(1) DGCL (providing that directors may declare dividends). 
239 See e.g. Kamin v. American Express Co., 54 A.D.2d 654 (N.Y. 1976). 
240 Supra note 237.
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the enterprise is intended to refer to employees, whose wellbeing the 
members of the management board must take care of.241 But of 
course, keeping the common good of folk and realm in mind was the 
preponderant objective among all, thereby integrating the firm into 
the policy framework of the national economy.242
4.3. Post-War reception 
The Aktiengesetz 1937 remained in place in Western Germa-
ny after the end of World War II without any significant changes.243
With the exception of the default provision that the chairman of the 
management board could decide alone in the case of disagree-
ments,244 the reforms were retained after the war. As Bruno Kropff 
(one of the leading drafters of the subsequent 1965 reform) points out, 
by that time the distribution of competences between shareholders 
and the two boards had by and large come to be considered appropri-
ate.245 Thus, it seems safe to say that in spite of its ideological com-
ponent, much of the substance of the act must have seemed defensible 
on policy grounds. While it was debated whether shareholders should 
again be granted the power to get involved in business decisions, the 
distribution of competences according to the 1937 reform was still 
considered adequate.246 A 2003 article echoes this view by explaining 
why the limited role of the shareholder meeting and the legal entren-
chment of the board of directors are considered mandatory law: 
“[T]he corporate constitution set out in the Ak-
tiengesetz is seen as an optimal guarantee, on the one 
hand, for serving the public economic interest in a 
well-functioning enterprise, and, on the other hand, for 
241 FRANZ SCHLEGELBERGER, LEO QUASSOWSKI, GUSTAV HERBIG, ERNST GESSLER 
& WOLFGANG HEFERMEHL, AKTIENGESETZ, § 70, comments 6, 7 (3rd ed. 1939). 
242 SCHLEGELBERGER ET AL., id., comment 8. 
243 E.g. Mertens, supra note 230, at 110. 
244 See Bruno Kropff, Reformbestrebungen im Nachkriegsdeutschland und die Ak-
tienrechtsreform von 1965, in 1 AKTIENRECHT IM WANDEL 670, note 57 (Walter 
Bayer & Mathias Habersack eds. 2007). 
245 Kropff, id., note 60 
246 Kropff, id.
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protecting the interests of current and future share-
holders (against management, and, if they exist, large 
shareholders) and of creditors (against management 
and shareholders).”247
Notably, the German reform of 1965 partly reversed the 1937 
decision regarding dividends and required 50% of profits to be distri-
buted if the financial statements were approved by the supervisory 
board (and thus not submitted to a shareholder vote).248
While employee interests had not been the focus of the debate 
of the 1920s, this gradually changed in the post-War Federal Repub-
lic. Scholars tended to distance themselves from the concept of Un-
ternehmen an sich, but instead focused on the Unternehmensinteresse 
(the interest of the enterprise) concept of § 70. While no uniform in-
terpretation of the term has ever emerged, post-war scholarship con-
tinued to understand the enterprise or the corporation to be distinct 
from shareholder interests.249 The first post-War edition of a leading 
treatise of German corporate law emphasized how the reform led to 
an insulation of management from shareholders and argued that the 
independent responsibility of the management board 
“is not an alien contaminant in corporate law 
resulting from faulty national socialist economic 
thought. This provision rather takes into account a de-
velopment of the structure of business, particularly the 
big enterprise in its macroeconomic and social impor-
tance, which is by no means restricted to the domain of 
corporate law in Germany. Even though one might 
deplore that particularly corporate law and the practice 
of large firms – even before the reform of 1937 – is 
moving more towards the “business in itself” […], this 
development cannot be stopped and will lead to a cer-
247 Doralt, supra note 236, at 40. 
248 § 58 AktG. 
249 But see Fischer, supra note 196, at 101-106; see also RIECHERS, supra note 96, 
at 1 (noting in the introduction to his 1996 book that the term “Unternehmen an 
sich” is still popular).
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tain reduction of shareholders’ role as formal own-
ers.”250
The general idea of the “good of the enterprise” survived the 
enactment of a new Aktiengesetz in 1965 at least in some form, when 
the old § 70 was replaced by a new § 76 that merely reiterated the 
board’s independence (much like DGCL § 141(a)), but was devoid of 
an explicit goal. However, the legislative report made it clear that no 
change in the law was intended;251 in fact, it pointed out that it was 
self-evident that managers would have to take capital, employee and 
public interests into account.252 In its decision declaring the 1976 co-
determination act to be constitutional, the German constitutional court 
gave support to this view by stating that ownership of stocks was sub-
ject to “social restrictions.”253
The new, expansive codetermination law of 1976254 may have 
further fueled arguments in favor of what we today call a stakeholder-
oriented interpretation of the law, but corresponding academic writing 
250 Walter Schmidt & Joachim Meyer-Landrut, § 70, comment 1, in 1 AKTIENGE-
SETZ GROSSKOMMENTAR (Carl Hans Barz, Robert Fischer, Ulrich Klug, Konrad 
Mellerowicz, Joachim Meyer-Landrut, Wolfgang Schilling & Walter Schmidt 2nd. 
ed. 1961) (own translation). 
251 See e.g. Joachim Meyer-Landrut, § 76, comment 9, in 1 AKTIENGESETZ GROSS-
KOMMENTAR (Carl Hans Barz, Herbert Bröner, Ulrich Klug, Konrad Mellerowicz, 
Joachim Meyer-Landrut, Wolfgang Schilling, Herbert Wiedemann & Hans 
Würdinger, 3rd. ed. 1973). 
252 See the official reasoning for the proposal in KROPFF, supra note 223, at 97. For
an overview of the development of the rule see Vagts, supra note 213, at 40-41; cf.
Mertens, supra note 216, § 76, comment 16 (stating that the language of the 1937 
act was still relevant; Klaus J. Hopt, Aktionärskreis und Vorstandsneutralität, 22 
ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR UNTERNEHMENS- UND GESELLSCHAFTSRECHT 534, 536 (1993). 
However, some authors did not agree with this interpretation. See e.g. Wolfgang 
Hefermehl, in 2 AKTIENGESETZ, § 76, comment 20 (Ernst Geßler, Wolfgang He-
fermehl, Ulrich Eckardt & Bruno Kropff eds. 1973, 1974) (suggesting that no such 
requirement exists). The German law’s Austrian offshoot to this day explicitly re-
quires the management board to pursue the good of the enterprise while having 
regard to the interests of stockholders, employees and the public interest (§ 70 Aus-
trian AktG of 1965). 
253 BVerfGE 50, 290, 315 f “Mitbestimmung”. 
254 MITBESTIMMUNGSGESETZ, BGBl. I 1976, S. 1153. 
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began to develop earlier. Legal scholars writing in the 1960s and 
1970s increasingly adopted a sociological theory of corporate law, in 
which the Unternehmensinteresse was traced to the idea that the en-
terprise constitutes a social collective.255 The corporation was seen as 
an amalgamation of the interests of owners, workers and managers,256
the proper goal of which was to maintain the existence of the firm, 
taking the interests of various groups into account257, and to maintain 
its long-term earning power.258 In that view, it is in the discretion of 
the management board to pursue other goals, such as fulfilling con-
sumer demand, providing adequate wages and working conditions, 
255 THOMAS RAISER, DAS UNTERNEHMEN ALS ORGANISATION 133-157 (1969);
Thomas Raiser, Das Unternehmensinteresse, in FESTSCHRIFT FÜR REIMER SCHMIDT
101, 117 (Fritz Reichert-Facilides, Fritz Rittner, Jürgen Sasse eds. 1976); see also 
Wolfgang Schilling, Das Aktienunternehmen, 144 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR DAS GESAMTE 
HANDELS- UND WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT 136 (1980); contra Fritz Rittner, Aktiengesell-
schaft oder Aktienunternehmen? 144 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR DAS GESAMTE HANDELS-
UND WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT 330, 330-334 (1980); WERNER FLUME, UM EIN NEUES 
UNTERNEHMENSRECHT (1980). 
256 Wolfgang Zöllner, Einleitung, in KÖLNER KOMMENTAR ZUM AKTIENGESETZ,
EINLEITUNGS-BAND, comment 130 (1st ed., Wolfgang Zöllner ed. 1984) (pointing 
out that the continued existence of old, unproductive firms serves no one); Michael 
Kort, in 19 GROSSKOMMENTAR AKTG § 76, comment 53 (Klaus J. Hopt & Herbert 
Wiedemann eds. 2003); Wulf Goette, Leitung, Aufsicht, Haftung – zur Rolle der 
Rechtsprechung bei der Sicherung einer modernen Unternehmensführung, IN FEST-
SCHRIFT AUS ANLASS DES FÜNFZIGJÄHRIGEN BESTEHENS VON BUNDESGERICHTS-
HOF, BUNDESANWALTSCHAFT UND RECHTSANWALTSCHAFT BEIM BUNDESGE-
RICHTSHOF 123, 127 (Karlmann Geiß, Kay Nehm, Hans Erich Brandner & Horst 
Hagen eds. 2000). 
257 Zöllner, id., note 256, comment 136; Hopt, supra note 252, at 536-537; Klaus J. 
Hopt, Übernahmen, Geheimhaltung und Interessenkonflikte: Problem für Vorstän-
de, Aufsichtsräte und Banken, 31 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR UNTERNEHMENS- UND GESELL-
SCHAFTSRECHT 333, 359-360 (2002). 
258 FRITZ RITTNER, WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT § 9, note 15 (2nd ed. 1987); Mertens, supra 
note 216, § 76, comments 10, 22-23; Kort, supra note 256, § 76, comment 51; 
Spindler, supra note 216, § 76, comment 61; Goette, supra note 256, at 127; THO-
MAS RAISER & RÜDIGER VEIL, DAS RECHT DER KAPITALGESELLSCHAFTEN § 14, 
comment 13 (4th ed. 2006) (mentioning the management board’s duty to “increase” 
shareholder value as one of several tasks); HÜFFER, supra note 216, § 76, comment 
13. It is interesting to note that this interpretation of the law seems to correspond to 
John Kenneth Galbraith’s descriptions of what managers in large firms do in fact. 
See GALBRAITH, supra note 23, at 153 passim. 
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the relationship to the firm’s social and cultural environment, the 
maintenance of a livable environment, and macroeconomic con-
cerns.259 Profits must be made in an amount that suffices to maintain 
the firm.260 During this period, confidence in the German corporate 
governance system was as its peak, and Germany even strove to ex-
port some of its core elements to the European level, e.g. by means of 
the proposed 5th EEC Company Law Directive, which would have 
required the introduction of worker representation across the conti-
nent.261 The project failed, not the least due to resistance from UK 
after the introduction of employee representation had failed within the 
domestic debate in Britain.262 A contrarian movement developed only 
during the 1990s, apparently under the influence of US scholarship 
and an increasing significance of capital markets and institutional 
investors. As a result, the idea of “shareholder value” became part of 
the debate.263 Unsurprisingly, the growing attractiveness of a share-
259 Mertens, supra note 216, § 76, comment 11. 
260 Mertens, id., § 76, comment 22-23; JOHANNES SEMLER, LEITUNG UND ÜBERWA-
CHUNG DER AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT, comments 38, 48 (2nd ed. 1996); contra Peter
Raisch, Zum Begriff und zur Bedeutung des Unternehmensinteresses als Verhal-
tensmaxime von Vorstands- und Aufsichtsratsmitgliedern, in STRUKTUREN UND 
ENTWICKLUNGEN IM HANDELS-, GESELLSCHAFTS- UND WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT, FEST-
SCHRIFT FÜR WOLFGANG HEFERMEHL 348, 352, 363 (Robert Fischer, Ernst Geßler, 
Wolfgang Schilling, Rolf Serick & Peter Ulmer eds. 1976) (suggesting that main-
taining the firm’s legal capital suffices). 
261 See e.g. J. Temple Lang, The Fifth EEC Directive on the Harmonization of 
Company Law, Part 2, 2 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 345, 346-349 (1975).
262 VANESSA EDWARDS, EC COMPANY LAW 388 (1999). The government-
commissioned “Bullock Report” recommended the introduction of a mandatory 
employee participation system similar to the German one, but the project had only 
limited support even within the Labour movement and was ultimately abandoned 
when Margaret Thatcher came to power in 1980. See LORD BULLOCK (CHAIRMAN),
REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF INQUIRY ON INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY (1977) (offi-
cial report recommending employee participation): David Marsh & Gareth Lock-
sley, Capital in Britain: Its Structural Power and Influence over Policy, WEST EUR.
POL., March 1983, at 36, 49-50 (discussing the failure of the proposal). 
263 Manfred Groh, Shareholder Value und Aktienrecht, 42 DER BETRIEB 2153
(2000); Spindler, supra note 216, § 76, comments 66-68; Peter O. Mülbert, Share-
holder Value aus rechtlicher Sicht, 26 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR GESELLSCHAFTS- UND UN-
TERNEHMENSRECHT 129 (1997); Friedrich Kübler, Shareholder Value: Eine Heraus-
forderung für das Deutsche Recht? in FESTSCHRIFT FÜR WOLFGANG ZÖLLNER 321
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holder primacy goal264 coincided with mounting criticism of codeter-
mination.265
4.4. An unusual practical application: The Mannesmann 
case
In spite of its long pedigree, the reception of the Unterneh-
mensinteresse (“interest of the business”) doctrine by the courts can at 
best be called ambiguous. The courts use the concept or equivalent 
ones frequently, but typically without defining it or striking a balance 
between shareholder and stakeholder interests, e.g. when discussing 
whether the exclusion of a preemptive right is justified “in the interest 
of the firm”, 266 or when defining the duties of board members.267 Un-
(Manfred Lieb, Ulrich Noack & H.P. Westermann eds. 1998); Axel von Werder, 
Shareholder Value-Ansatz als (einzige) Richtschnur des Vorstandshandelns? 27 
ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR GESELLSCHAFTS- UND UNTERNEHMENSRECHT 69 (1998); contra 
HÜFFER, supra note 216, § 76, comment 12a-12b (rejecting shareholder value and 
espousing a stakeholder conception). 
264 Kübler, id.; Groh, id., at 2158; Klaus J. Hopt & Markus Roth, in GROSSKOM-
MENTAR AKTIENGESETZ, § 111, comment 104 (4th ed. 24th installment, Klaus J. 
Hopt & Herbert Wiedemann ed. 2005); Holger Fleischer, in 1 KOMMENTAR ZUM 
AKTIENGESETZ, § 76, comment 34 (Gerald Spindler & Eberhard Stiltz 2007). 
265 E.g. Axel von Werder, Modernisierung der Mitbestimmung, 64 DIE BETRIEBS-
WIRTSCHAFT 229 (2004); Eberhard Schwark, Globalisierung, Europarecht und 
Unternehmensmitbestimmung im Konflikt, 2004 DIE AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT 173;
Michael Adams, Das Ende der Mitbestimmung, 2006 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR WIRT-
SCHAFTSRECHT (ZIP) 1561. 
266 Under German case law, a substantive reason that is potentially subject to judi-
cial review is required to deprive shareholder of their statutory preemptive right. 
See BGH March 13, 1978, II ZR 142/76, BGHZ 71, 40 (“Kali+Salz”); BGH April 
19, 1982, II ZR 55/81, BGHZ 83, 319; BGH June 23, 1997, II ZR 132/93, BGHZ 
136, 133 (“Siemens/Nold”); see also OLG Stuttgart 12.8.1998, 20 U 111/97, DB 
1998, 1757; OLG Braunschweig July 29, 1998, 3 U 75/98, ZIP 1998, 1585; BGH 
November 21, 2005, 2006 WERTPAPIER-MITTEILUNGEN 432; BGH March 7, 1994, 
II ZR 52/93, BGHZ 125, 239 (discussing whether a company should seek a foreign 
stock exchange listing); see also BGH February 8, 1988, II ZR 159/87, BGHZ 103, 
213, 217 (using the interest of the association as an argument why the company 
should be represented by the supervisory board instead of management board in a 
court procedure about the removal of members of the management board). 
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der the Takeover Law implementing the 2004 EU directive, takeover 
defenses are permitted when they were approved by shareholders and 
permitted in the company’s charter,268 and the supervisory and man-
agement must act in the “interest of the target company,”269 i.e. the 
Unternehmensinteresse.270
The one recent case where the doctrine was at least of superfi-
cial significance was Mannesmann, resulting from the first openly 
hostile takeover bid for a German firm,271 launched by Vodafone Air-
touch of the UK in 2000. Mannesmann’s management abandoned its 
defenses, the cost of which had gone into the hundreds of millions of 
Deutschmarks,272 after Vodafone had raised its bid price from € 240 
to € 360.273 The supervisory board then decided to grant “appreciation 
awards” to the members of the management board, most of all an 
amount of € 16 Million to CEO Klaus Esser, who had been in this 
position for less than a year, in addition to his contractual severance 
payment of € 15 Million.274 Other management board members, some 
of whom had been members for only a few days and left the firm a 
few months after the decision, also received substantial sums. These 
awards “in recognition for their contribution to the firm’s success” 
had in fact been suggested by Mannesmann’s 10% shareholder, Hut-
267 BGH June 5, 1975, BGHZ 64, 325, 331, NJW 1975, 1412 (duty of confidentiali-
ty); see also BGH February 25, 1982, BGHZ 83, 144 (briefly mentioning that the 
board should remain operational in the interest of the business); see also BVerfG
March 1, 1979, 1 BvR 532, 533/72, 419 and 41 BvR 21/71, BVerfGE 50, 290, 374 
(Constitutional Court approving the 1976 codetermination regime and mentioning 
the obligation of board members to pursue the interest of the enterprise in passing). 
268 § 33a WpÜG. 
269 § 3(3) WpÜG. 
270 E.g. Kai Haakon Liekefett, Bietergleichbehandlung bei öffentlichen Übernah-
meangeboten, 50 DIE AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT 802, 806-810 (2005) (discussing what 
the concept could imply in the takeover context). 
271 E.g. Cheffins, supra note 6, at 502. 
272 Cf. Mark Binz & Martin Sorg, Esser und Ackermann müssen Pyrrhussiege 
fürchten, FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG, May 6, 2004, at 12 (reporting costs 
of € 432 Million). 
273 See Franklin A. Gevurtz, Disney in a Comparative Light, 55 AM. J. COMP. L.
453, 460 (2007). 
274 Stefan Maier, A Close Look at the Mannesmann Trial, 7 GERMAN L. J. 603, 604
(2006). 
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chinson Whampoa of Hong Kong, which benefited from the sale fi-
nancially275 and had previously offered to make such a payment.276
Since the bonus gave the appearance of a bribe to many ob-
servers,277 it sparked outrage in the press and among employees.278 In 
2003, Mr. Esser and members of Mannesmann’s supervisory board 
were indicted for Untreue (disloyalty), a criminal offense punishing 
the abuse of the power to depose over someone else’s property or to 
legally bind someone else.279 Defendants, including the former presi-
dent of the board, Deutsche Bank CEO Josef Ackermann, claimed 
that such payments were in accordance with international practices. 
The employee representatives on the supervisory board, who had ac-
quiesced to the payments without giving their assent, were also in-
dicted.280 Law professors commented in the business press, most 
prominently Marcus Lutter and Wolfgang Zöllner, who pointed out 
that “the management board must secure the corporation’s position in 
the market and increase profits.” Shareholders had benefited from the 
higher bid price in consequence of the board’s defensive efforts, but 
the firm (which ceased to exist) itself had not. In this view, their ac-
tions violated their duty to advance the interest of the firm.281 Others 
explained that the gains in stock price were only a temporary result of 
275 Peter Kolla, The Mannesmann Trial and the Role of the Courts, 5 GERMAN L. J.
829, 833 (2004); CURTIS MILHAUPT & KATHARINA PISTOR, LAW AND CAPITALISM 
70 (2008). 
276 Mark K. Binz & Martin Sorg, Ackermann & Co.: Gutsherren oder Gutsverwal-
ter? BETRIEBS-BERATER, February 6, 2006, at I; MILHAUPT & PISTOR, id., at 70. 
277 Kolla, supra note 275, at 833. 
278 Gevurtz, supra note 273, at 461; MILHAUPT & PISTOR id., at 70-71. 
279 § 266 StGB (GERMANY). A typical case of Untreue would be a property manag-
er who uses rent payments to gamble instead of passing them on to the owner, but 
the offense is also relevant in the corporate context. See Pierre-Henri Conac, Luca 
Enriques & Martin Gelter, Constraining Dominant Shareholders’ Self-Dealing: The 
Legal Framework in France, Germany, and Italy, 4 EUR. COMPANY & FIN. L. REV.
491, 520 (2007). 
280 MILHAUPT & PISTOR, supra note 275, at 70-71. 
281 Marcus Lutter & Wolfgang Zöllner, “Die Mannesmann-Prämien durften nicht 
gezahlt werden“, FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG, February 10, 2004, at 12; 
see also FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG, March 19, 2004, at 14 (citing crimi-
nal law scholar Bernd Schünemann as saying that the board’s actions were punisha-
ble under criminal law). 
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the takeover offer: The main beneficiary of the defenses was Hutchin-
son, whereas Vodafone subsequently wrote off the purchase price (to 
the detriment of German taxpayers), and thousands of jobs were 
lost.282
The initial trial resulted in an acquittal, but on appeal, the 
German Federal Supreme Court (BGH) sided with the prosecution. In 
its opinion, the BGH only paid lip service to the concept of Unter-
nehmensinteresse, but applied a more specific statute that requires 
management compensation to be reasonable.283 In the eyes of the 
court, this was not the case here, since the bonus was neither based on 
a prior contractual stipulation, nor could it be understood to generate 
future benefits such as an incentive effect for managers given the im-
pending breakup of the firm. Thus, the court found that the decision 
to make the payment violated the duty of loyalty. The defendants ul-
timately reached a settlement with prosecutors, in the course of which 
they agreed to pay substantial fines without having to admit guilt.284
In spite of the court’s rhetorical embrace of an institutional 
understanding of the corporation, in which it reiterated that the inter-
ests of the totality of shareholders, of creditors and the public are re-
levant for concept of the welfare of the “business”, the reference to 
the Unternehmensinteresse was superfluous. The court could easily 
have reached the same result by referring to any definition of the best 
“interests of the company”, including one taking only shareholder 
wealth into account. The best analogy in US corporate would be the 
waste doctrine.285 It is telling that even employee representatives on 
282 Binz & Sorg, supra note 276, at I. 
283 BGH December 21, 2005, BGHST 50, 331. The statute referred to is § 87(1), 
sentence 1 AktG. 
284 Bernard Black, Brian Cheffins, Martin Gelter, Hwa-Jin Kim, Richard Nolan, 
Mathias Siems & Linia Prava Law Firm, Legal Liability of Directors and Company 
Officials Part 2: Court Procedures, Indemnification and Insurance, and Adminis-
trative and Criminal Liability (Report to the Russian Securities Agency), 2008 CO-
LUM. BUS. L. REV. 1, 145-146. 
285 See also Gevurtz, supra note 273, at 464 (“Essentially, this is the same as a 
waste claim in the United States”). Gevurtz‘ suggestion conclusion that this shows 
that German courts are less deferential to business decisions therefore seems prema-
ture. Fleischer, id., at 543. See also Maier, supra note 274 (“Contrary to popular 
opinion, the BGH’s verdict in the Mannesmann trial makes no statement as to the 
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the board did not object to the payment: At the time of the decision, 
the breakup of the company (and layoffs) had already become inevit-
able.286 Furthermore, contradicting its professed adherence to an un-
derstanding of the corporation transcending shareholder interests, the 
court stated that the board’s actions would not have led to a criminal 
conviction if all shareholders had approved them, and not only Voda-
fone, which held 9.8% when the decision was made, and 98.6% at the 
time of the payment.287
4.5. Conclusion: Institutionalism as an attempt to con-
strain shareholder power 
In spite of recent criticism,288 we can still discern the imprint 
of an institutional understanding of the corporation in German law. 
Commentators typically see the Unternehmensinteresse as a proxy for 
the interests of various groups that must be reconciled.289 Its practical 
significance is rather doubtful, given that courts are usually able to 
skirt clear definitions. Historically, the debate around 1930 was pri-
marily concerned with the institutional construction of the firm. The 
legal theory of the Unternehmen an sich was partly intended as a con-
straint on the conduct of shareholders, who were thought to be able to 
often exert a detrimental influence on the firm. Other than in the US, 
managerial power could not simply be taken for granted given the 
complications in the corporate governance system created by non-
atomistic share ownership patterns. Thus, participants in the German 
appropriateness of executive remuneration.”) and id., at 606 (rejecting the argument 
that non-contractual appreciation awards could be justified by the extra effort of 
defending against hostile takeovers to achieve a high price). 
286 MILHAUPT & PISTOR, supra note 275, at 80. 
287 MILHAUPT & PISTOR, supra note 275, at 73; see Gevurtz, supra note 273, at 484
288 E.g. Fleischer, supra note 264, § 76, comments 30-31; see also Philipp Klages, 
The Contractual Turn: How Legal Academics Shaped Corporate Law Reforms in 
Germany, at http://www.mpifg.de/people/kg/downloads/Contractual%20Turn.pdf,
at 11-16; Roth, supra note 31, at 64 (both identifying a shift towards a contractual 
understanding of the corporation and a shareholder primacy objective in legal scho-
larship). 
289 HÜFFER, supra note 216, § 76, comment 15. 
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debate struggled with intra-shareholder conflicts, for the resolution of 
which an institutional understanding of the firm was intended to pro-
vide benchmarks. As far as the concept was intended to serve the 
public interest (e.g. in the context of the 1937 statute), the intention 
was clearly to shift the balance of powers between shareholders and 
management in favor of the latter in order to reduce the scope of fi-
nancially motivated decision-making. Nevertheless, the practical ef-
fects of the theory contemporary German corporate law seem to be 
limited. 
5. French institutionalism and the “intérêt social”
France shares two traits with Germany that are interesting for 
this article’s thesis: First, France is also often said to have a corporate 
governance system not primarily intended to serve shareholder inter-
ests, but also those of employees and others, and the public interest in 
general. France does not have codetermination, the reason probably 
being that the tradition of dirigisme, meaning that the government 
often intervenes in the economy, partly through direct ownership of 
large businesses.290 Like Germany, France developed a strong “insti-
tutional school” of corporate law, which focused on the doctrine of 
the intérêt social or intérêt de la société (interest of the association or 
corporation), which is usually understood to take the interests of other 
non-shareholder constituencies into account.291 The second feature 
France shares with Germany is concentrated ownership, and I argue 
that the impact it had on shareholder-stakeholder debates was similar, 
while the tradition of state ownership appears not to feature promi-
nently.
Section 5.1 describes the academic debates from which the 
French institutional school developed. Section 5.2 looks at the role 
specific legal rules and cases. Section 5.3 looks at rules relating to the 
290 E.g. James A. Fanto, The Role of Corporate Law in the Adaptation of French 
Enterprises, 1998 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 97, 100-103. 
291 E.g. PHILIPPE MERLE & ANNE FAUCHON, DROIT COMMERCIAL. SOCIETES COM-
MERCIALES, para. 52-1 (13th ed. 2009); Christiane Alcouffe, Judges and CEOs : 
French Aspects of Corporate Governance, 9 EUR. J. L. & ECON. 127, 133 (2000). 
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removal of directors, which counteract a strong independent position 
of the firm. Section 5.4 concludes. 
5.1. The origins of the French institutional school 
The contemporary institutional school can trace its roots to the 
1930s and developed vigorously during the 1960s. The first to devel-
op an “institutional theory” of the corporation was Gaillard in his 
1932 dissertation. He observed the growing number of small inves-
tors, but at the same time the possibility that financial groups could 
easily obtain the majority of shares. Small shareholders would remain 
passive, while a financial group, if not restrained by the law, could 
use the power of the shareholder meeting to dominate the compa-
ny.292 In his view, a contractual theory could not adequately address 
abuses, as it presumed that minority shareholders had voluntarily 
submitted to majority control, which is why courts would normally 
not interfere with majority decisions (except maybe under a theory of 
good faith).293 As a legal solution, he proposed an institutional theory, 
in which the corporation was to be understood as the subject of its 
own interest, the intérêt social; corporate decisions by managers, but 
also shareholder votes, should be subject to judicial review under this 
standard.294
The emergence of the institutional theory in the early 1930s 
may have been influenced by contemporary economic developments, 
as a result of which the significance of controlling shareholders had 
grown. As in Germany, multiple-vote shares had been increasingly 
used in French publicly traded companies during the 1920s. Follow-
ing a period of high inflation around 1926, French companies sought 
means to protect themselves against takeovers, particularly by foreign 
292 EMILE GAILLARD, LA THEORIE INSTITUTIONNELLE ET LE FONCTIONNEMENT DE LA 
SOCIETE ANONYME 10-13 (1932). 
293 GAILLARD, id., at 14-20. 
294 GAILLARD, id., at 36-43. Gaillard’s theory was not only normative, but to a large 
degree descriptive, as he attempt to explain the existing French case law on its ba-
sis. See GAILLARD, id., at 33-36.
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investors.295 Volatile majorities that created difficulties for manage-
ment were increasingly seen as a problem,296 and it was increasingly 
thought that anti-takeover protections were needed to keep French 
firms viable in international competition.297
Georges Ripert, a leading French business law scholar of the 
mid-20th century, endorsed an institutional theory of the firm in his 
1946 book, arguing that shareholders were abandoning their status as 
an owner, taking a position similar to that of a creditor. His book 
paints a picture of corporations resembling American firms with 
strong management and apathetic shareholders, whose passivity no 
corporate law reform has managed to overcome.298 Like American 
scholars of his period, he recognized the “enterprise” as a de facto 
entity, despite the law’s emphasis on shareholder democracy.299
While Ripert did not ignore the concerns of workers, he also did not 
consider them to be an issue of concern of corporate law and objected 
to codetermination.300 Employment law, on the other hand, ensured 
that labor was no longer put to the service of capital and was, accord-
ing to Ripert, already on the way towards effectively giving em-
ployees property right in their jobs by virtue of legal limits on dismis-
sals.301
295 Muriel Petit-Konczyk, Big changes in ownership structures – Multiple votes in 
interwar France, WORKING PAPER 11, at http://ssrn.com/abstract=944808.
296 ROQUEFORT-VILLENEUVE, LES ACTIONS A VOTE PLURAL AU POINT DE VUE ECO-
NOMIQUE 33-58, 59-77 (1932). 
297 Id., at 78-92. Nevertheless, multiple-vote shares had been prohibited and were no 
longer allowed to be issued according to a 1931 law. Existing ones had to be trans-
formed into regular shares in 1934. Petit-Konczyk, supra note 295, at 4. 
298 GEORGES RIPERT, ASPECTS JURIDIQUES DU CAPITALISME MODERNE 87-104 (1st
ed. 1946). In particular, see RIPERT, id., at 102 (“pendent toute la vie sociale, 
l’actionnaire se présente comme créancier de la société”). Interestingly, in spite of 
occasional references to German law, Ripert does not refer to American or German 
writers with similar ideas. For a summary of Ripert’s theory see Thierry Kirat, The 
firm between law and economics, in THE FIRM AS AN ENTITY 131, 138-141 (Yuri 
Biondi, Arnaldo Canziani & Thierry Kirat eds. 2007). Kirat, however, does not 
discuss Ripert’s ideas about employment. 
299 See Kirat, id., at 141. 
300 RIPERT, id., at 270. 
301 RIPERT, id., at 296-300 
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An increasing number of scholars emphasized the “institu-
tional character” of the company during subsequent decades, and, in 
doing so, focused on majority-minority conflicts.302 Despax argued in 
1957 that the “enterprise” had a separate interest from that of the en-
trepreneur,303 and that it was developing more and more autonomy in 
the law. Effectively, it was on the way to having legal capacity on its 
own;304 he also suggested that it was necessary to balance the inter-
ests of capital, labor, and costumers within the enterprise.305 As in 
Germany, the discussion of this period was partly linked to an increa-
singly sociological understanding of the nature of the “enterprise” 
that was more than just a form of business organization. 
The heyday of the institutional school came during the 1960s. 
Members of the “School of Rennes” argued that the “enterprise” 
served as a focal point for economic activity, economic assets, and 
entrepreneurial decision-making, for which the corporation provided 
the organizational structure.306 The School of Rennes was later de-
scribed by one of its main representatives, Claude Champaud, as a 
“realist” movement.307 His 1962 book explored the concentration of 
302 E.g. Jean Portemer, Du contrat à l’institution, 1947 SEMAINE JURIDIQUE JCP, 
doctrine, para. 586 (suggesting that an understanding of managers as agents of 
shareholders may no longer by adequate); Jean Leblond, Les pouvoirs respectifs de 
l’assemblée générale, du conseil d’administration et du directeur général adjoint 
dans la doctrine institutionnelle, 1957 GAZETTE DU PALAIS, I, doctrine, 29-32 (em-
phasizing the mandatory role of different company organs); see Jean Paillusseau, La
nouvelle société par actions simplifiée. Le big-bang du droit des sociétés, 1999
RECUEIL DALLOZ, chronique, 333, at 344-345.
303 MICHEL DESPAX, L’ENTREPRISE ET LE DROIT, para. 178-198 (1957). 
304 DESPAX, id. para. 351-391. 
305 DESPAX, id. para. 290. 
306 JEAN PAILLUSSEAU, LA SOCIETE ANONYME, TECHNIQUE D’ORGANISATION DE 
L’ENTREPRISE 5 (1967); see Jean Paillusseau, Le droit des activités économiques à 
l’aube du XXIe siècle (suite et fin), 2003 RECUEIL LE DALLOZ 322, 322-324; see
also Alain Couret, Le gouvernement d’entreprise. La corporate governance, 1995
RECUEIL DALLOZ SIREY, chronique, 163, 165; Géraldine Goffaux-Callebaut, La
définition de l’intérêt social, 2004 REVUE TRIMESTRIELLE DE DROIT COMMERCIAL ET 
DE DROIT ECONOMIQUE 35, 36. 
307 See Claude Champaud, Les fondements sociétaux de la « doctrine de 
l’entreprise », in ASPECTS ORGANISATIONNELS DU DROIT DES AFFAIRES. MELANGES 
EN L’HONNEUR DE JEAN PAILLUSSEAU 117, 149 passim (2003). 
MARTIN GELTER 8/19/2010 
71
corporations, focusing on legal instruments used to achieve concen-
tration and to create corporate groups, and on the legal consequences. 
Other than American scholars such as Berle, to whom he sometimes 
referred in his work, he did not focus on the managerial power of 
large corporations, but developed a distinction between shareholders 
purely contributing funds and those taking a larger share, intending to 
exercise control over the firm.308 Quite obviously, this raised much 
less concern about the protection of shareholders against manage-
ment, but rather the protection of non-controlling shareholder and 
creditors.309 “Business activity”, he argued, “in large corporations is 
profoundly marked by the dominance of controlling shareholders,”310
which of course raises the problem of abuse.311
Champaud seems not to have been particularly concerned with 
stakeholders or an institutional understanding of the firm. However, 
the emphasis on the two types of shareholders was picked up a few 
years later by Jean Paillusseau, who developed the legal theory of the 
intérêt social. He argued that the traditional contractual understanding 
of the corporation was not capable of explaining the increasing power 
of managers in large firms and the decline of the practical importance 
of shareholder meetings.312 His descriptive account is similar to that 
of the American authors of this period. Again, the crucial difference 
to the US that characterized his theory related to concentrated owner-
ship.313 The reason for the decline of the shareholder meeting was 
therefore, in his view, not merely the absenteeism of contributors of 
capital, but the existence of controlling shareholders who were able to 
impose their will on the firm.314 The theory thus seems torn between 
the apparent necessity of centralized corporate decision-making and 
the role of large blockholders. Apparently assuming that controlling 
308 CLAUDE CHAMPAUD, LE POUVOIR DE CONCENTRATION DE LA SOCIETE PAR AC-
TIONS 29-44 (1962); PAILLUSSEAU, supra note 306, at 49-52. 
309 E.g. CHAMPAUD, id., at 45. 
310 CHAMPAUD, id., at 140. 
311 CHAMPAUD, id., at 145-146. 
312 PAILLUSSEAU, supra note 306, at 239-245. 
313 See PAILLUSSEAU, id., at 49-52 (referring to the distinction between two types of 
shareholders emphasized by Champaud). 
314 PAILLUSSEAU, id., at 239. 
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shareholders were typically represented on the board of directors, he 
observed that members of the board of directors were typically in the 
position to impose their will on other shareholders; the shareholder 
meeting must therefore not be allowed to authorize or approve acts 
contrary to the intérêt social.315 For the definition of the concept, 
while not explicitly emphasizing stakeholder issues, he picked up 
Despax’ theory of the institutional nature of the firm and argued that 
the firm’s interest cannot be identified with the interest of sharehold-
ers, but that it includes all of the interests converging in the enter-
prise, the goal essentially residing in the life and growth of the eco-
nomic organism.316 The interest of the firm was thus intended as a 
limit to shareholder power. 
5.2. Institutionalism, the law, and the courts 
Institutional theories of the corporation apparently did have 
some background in the development of legislation. On the legal lev-
el, the concept of intérêt social can be traced to the 1930s, when 
France was suffering from the effects of the Great Depression and 
political instability. The Laval government had been given the power 
to take emergency measures in June 1935 in order to “ensure the de-
fense of the currency and to fight speculation.”317 Among other 
things, the government used this power to pass a decree-law in Au-
gust 1935 without parliamentary approval or debate.318 This law in-
troduced a number of business crimes, including abus de biens so-
ciaux (abuse of corporate assets), which remains in the law319 and 
315 PAILLUSSEAU, id., at 194. 
316 PAILLUSSEAU, id., at 196-200. 
317 PAUL PIC, ÉVOLUTION RECENTE DU DROIT DES SOCIETES 1930-1943, 8 (2nd ed. 
1943). 
318 Décret-loi du 8 août 1935. See HENRY SOLUS, LA REFORME DU DROIT DES SO-
CIETES PAR LES DECRETS-LOIS DE 1935 ET 1937, 2 (1938).
319 In the [former] Code des Sociétés of 1966, the criminal provision was in art. 
425(4) and 437(3). The current provision is C. COM. art L. 242-6. See PAILLUS-
SEAU, supra note 306, at 189-191; Alcouffe, supra note 291, at 133; EVA JOLY &
CAROLINE JOLY-BAUMGARTNER, L’ABUS DE BIENS SOCIAUX A L’EPREUVE DE LA 
PRATIQUE 8 (2002); Nicole Stolowy, Company-Related Offenses in French Legisla-
tion, 2007 J. BUS. L. 1, 3 (2007). 
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continues to be important in practice.320 It penalizes directors' misuse 
of the company’s property and credit in bad faith, “when directors 
knew that it was contrary to its interest.”321 While the provision did 
not explicitly use the wording intérêt social,322 the concept was used 
to refer to the offense.323 Even early commentators pointed out that 
the interest of the company was not identical to that of shareholders, 
but that, for example, an actual damage to the corporate patrimony 
was required and that a decrease in the stock price did not suffice.324
Attempts to strengthen management vis-à-vis shareholders 
may have played a role as well. In fall 1940, only months after the 
German invasion, the Vichy government hastily passed a reform of 
the structure of the firm’s leadership without a debate or a clarifica-
tion of its motives,325 which had to be amended in early 1943 due to 
320 Conac et al., supra note 279, at 518-519 (citing statistics reporting several hun-
dreds of convictions between 2000 and 2006). 
321 See SOLUS, supra note 318, at 88; PIERRE BAUDOUIN-BUGNET & GILLES GO-
ZARD, LA DIRECTION DES SOCIETES PAR ACTIONS EN FRANCE ET EN ALLEMAGNE 35
(1941); PIC, supra note 317, at 73. In fact, Baudouin-Bugnet and Gozard report that 
the provision merely codified an already existing development in the case law de-
riving from the more general crime of abus de confiance (breach of trust). Accord-
ing to Solus, this statute was not sufficiently specific to combat the tendency of 
directors to treat the corporation as if it were their own. Abus de confiance contin-
ues to be relevant e.g. for transfers of property to the benefit of managers and em-
ployees and in partnerships. The intérêt social is also relevant here. 
322 To be precise, the law penalizes “managers who, in bad faith, have made use of 
the company’s property or credit in a way which they knew was contrary to the 
interest of it, for personal purposes or to favor another association in which they had 
a direct or indirect interest” (“les gérants qui, de mauvaise foi, ont fait des biens ou 
du crédit de la société un usage qu’ils savaient contraire à l’intérêt de celle-ci, dans 
un but personnel ou pour favoriser une autre société dans laquelle ils étaient intéres-
sés directement ou indirectement”). 
323 E.g. JOSEPH HAMEL & GASTON LAGARDE, 1 TRAITE DE DROIT COMMERCIAL,
para. 660 (1954). 
324 SOLUS, supra note 318, at 92-93. 
325 Loi du 16 novembre 1940. This law replaced the prior loi du 18 septembre 1940 
before it could come into force, which was suffering from even greater legislative 
problems. See Paul Cordonnier, Loi du 16 novembre 1940, 1941 DALLOZ CRITIQUE,
legislation, 1, 1-2; MICHEL GERMAIN, 1/2 TRAITE DE DROIT COMMERCIAL para.
1367 (G. Ripert & R. Roblot, 18th ed. 2001). 
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shortcomings in legislative craftsmanship.326 However, there was also 
a substantive aspect to this reform, which further increased the con-
centration of power: In 1940, the president of the board was by de-
fault the CEO at the same time, but he was still permitted to designate 
another person to take that position. The 1943 reform made the identi-
ty of the two functions mandatory,327 introducing the Président Direc-
teur-General (PDG) – CEO and president of the board – as the domi-
nating figure in French corporations. 
Until the “nouvelles régulations économiques” reforms of 
2001,328 the two functions of president of the board (président) and 
CEO (Directeur-General) had to be held by the same person.329 Some 
contemporary writers attributed this development to a “transposition 
of the German theory of the Führerprinzip” in France.330 After the 
end of the German occupation, a growing number of scholars ob-
jected to this interpretation of invents and argued out that these 
enactments had been intended to identify a clear responsibility within 
326 Loi du 4 mars 1943. See RIPERT, supra note 298, at 116-117; HAMEL & LA-
GARDE, supra note 323, para. 652 (both citing low legislative quality as a reason for 
the amendment); see also Paul Esmein, L’Administration des Sociétés anonymes 
d’après la loi du 16 novembre 1940, 1940 GAZETTE DU PALAIS, II, doctrine, 90, 93-
94 (describing that the president legally responsible for the actions of the directeur). 
327 See PIC, supra note 317, at 79; Joseph Hamel, Les pouvoirs du président et du 
directeur général des sociétés anonymes d’après la loi du 4 mars 1943, 1943 GA-
ZETTE DU PALAIS, II, doctrine, 59, 60. 
328 Loi no 2001-420 du 15 Mai 2001 relative aux nouvelles régulations écono-
miques (JO 16 mai 2001, p. 7776) [hereinafter: NRE law]. 
329 After 1967, firms were able to opt out by implementing a two-tier board struc-
ture inspired by German law. However, the latter never took root in France. See
Alcouffe, supra note 291, at 129 (reporting that less than 3% had opted for a two-
tier structure). 
330 BAUDOUIN-BUGNET & GOZARD, supra note 321, at 53 (“one could not achieve a 
more complete application of the Führerprinzip…” [own translation]); LOUIS CZU-
LOWSKI, LA NOTION DE DIRECTION DANS LES SOCIETES ANONYMES ET LA LEGISLA-
TION DE 1940, 133-134 (1943) (agreeing with this assessment); PAUL PIC & JEAN 
KREHER, 2 DES SOCIETES COMMERCIALES, para. 2018 (3rd ed. 1948) (“the reform of 
the Vichy government seems like a rather servile imitation of the ‘führer prinzip’ 
[sic!] of the German law of 1937”); See DESPAX, supra note 303, para. 249; see also 
the references provided by PAILLUSSEAU (supra note 306, at 154-155), who seems 
to give a mixed assessment; Esmein, supra note 326, at 90-91 (stating that the 
draftsmen’s intention was to ensure that the company had a “veritable boss”). 
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the firm and were a reaction to prevailing monitoring problems, as the 
members of the board (particularly the president) did not take a suffi-
cient interest in what the firm’s mangers did.331 Yves Bouthillier, the 
finance minister of the Vichy government, later explained that the 
motivation was to appease the working class by showing that the 
government took action by linking responsibility to personal liability 
of the PDG, while at the same time avoiding the populist option of 
state ownership.332 By contrast, a book comparing French and Ger-
man law published in 1941 (by a former and a future center-left 
member of parliament) identified strong German influence on the 
enactment and concluded that “understanding German law sheds light 
on French legislation and facilitates its comprehension.”333 While all 
of these reasons may have jointly motivated the reform, some post-
war writers may have felt compelled to distance French legal devel-
opments from German influence.334 Given that French law, other than 
German law, concentrated power in the hand of one person – the 
PDG – one could even argue that the principle was implemented in 
purer form west of the Rhine.335
331 HAMEL & LAGARDE, supra note 323, para. 652; CLAUDE BERR, L’EXERCICE DU 
POUVOIR DANS LES SOCIETES COMMERCIALES, para. 109-110 (1961); GEORGES RI-
PERT & RENE ROBLOT, TRAITE ELEMENTAIRE DE DROIT COMMERCIAL, para. 1268 
(5th ed. 1963); see also RIPERT & ROBLOT, id., at para. 981 (pointing out that politi-
cians subsequently remained opposed to large firms, which resulted in nationaliza-
tions). This possible rationale is described in more detail by PIC, supra note 317, at
74. 
332 YVES BOUTHILLIER, LE DRAME DE VICHY II: FINANCE SOUS LA CONTRAINTE 298-
303 (1951); see also JEAN PEYRELEVADE, LE GOUVERNEMENT D’ENTRPRISE 30-34
(1999) (summarizing Bouthillier’s justification). 
333 BAUDOUIN-BUGNET & GOZARD, supra note 330, at 144 (own translation). 
334 The two motivations are not necessarily a contradiction, as the German Führer-
prinzip was also defined as a combination of personal authority and responsibility. 
See e.g. Wilhelm Kißkalt, Reform des Aktienrechts, 1 ZEITSCHRIFT DER AKADEMIE 
FÜR DEUTSCHES RECHT 20, 26 (1934). 
335 See CZULOWSKI (supra note 330, at 124, 134 n4) (correctly pointing out that the 
German law does not fully implement the principle, as it left the possibility of hav-
ing several management board members of equal rank (other than French law); 
FRANÇOIS BLOCH-LAINE, POUR UNE REFORME DE L’ENTREPRISE 66 (1963) (“Believ-
ing to imitate the Germans during an embarrassing period, one made us adopt, un-
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The law did not revert after World War II. As one author from 
that period notes, the reason may have been post-war state involve-
ment in the economy.336 A 1963 textbook points out that the political 
authorities took a hostile stance towards large corporations, a many of 
which were nationalized during that period. Reforms were characte-
rized by a “spirit of struggle against financial capitalism.”337 The 
“hierarchical” view of the firm was subsequently espoused also by the 
French Supreme Court (Cour de Cassation) that prohibited the share-
holder meeting from interfering with the board’s competences.338
Contemporary observers suggested that the law of 1940 had effective-
ly turned the relationship between the shareholder meeting, directors, 
and the PDG on its head.339
As described in the previous subsection, the 1960s are often 
thought to be the period when the institutional view of the corporation 
finally defeated the contractual view not only in legal theory, but also 
in the law. The 1966 reform has been described as endorsing it by 
creating a largely mandatory corporate law (the “institution”) that 
would protect minorities, creditors, and employees.340 More impor-
tantly, the core role of the intérêt social in the case law took root dur-
ing the 1960s. Besides its role in corporate criminal law already de-
scribed, there are various contexts in which it comes up. Among other 
things, it is used as the standard to which managerial decisions are 
held in liability suits, and it is also a component of the abus to majori-
té (abuse of majority powers) and abus de minorité (abuse of minority 
rights) doctrines, which are used to assess the validity of shareholder 
der the name of the ‘führer prinzip’ [sic!], that formula of the ‘président-directeur 
général’ that the Germans have never known”). 
336 See Leblond, supra note 302, at 29 (attributing the maintenance of the reform to 
a “post-war statist tendency”). 
337 RIPERT & ROBLOT, supra note 331, at 474-475. 
338 Cass. civ., 4 juin 1946, 1947 LA SEMAINE JURIDIQUE (JCP), II, para. 3518 (“arrêt 
Motte”).
339 E.g. D. Bastian, Case note, 1947 LA SEMAINE JURIDIQUE (JCP) II, 3518 (describ-
ing how different observers, in their interpretation of the law, either sought to ex-
pand or to limit its consequences). 
340 Jean Paillusseau, La modernisation du droit des sociétés commerciales, 1996 
RECUEIL DALLOZ SIREY, chronique, 287, 289. 
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resolutions (i.e. resolutions found to violate the intérêt social can be 
voided).341
Interestingly, the question of dividends, which had been con-
troversial both in Dodge v. Ford in the US and in the German debates 
of the 1920s and 1930s, is sometimes addressed by the abus de majo-
rité doctrine under French law, namely when the majority shareholder 
votes to retain earnings. While the power to decide about this issue 
has always remained with the shareholder meeting in France, the 
courts tend to find against the plaintiff minority, as judges usually 
consider the retention of earnings to be in the interest of the firm.342
The intérêt social serves as the standard to which the majority share-
holders’ decision is held. 
Nevertheless, the leading case that connects the notion of inté-
rêt social to a purported shareholder-stakeholder conflict, Fru-
ehauf343, was decided in 1965 and is as unusual as the sparse US cas-
es on the shareholder primacy norm. Fruehauf-France had entered 
into a contract to deliver sixty trucks to a customer who would ulti-
mately have exported them to the People’s Republic of China, which 
apparently caused some difficulty for its American majority share-
holder at home. The majority voted to cancel the deal, but the minori-
341 MAURICE COZIAN, ALAIN VIANDIER & FLORENCE DEBOISSY, DROIT DES SO-
CIETES 167 (17th ed. 2004).,For an abuse to found, the courts generally require two 
conditions to be met cumulatively, namely (1) that a decision was taken with the 
exclusive purpose to favor the majority (and harm the minority), and (2) that this 
decision does not respect the intérêt social. See C. cass. 18 avril 1961, 1961 SE-
MAINE JURIDIQUE (JCP), ED. G., II, para. 12164; Cass. com. 22 avr. 1976, 1976 RE-
VUES DES SOCIETES 479; Cass. com. 30 mai 1980, 1981 REVUE DES SOCIETES 311
(note by Dominique Schmidt); cf. Dominique Schmidt, De l’intérêt commun des 
associés, 1994 SEMAINE JURIDIQUE (JCP), EDITION GENERALE, I, 440, 441; Antoine 
Pirovano, La “boussole” de la société. Intérêt commun, intérêt social, intérêt 
d’entreprise ? 1997 RECUEIL DALLOZ 190, 194; COZIAN ET AL., id, at n. 354; see
also Conac et al., supra note 279, at 501. In other words, when a resolution is found 
to conform to the intérêt social, but favors the majority, it is shielded from nullifica-
tion, which has led to some criticism in recent years. See particularly SCHMIDT, id.,
at 318, 330-331, 339-340.
342 See MERLE & FAUCHON, supra note 291, para. 580; COZIAN ET AL., id., para. 
362. 
343 CA Paris, 22 mai 1965, JCP 1965, II, para. 14274bis; D. 1968, Jur. p. 147 (note 
by Raphaël Contin). 
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ty of board members (representing French minority shareholders) 
objected and asked the competent local court to appoint a preliminary 
administrator for the company. The Paris Court of Appeal confirmed 
the lower courts’ decision to that end, stating that the cancellation 
would have resulted in the ruin of the company because of the aliena-
tion of a major customer, and ultimately in the loss of 650 (French) 
jobs. Thus, the decision was found to violate the intérêt social. Even 
though the case became well-known344 and is still cited for introduc-
ing a new criterion into the evaluation of management decisions, no 
others followed.345 Like the American cases, it is easy to argue that 
the case represented rather a majority-minority conflict than a share-
holder-stakeholder one.346
Despite the significance of the criminal provisions drawing 
upon the idea of intérêt social, which are said to be of some relevance 
to the protection of creditors, commentators assert that it has not been 
all that important with respect to potential conflicts of interest be-
tween shareholders and other constituencies. Most of all, the Fru-
ehauf case, in which the court explicitly referred to the dangers to 
employees, remained largely without further jurisprudential conse-
quences, as it did e.g. not allow unions to challenge management de-
cisions on behalf of employees.347 The concept has been criticized as 
embodying outdated managerial ideas of the 1970s, when the intérêt 
social was used as “a curtain of fume behind which managers had 
ultimately considered the enterprise their own,” with legal mechan-
isms being built around the protection of the position of the dominant 
stockholder.348 In any case, the function of the standard seems to be 
mainly to restrain actions that deliberately harm the corporation, 
without being much of a check on business decisions, such as how to 
344 Cf. Raphaël Contin, Note, 1968 RECUEIL DALLOZ SIREY 148, 150. 
345 Claude Ducouloux-Favard, Actionnariat et pouvoir, 1995 RECUEIL DALLOZ 
SIREY, chronique, 177, 180; Philippe Bissara, L’intérêt social, 117 REVUE DES SO-
CIETES 5, 15 (1999) (both pointing out that the case remained isolated). 
346 See PAILLUSSEAU, supra note 306, at 199 (describing the case); see also Pirova-
no, supra note 341, at 190 (pointing out the political ramifications of the case). 
347 Pirovano, id., at 190. 
348 Pirovano, id., at 195. 
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best finance the company, which supplier to use, or how to organize 
the firm.349
The nationalization of many large French firms seems not to 
have played a significant role in the institutionalist movement in 
French thought about the corporation,350 as authors developing the 
theory rarely discuss it.351 Nationalized firms such as Renault were 
often directly run as an economic unit of the government and not as 
corporations. In other cases, the state was the only shareholder.352
Where minority shareholders remained, their relationship with the 
state majority may not have been all too different from that of a mi-
nority in a family-owned firm if the government used the firm to ad-
vance goals at odds with purely financial shareholder interests. How-
ever, managers in public-sector firms are usually thought to have 
comparatively large powers to act independently, even from the gov-
349 Bissara, supra note 345, at 16. 
350 While the Third Republic (up to World War II) was described as anti-labor up to 
the rise of the left-wing Popular Front in 1935 (ROE, supra note 9, at 70), the state 
began to play a major role in the French economy after World War II. Nationaliza-
tions began in 1936/37 with industries crucial for the military and transportation. 
See HAMEL & LAGARDE, supra note 323, para. 893. After the war, all firms “with 
the character of a public national service or of a natural monopoly” followed, as did 
some firms such as Renault whose owner was (possibly falsely) being accused of 
collaboration. See HAMEL & LAGARDE, id. para. 894; JEAN-FRANÇOIS ECK, HIS-
TOIRE DE L’ECONOMIE FRANÇAISE DEPUIS 1945, 13 (4th ed. 1994). Some firms were 
nationalized to aid the government’s planned reconstruction efforts, which suc-
ceeded and resulted in “Les Trente Glorieuses”, 30 years of economic growth after 
the war. See James A. Fanto, The Transformation of French Corporate Governance 
and Institutional Investors, 21 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 1, 32 (1995). Much later, the so-
cialist government under President Mitterrand took a number of large firms under 
the wing of state ownership in 1981/82. Fanto, id., at 33; Michel Berne & Gérard 
Pogorel, Privatization Experiences in France, CESIFO WORKING PAPER NO. 1195,
1, at http://ssrn.com/abstract=553952 (2003). On nationalization and privatization 
during the 1980s see also ECK, id., at 50-51. 
351 DESPAX (supra note 303, at 164-169) discusses nationalizations, but focuses on 
the legal aspect of nationalizations laws leaving the structure of the “enterprise” 
intact. 
352 HAMEL & LAGARDE, supra note 323, para. 902, 914. In the économie mixte the 
government merely took a majority share, but it was usually made sure that direc-
tors were appointed by the state. HAMEL & LAGARDE, id., para. 932; Fanto, supra 
note 350, at 34. 
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ernment,353 which would have put them in the position to advance an 
agenda centering on the “interests of the firm”, however defined. 
5.3. Dismissal ad nutum 
There is another aspect of French law that may explain why 
the “interests of the firm” as a guiding legal standard is less important 
than it might seem at first glance. Despite the establishment of the 
institutional theory in French corporate law in the 1960s, shareholders 
were always in the position to remove directors by a simple majority 
vote before their stipulated term of office. Ducouloux-Favard, writing 
in 1996, describes this revocation ad nutum as a characteristic of the 
contract of agency and a pillar of corporate law that remains inde-
structible.354 True, the 2001 NRE law355 resulted in some changes to 
the relationship between shareholders and managers. Previously, 
shareholders could directly remove the Président Directeur-General
(PDG, i.e. CEO) by revoking the appointment to the board of direc-
tors, given that he had to be its president.356 Now, shareholders can 
now only remove board members,357 while the managing directors are 
appointed, and can be removed by the board at any time.358 While the 
PDG may traditionally have enjoyed a particularly authoritative posi-
tion during the day-to-day management of the firm,359 this powerful 
position was undermined the majority’s removal power that French 
353 JEAN KERNINON, LES CADRES JURIDIQUES DE L’ECONOMIE MIXTE 88-90 (2nd ed. 
1994); Fanto, id., at 34-37. 
354 Claude Ducouloux-Favard, Les déviances de la gestion dans nos grandes entre-
prises, 1996 RECUEIL DALLOZ SIREY, chronique, 190, 191. In fact, several early 
proponents of the French institutional theory had recognized that the revocation ad 
nutum principle was untenable under the contrary position and called for legislative 
reform. See GAILLARD, supra note 292, at 120-123; RIPERT, supra note 298, at 119. 
355 Supra note 328. 
356 GERMAIN, supra note 325, para. 1685. 
357 Art. L. 225-18 al. 2 C. com. 
358 Art. L. 225-55 C. com. These rules are considered mandatory law. See MERLE &
FAUCHON, supra note 291, para. 386; GERMAIN, supra note 325, para. 1653. 
359 E.g. Alcouffe, supra note 291, at 129 (2000). On the transplantation of the Nazi 
Führerprinzip to France, see supra note 328-335 and accompanying text. 
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law always retained.360 The reform may in fact have slightly streng-
thened the position of managers by providing that premature removal 
from office may give rise to damages under certain circumstances. 
5.4. Conclusion: Another attempt to constrain sharehold-
ers through institutionalism 
French corporate law shares an influential institutionalist cur-
rent with German law. The development began in the 1930s and came 
to full fruition in the 1960s. French law shared many aspects of its 
historical development with German law, such as a period of volatili-
ty of ownership structures between the wars, and an ensuing debate 
focusing on the institutional nature of the firm. As in Germany, it was 
intended as a legal standard that would serve to defend the firm 
against individual interests of shareholders, an issue that was of little 
significance in the US. Again, the historical overview illustrates how 
the economic background variable of ownership structure influenced 
the debate. 
6. Emerging comparative patterns 
On the basis of these country-specific histories, we can identi-
fy some cross-country patterns. Section 6.1 summarizes the results of 
the US, German and French debates and puts them into comparative 
perspective. Section 6.2 further develops the main theory of this ar-
ticle, namely how pro-shareholder and pro-stakeholder (or institution-
al) arguments were employed to reach different ends in dispersed and 
concentrated ownership systems. Section 6.3 asks whether the histori-
cal debates had an influence on more recent developments. I suggest 
that there has been a change since the 1980s, to which a growing dis-
illusionment with the actual effects of institutional theories may have 
contributed.
360 See GERMAIN, supra note 325, at 453; Ducouloux-Favard, supra note 354, at 
191 (describing the possibility of removal at nutum as being at odds with the pre-
vailing institutional theory of the firm); Enriques et al., supra note 156, at 61 (not-
ing the non-waivable right in French law to remove directors midterm). 
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6.1. A transnational history of the debate 
The ultimate trigger of the debate was the development of the 
“great corporation”, characterized by a large capital basis, specialized 
management, and an increased detachment from its owners. Rathenau 
was among the first to recognize this when he spoke of the “substitu-
tion of the reason” (Substitution des Grundes) for the existence and 
role of corporations in 1917.361 He argued that the “enterprise” was 
essentially turning into an institution resembling the state,362 a pas-
sage that was later cited by Berle and Means.363 With his involvement 
in the New Deal, Berle similarly began to sympathize at least to some 
degree with a “public” function of corporations and directors, al-
though he thought that the shareholder primacy norm was necessary 
to curb managerial power. Rathenau pointed out that the development 
of large firms was already more advanced in the US and in Germany 
than in other countries including the UK and France, which may ex-
plain why these countries were the first to develop a debate.364
The rise of the large firm was a phenomenon common to the 
US and Germany, but apart from that point, the debates diverged be-
tween the two countries. Rathenau’s position seems to have been cha-
racterized by his personal experience on the board of what we would 
today call a Berle-Means firm, while most German firms had control-
ling shareholders, an issue that was picked up by subsequent legal 
commentators. Concentrated ownership may in fact have increased 
after World War I due to inflation (as it did in France in the late 
1920s). Berle and Means, on the other hand, identified a prevailing 
pattern of powerful management and dispersed shareholders that had 
already solidified. The distinction characterized the respective nation-
al debates: In the US, scholars were concerned by the quasi-political, 
361 See RATHENAU, supra note 166, at 8. 
362 RATHENAU, supra note 179, VON KOMMENDEN DINGEN, at 143; RATHENAU,
supra note 179, IN DAYS TO COME, at 121. 
363 BERLE & MEANS, supra note 7, at 352. 
364 RATHENAU, supra note 166, at 10. In the UK, the debate arose primarily during 
the 1970s, when the introduction of a mandatory employee participation system 
similar to the German model was discussed. See BULLOCK, supra note 262: Marsh 
& Locksley, supra note 262, at 49-50 (discussing the failure of the proposal).
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agency-cost driving power of managers, while in Germany, legal 
scholars picking up Rathenau’s ideas were concerned with the posi-
tion of large shareholders in corporations, and with their interference 
with the proper functioning of management. 
Mark Roe persuasively argued that American politics was his-
torically often turned against the power of large financial institutions, 
which kept them small and unable to become major shareholders like 
their European peers. Economic crises and corporate governance 
scandals led to the New Deal reforms, which helped to further ensh-
rine dispersed ownership.365 By the time of the economic crisis of the 
1930s, this structure was firmly entrenched (at least in the mind of the 
public debate shaped by Berle and Means). The political response 
was the New Deal, specifically the 1933 Securities Act and the 1934 
Securities Exchange Act, which partly addressed the concern about 
excessive power of managers by providing extensive disclosure. Most 
stakeholder concerns that might have arisen were overshadowed by 
the fact that the enshrinement of managerial power ensured the pro-
tection of legal capacity from shareholder influence and thus pro-
tected stakeholders’ expectations, while it exacerbated agency prob-
lems in the shareholder-manager relationship. In the following dec-
ades, scholars observed the power of managers and debated whether 
and how to constrain it, and whether political and regulatory interven-
tion was necessary to ensure that firms directed their minds towards 
the public policy concerns that their powerful position entailed. 
In Germany, managers were not seen as sufficiently insulated 
from the possibilities of blockholders to interfere. The 1937 corporate 
law reform, in spite of many ideological overtones, was ultimately 
pragmatic, as even hardened ideologues had to realize that large firms 
could not operate without tapping capital markets. The reform in-
tended to shield managers from shareholder influence and enshrined a 
corporate objective norm that went well beyond shareholder interests. 
Still, in spirit it was skeptical towards capital, and it was intended to 
foster managerial power. Concerns were raised not by the power of 
managers, but primarily by the power of capital, both to the proper 
365 ROE, supra note 10, at 51-123. 
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functioning of firms and the public interest.366 The attempt to contain 
it may have been a logical reaction. Blockholders persisted and con-
tinued to exert a strong influence on large German firms, which pro-
hibited the rise of a truly strong management. 
True, as in the US, there often was popular sentiment against 
big business in these countries; however, it was never directed direct-
ly against large blockholders, whose role was already entrenched.367
With structures of corporate control firmly in place, the reforms 
helped to solidify an institutional view of the firm that intended cen-
tralize power within the firm and to reduce the role of shareholders – 
quite the opposite from what was debated in the US. Codetermina-
tion, in particular its enhancement in 1976, was another reaction to 
capital against the background of raising political power of labor.368
At the same time, it strengthened the institutional view of the firm, 
which, however, remained overshadowed by concentrated ownership. 
Until the 1990s, when the importance of capital markets began to rise 
again, this view remained mostly unopposed. 
The French debate resembled the German one. French popul-
ism in the 1930s was directed against powerful families.369 Like their 
Eastern neighbors, French firms saw entrenchment through shares 
carrying a disproportional number of votes (which were prohibited in 
France in 1931/1934 and in Germany in 1937). However, only after 
World War II and a period of nationalization, French institutionalist 
theory solidified in the 1960s, with the intérêt social intended as a 
366 See FRIEDRICH KLAUSING, GESETZ ÜBER DIE AKTIENGESELLSCHAFTEN UND 
KOMMANDITGESELLSCHAFTEN AUF AKTIEN 56 (1937) (official report accompanying 
the 1937 act stating that “fundamental decisions regarding the fate of the corpora-
tion are made by the majority of the providers of funds, who are personally not 
responsible, who usually lack precise and competent insight into business and the 
firm’s operations, and who typically emphasize the concerns of capital.”) 
367 See ROE, supra note 10, at 212-216 (describing German “populism” and the role 
of banks). 
368 Mark J. Roe, Some Differences in Corporate Structure in Germany, Japan, and 
the United States, in 102 YALE L. J. 1927, 1970 (1993). 
369 Antoin E. Murphy, Corporate Ownership in France, in A HISTORY OF CORPO-
RATE GOVERNANCE AROUND THE WORLD 185, 188 (Randall K. Morck ed. 2005) 
(referring to prime minister Edouard Daladier’s famous criticism of the alleged two 
hundred “grandes familles” in 1930). 
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benchmark to resolve conflicts among shareholders. The debate was 
initially hardly characterized by shareholder-stakeholder conflicts; by 
contrast, adherents of the institutional school of corporate law were 
preoccupied with the protection of the firm from influence by share-
holders, which were seen as a danger to a prosperous development. 
As in Germany, the increased need to tap capital markets made the 
pendulum swing back in the other direction in the 1990s. 
6.2. Defending the firm against its shareholders 
Why was institutionalism brought forward as an answer to in-
terference of shareholders with management or from strife between 
shareholders groups? As explained above in section 2.3, economic 
analysis has brought forward reasons why it may be beneficial to set 
limits to shareholder control. Many of the arguments resonate with 
the historical debate: Tight monitoring may stifle managerial initia-
tive.370 Discord among shareholders, particularly when they are hete-
rogeneous, may hamper decision-making,371 which is a more signifi-
cant issue in a firm with various blockholders than in an “atomistic” 
structure where each shareholder will most likely be primarily interest 
in making a return on his or her investment. Controlling shareholders 
or coalitions of large shareholders may abuse their strong position in 
the firm to obtain private benefits, to the detriment of the minority 
and other stakeholders.372 Last but not least, to those who sought to 
make corporations subservient to public policy goals, financially mo-
tivated decision-making by shareholders was obviously an anathema. 
Table 1 summarizes the argument: Shareholder influence may 
increase the agency cost of debt, as managers are more likely to en-
gage in risk enhancement:373 The going-concern value of the firm is 
370 Mike Burkart, Denis Gromb & Fausto Panunzi, Large Shareholders, Monitor-
ing, and the Value of the Firm, 112 Q. J. ECON. 693 (1997). 
371 Bainbridge, Shareholder Disempowerment, supra note 62, at 1744-1751; Anab-
tawi, supra note 64, at 577-593. 
372 E.g. Shleifer & Vishny, supra note 153, at 754-755; Armour et al., supra note 
153, at 36.
373 See Hollis Ashbaugh-Skaife, Daniel W. Collins & Ryan B. LaFond, The effects 
of corporate governance on firms‘ credit ratings, 42 J. ACCT. & ECON. 203 (2006)
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more strongly protected if it is harder for shareholders to force the 
disgorgement of funds.374 Shielding corporations from shareholders 
allows long-term commitment of capital to the firm, which in turn 
may allow stakeholders to commit to their relationship due to lower 
risks for their specific investment.375
Ownership 
structure 
Effective 
controller of 
the firm 
Main problem(s) “Reformist” 
response in 
historical
debates 
Defense of 
the status 
quo 
Dispersed 
ownership 
Directors 
and officers 
 Managerial 
agency cost 
shareholder 
primacy
institutional 
theory of the 
firm / stake-
holders
Concentrated 
ownership 
Controlling 
shareholder 
or coalition 
 Controller’s 
private benefits 
 disruptive 
conflict between 
shareholders 
 holdup of 
stakeholders 
institutional 
theory of the 
firm / stake-
holders
shareholder 
primacy
Table 1 
In a dispersed ownership setting, managerial agency problems 
and the strong position of management in general were considered to 
be the main problem. The “reformist” position was therefore to con-
strain managers tightly, for which a shareholder primacy position 
seemed to offer the best option. An institutional or stakeholder theory 
focusing on the board of directors was typically a defense for incum-
(finding a correlation between block ownership and higher cost of debt, and a nega-
tive one for takeover defenses); on the debate in finance see also Roman Inderst & 
Holger Müller, Ownership Concentration, Monitoring, and the Agency Cost of 
Debt, WORKING PAPER (1999), at http://ssrn.com/abstract=190497; Michael Brad-
ley, Dong Chen, George Dallas & Elisabeth Snyderwine, The Relation between 
Corporate Governance and Credit Risk, Bond Yields and Firm Valuation, WORK-
ING PAPER (2007), at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1078463.
374 See Hansmann et al., supra note 74, at 1348-1350 (discussing the protection of 
the going concern value from liquidation). 
375 Blair, supra note 78. 
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bent managers. In a concentrated ownership system, disruptive influ-
ence of shareholders on the firm becomes a major problem, either 
because of a controlling shareholder, or because of disputes between 
shareholders. Thus, an institutional theory that reduced shareholder 
control seemed appealing as a way of shutting out the power of capi-
tal and as a guideline for the resolution of conflicts. For several dec-
ades, the “reformist” position was therefore the one asserting the in-
dependence of the firm. The point of my argument is not that the ma-
nagerial agency problem is unimportant in general, or in concentrated 
ownership systems specifically. I rather emphasize that the problems 
of shareholder decision-making power brought forward in the con-
temporary debate increase when a firm’s ownership structure does not 
resemble an atomistic Berle-Means structure, where everybody has 
merely a small financial interest, but when there are larger blocks, 
where the interests of blockholders, controlling or not, are heteroge-
neous. Against the backdrop of concentrated ownership structures, 
institutional theories were therefore more appealing. 
6.3. Does the theory predict more recent developments 
Do these patterns persist, and do they help us to explain con-
temporary developments in corporate governance? Is there still a con-
troversy between supporters of strong management and those of 
shareholders in the US, while in Europe advocates of institutional 
theories seek to expand the “independent” position of shareholders to 
the disadvantage of blockholders? 
For the US, the question is easily answered affirmatively. 
Since the takeover wave of the 1980s, the debate has most often 
emerged in the context of hostile takeovers. Such an event results in 
the replacement of the typical Berle-Means ownership structure by 
one dominated by a core shareholder determined to reshape business 
activities or even to break up the firm. The takeover wave of the 
1980s led to a backlash of law that is (at least superficially) pro-
stakeholder. In 1985, the Delaware Supreme Court famously estab-
lished a two-prong test for antitakeover measures in Unocal.376 First, 
376 Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985). 
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the board has to identify a threat, and second, its response must be 
reasonable in relation to the threat posed. Regarding the evaluation of 
the existence of a threat by the target board, the court explained that a 
number of elements were to be considered when evaluating a possible 
threat, such as  
“inadequacy of the price offered, nature and 
timing of the offer, questions of illegality, the impact 
on "constituencies" other than shareholders (i.e., cred-
itors, customers, employees, and perhaps even the 
community generally), the risk of nonconsummation, 
and the quality of securities being offered in the ex-
change” (emphasis added).377
When it further specified the standard in subsequent opinions, 
at least during the 1980s, the Delaware Supreme Court maintained its 
view that the interests of other constituencies are to be considered as 
objects of a threat which the board may resist.378 The Unitrin decision
of 1995379 further increased the latitude of the board by finding that 
defensive measures will only be prohibited if the court finds them to 
be draconian, i.e. “coercive” or “preclusive”. Similarly, in more than 
half of all states,380 a statute explicitly allows or requires directors to 
take the interests of other constituencies into account, with Delaware 
and California being the most prominent absentees. Groups men-
tioned apart from shareholders are employees, creditors, bondholders, 
377 493 A.2d 955. 
378 Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp., 535 A.2d 1334 , 1342 
(1987); Citron v. Fairchild Camera & Instrument Corp., 569 A.2d 53, 68 
(1989); Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1153 
(1989) 
379 Unitrin, Inc. v. American General Corp., 651 A.2d 1361 (Del. 1995). 
380 Jonathan D. Springer, Corporate Constituency Statutes: Hollow Hopes and High 
Fears, 1999 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 85, 125-128 (listing a total of 32 statutes, among 
those 30 constituency statutes and 2 statutes explicitly allowing to consider the 
directors to consider the corporation’s continued independence as optimally serving 
the corporation’s and shareholder interest). However, Nebraska’s statute was re-
pealed in 1995. Springer, id., at 95. 
MARTIN GELTER 8/19/2010 
89
suppliers and communities; some statutes mention broader societal 
interest381 or even officers of the corporation.382
The rhetoric employed by the Delaware courts, as well as 
some of these statutes, is often built on an institutional understanding 
of the corporation. Before enumerating the relevant constituencies in 
the quoted passage above, the court requires directors to identify the 
“threat posed” by the takeover bid to the “corporate enterprise.”383 In 
doing so, the argument is that the court may reasonably consider the 
interests of shareholders, including “short term speculators, whose 
actions may have fueled the coercive aspect of the offer at the ex-
pense of the long term investor.”384 This language seems to indicate 
that the Unocal court considered the entity aspect to be worth of pro-
tection, and that it views it as an amalgamate of the interests of vari-
ous groups. Very much in line with a typically American understand-
ing of corporate law, the board of directors is given a broad latitude in 
defining how exactly these interests are to be weighed. It is particular-
ly revealing that, according to the Delaware Supreme Court, Revlon 
duties apply when a corporation initiates a bidding process “to sell 
itself”.385 It would be hard to find such language in Continental Euro-
pean parlance, since logically only the corporation’s owners would be 
in the position to sell it. 
The Unocal court was also concerned about conflicts of inter-
est between long-term and short-term shareholders,386 as were Conti-
nental European proponents of institutional theories of corporate 
law.387 While Delaware leaves it to directors to resolve these conflicts 
by identifying a threat to the “corporate enterprise”, the European 
scholars looked to the “institutional interest” as a judicial guideline, 
381 JAMES D. COX & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, COX & HAZEN ON CORPORATIONS 172
(2nd ed., 2003).
382 Springer, supra note 380, at 125-128. 
383 493 A.2d 955. 
384 493 A.2d 956. 
385 Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1150 (1989); 
Paramount Communications v. QVC Network, 637 A.2d 34, 43 (Del. 1994); Omni-
care, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914, 929 (Del. 2003). 
386 493 A.2d 956. 
387 Supra sections 4.2 and 5.2. 
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which again underscores the different functions of the “institutional”
argument. 
In the two European countries, it appears that institutionalism 
seems to be losing the important role it once had. A growing number 
of legal writers now argue in favor of shareholder primacy.388 One 
explanatory factor could be the internationalization of the debate in 
the wake of ECJ case law389 permitting regulatory competition,390 and 
other forces of convergence. Policy debates are now often dominated 
by the goal of attracting international investment. Consequently, 
agency cost analysis has gained significance. A parallel development 
was the propagation of UK-inspired “codes of good corporate gover-
nance”, which addressed the grievances of institutional investors and 
swept the Continent in the late 1990s and early 2000s.391
Despite changes in some Continental corporate governance 
practices (such as the cautious withdrawal of German banks from 
extensive share ownership in industrial firms392), concentrated owner-
ship structures have largely remained in place so far. Nevertheless, 
388 For Germany, see supra notes 263-265 and accompanying text. For France, see 
Dominique Schmidt, De l’intérêt commun des associés, 1994 SEMAINE JURIDIQUE 
(JCP), EDITION GENERALE, I, 440-441; DOMINIQUE SCHMIDT, LES CONFLITS 
D’INTERETS DANS LA SOCIETE ANONYME 11-12 (2nd. ed. 2004) (both criticizing the 
prevailing interpretation of intérêt social as being too friendly to controlling share-
holders). 
389 Centros Ltd v. Erhvervs- og Selskabsstyrelsen, Case C-212/97, [1999] E.C.R. I-
1459; Überseering BV v. Nordic Construction Company, Case C-208/00, [2002] 
E.C.R. I-9919; Kamer van Koophandel en Fabrieken voor Amsterdam v. Inspire Art 
Ltd, Case C-167/01, [2003] E.C.R. I-10155. 
390 E.g. STEFANO LOMBARDO, REGULATORY COMPETITION IN COMPANY LAW IN 
THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY (2002); Jens C. Dammann, Freedom of Choice in 
European Corporate Law, 29 YALE J. INT’L L. 477 (2004); Luca Enriques, EC 
Company Law and the Fears of a European Delaware, 15 EUR. BUS. L. REV. 1259
(2004); John Armour, Who Should Make Corporate Law? EU Legislation versus 
Regulatory Competition, 58 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 369 (2005); Tobias 
H. Tröger, Choice of Jurisdiction in European Corporate Law: Perspectives on 
European Corporate Governance, 6 EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV. 3, 43-48 (2005); Mar-
tin Gelter, The Structure of Regulatory Competition in European Corporate Law, 5
J. CORP. L. STUD. 247, 253-264 (2005). 
391 See e.g. Ruth V. Aguilera & Alvaro Cuervo-Cazurra, Codes of Good Gover-
nance, 17 CORP. GOV 376 (2009). 
392 Cheffins, supra note 6, at 502-503. 
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some observers have identified a shift from “institutional” theories of 
the corporation to contractarianism in Germany.393 In France, criti-
cism against institutional theories of the corporation began to mount 
in the 1990s as well.394 Protection of individual shareholders in-
creased in the past twenty years in several important jurisdictions, 
including Germany and France.395 The UK model of requiring a man-
datory bid when a single shareholder acquires a controlling stake, 
which is arguably intended to protect small shareholders against large 
ones, was implemented throughout Europe through the Takeover Di-
rective.396
What are the reasons for this shift? Is it merely a change 
against controlling shareholders, resulting in a departure from institu-
tional theories to minority shareholders’ rights? The growing appeal 
of the American model may have played a role. Another factor could 
have been a growing disillusionment with institutional theories. Ger-
man and French commentators have both increasingly criticized insti-
tutional objectives to be too malleable, too unclear be workable for 
courts in practice, who are likely to accept a definition of the corpo-
rate interest suiting insiders.397 While there is no clear pattern in the 
outcomes of the court decisions discussed in this paper, legal stan-
dards such as shareholder primacy, Unternehmensinteresse or intérêt
social leave a lot of space for interpretation and argument. Since both 
managers and controlling shareholders are in a good position to make 
393 Klages, supra note 288 (suggesting that “corporatist” arguments have been out-
competed by “contractarian” arguments since about 1990). See also Roth, supra
note 31, at 64 (2010) (suggesting a trend towards “enlightened shareholder value”). 
394 Supra note 388. 
395 John Armour, Simon Deakin, Priya Lele & Mathias Siems, How Do Legal Rules 
Evolve? Evidence from a Cross-Country Comparison of Shareholder, Creditor and 
Worker Protection, 57 AM. J. COMP. L. 579, 609-612 (2009) 
396 But see Marco Ventoruzzo, Takeover Regulation as a Wolf in Sheep’s Clothing: 
Taking U.K. Rules to Continental Europe, 11 U. PENN. J. BUS. L. 125, (2008) (ar-
guing that the mandatory bid actual helps to entrench controlling shareholders).
397 For Germany, see Spindler, supra note 216, comment 70 (diagnosing a disillu-
sionment about the usefulness of the concept of Unternehmensinteresse among 
legal scholars); for France, see Schmidt, supra note 388; SCHMIDT, supra note 388 
(both criticizing the intérêt social as allowing too much discretion to controlling 
shareholders). 
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a good case to the court, the actual constraints for these groups is very 
small, if there is any. 
In shareholder-employee conflicts of interests, there were cer-
tainly more important regulatory incursions that limited shareholder 
power, most of all codetermination in Germany, and stronger em-
ployment protection laws in Western Europe compared to the US.398
These differences may also help to explain why shareholder primacy 
typically had the greater appeal in the US, whereas institutional theo-
ries have more often appealed to Continental European scholars. In-
stitutional theories of corporate law seem to precipitate rather than 
follow the full development of pro-labor laws.399 It remains to be seen 
whether the current American trend towards shareholder empower-
ment, which seems to be the consequence of increased significance of 
institutional shareholders, will lead to a backlash of stakeholder-
oriented thought. It is conceivable that the debate lost its vigor since 
there was less at stake with pro-stakeholder laws in place that gave 
them specific rights and were therefore actually enforceable. As 
Christopher Bruner points out in the context of the UK, the growth 
the welfare state may also have reduced employees’ need for protec-
tion.400 Today employees – the stakeholder group probably least ca-
pable of contractual self-protection – certainly have less need for pro-
tection than at the time when institutional theories arose. Fewer dis-
tributive gains may be available between employees and shareholders 
than in the past. It may therefore become easier to argue in favor of 
the protection of minority shareholders without interfering with 
stakeholder issues too much. 
398 See Gelter, supra note 6, at 168-173. 
399 In Germany, contemporary employment protection law has its roots in the years 
after World War II. The Kündigungsschutzgesetz (KSchG) was passed in 1951 to 
reunify laws in the Western zones. See Stefan Fiebig, Einleitung, comments 108-
113, in KÜNDIGUNGSSCHUTZGESETZ HANDKOMMENTAR (Stefan Fiebig et al. eds., 
2nd ed. 2004); see also 4 RECHT DER ARBEIT 61–63 (1951) (the official proposal), 
regarding codetermination, see supra note 156-158 and accompanying text. French 
employment protection law solidified in the 1970. See Gelter, id., at 171-172, while 
the institutional school in corporate law developed in the 1960s. 
400 Bruner, supra note 6, at 621-631. 
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7. Conclusion
This article took a “grand tour” through the history of the de-
bates about the goal of corporate law and objective of directors in the 
US, Germany and France. We have traced shareholder-stakeholder 
debates through history and the particular political circumstances in 
which corporate law developed. The roots of the debates in all three 
countries go back to the interwar period, with the German one begin-
ning the earliest, followed closely by the US. The French debate has 
its roots in the 1930s as well, but reached its peak only during the 
1960s.
While political and cultural factors have certainly played a 
role for the attractiveness of institutional and stakeholder theories in 
the two Continental European countries, I have attempted to show 
that differences in the underlying economic structure have at least 
contributed to divergences in their reception. Both shareholder prima-
cy and stakeholder arguments were intended to serve different goals 
in the debates of these countries, depending on prevailing (or per-
ceived) corporate ownership structures and distribution of power be-
tween management and shareholders. 
In the dispersed ownership system of the US, the main con-
cern was and is the unconstrained power of managers. In debates re-
volving around large American firms they largely served the mana-
gerial status quo. Shareholder primacy arguments tended to be 
brought forward in order to keep corporations and managers in check, 
while stakeholder arguments served as a managerial defense. By con-
trast, in France and Germany there was less need to tame Continental 
“giant corporations” and their managers, but rather a concern that 
firms needed protection from their shareholders, whose influence was 
considered detrimental by some early analysts of corporate gover-
nance. Institutional theories – coupled with stakeholder arguments or 
not – were intended to assert an independent position of the firm, and 
thus as an instrument to protect the most important economic vehicles 
of economic activity against capital. In practice, this project seems to 
have largely failed. Growing disillusionment with stakeholder theo-
ries – at least on the level of directors’ duties – and the increasing 
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attractiveness of the American model during the 1990s began to un-
dermine the role of stakeholder theories and became a force of con-
vergence in corporate governance. The future will show whether the 
current financial crisis will turn the tide. 
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